FRICA SOUTH

No. 4 July—Sept. 1959

Feature:

TRAL AFRICA CRISIS SECTION

Articles by: M. W. Kanyama Chiume, Kenneth Kaunda,
oshua Nkomo, Barbara Castle, M.P., and others

N OF SOUTH AFRICA 3/9
ITAIN AND AFRICA 4/-

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 75c
INDIA AND CEYLON Rs. 2.50

africa south

VOL. 3 No. 4 EDITOR: RONALD M. SEGAL JULY–SEPT.

CONTENTS

DEAR SIR ROY -
EMIGRANT SHIP *by Reginald Reynolds*
THE SENATE FARCE *by Stanley Uys, with a Cartoon by David Marais*
REVOLUTION: FURTHER REFLECTIONS *by Joe Matthews*
THE PLACE OF BOYCOTT *by Stanley Trapido*
THE AFRICANISTS CUT LOOSE *by Peter Rodda*
CONGRESS AND THE AFRICANISTS *by Walter Sisulu*
SPORTS TEST FOR SOUTH AFRICA *by D. A. Brutus*
ORLANDO REVISITED *by Anthony Sampson*
THE NYASALAND CRISIS *by M. W. Kanyama Chiume*
RIDER AND HORSE IN NORTHERN RHODESIA *by Kenneth Kaunda*
THE CRUCIBLE OF PRIVILEGE: SOUTHERN RHODESIA *by Joshua Nkomo*
AN IOTA OF DIFFERENCE *by Moses Makone*
PORTRAIT OF A FAILURE: SIR ROY WELENSKY *by Frank Barton, with illustration by David Marais*
AN INTERVIEW WITH TODD *by Denis Grundy*
NATIVES NO LONGER KILL TWINS *by Colin Leys*
LABOUR AND CENTRAL AFRICA *by Barbara Castle, M.P.*
CARTOON *by Vicky*
KENYA AT THE CROSS-ROADS *by Tom Mboya, M.L.C.*
A SOUTH AFRICAN IN NIGERIA *by Ezekiel Mphahlele*
THE UNITED STATES AT U.N.O. *by Winifred F. Courtney*
TOWARDS AN AFRICAN LITERATURE IX: THE TALE OF NONGQAWUSE *by Dr. A. C. Jordan*
BELLA *by Marianne Nordfors*
BOOK REVIEWS *by Homer A. Jack*

AFRICA SOUTH is published quarterly by Africa South Publications (Pty.) Ltd. Editori and Advertising Offices are at 2 Vlam Gebou, Parliament Street, Cape Town, South Afric Price per issue 3s. 9d.; 15s. per year, post free in the Union of South Africa. In the Unite States, promotion offices are located at 320 W. 87th Street, New York, N.Y., and subscri tions should be sent to Mrs. S. Pauley at that address. Price per issue 75c; $3 per year, po free. Entered as second-class matter at the Post Office at New York, N. Price per issue in the United Kingdom 4s.; 16s. per year, post free. Representative, Mi R. Ainslie, 31A, John Adam St., London, W.C.2. Price per issue in West Africa 4s 16s. per year, post free. Representative, Mr. E. Mphahlele, Dept. of Extra-Mur Studies, University College, Ibadan, Nigeria. Price per issue in South Asia Rs. 2.5 Rs. 10 per year, post free. Representatives, Messrs. K. V. G. de Silva & Sons, 4 Galle Road, Colombo 4, Ceylon.

DEAR SIR ROY,

r is six years now since the British Government collaborated
vith Central African settlerdom in forcing Federation upon some
ix and a half million clamorously hostile Africans. And for
ix years now a government geared to the 'maintenance of
ivilized standards' and pledged to a policy of racial 'partnership'
as had the chance to dispel that hostility, to prove its dedication
o those principles of Western culture that it sanctifies so
trenuously in its speech. Do you, the head of that government,
elieve that it has done so?

Nyasaland survives in the Federation today as occupied
erritory, its allegiance as sure and as lasting as the guard at
our detention camps and your army of occupation can forcibly
nsure. You claim the existence of a Congress-sponsored
nassacre plot as the excuse for the violence that you yourself
ave employed to retain the territory. And surely you must
rope at an excuse, for no settler in Nyasaland has been killed;
hough underneath the interminable explanation that you have
iled high upon them, lie the bodies of fifty Africans shot by
our security forces. The evidence you have offered for the
lot so far is flimsy enough, but doubtless you will supply the
Commission of Inquiry with less fragile furniture. Do you think
hat that is likely to acquit you? A people must be driven by
uffering headlong beyond hope before it surrenders itself
nally to violence. Would a campaign of murder satisfactorily
llustrate the loyalty that the Federation has earned from its
ubjects since its inception? Dominion status should wait upon
omewhat more convincing proofs of African allegiance.

Experience of your conspiracies in the past, however, promotes
sedulous scepticism. There have been too many Soviet plots
hat you alone have been able to discover; whenever African
eaders confer, you eavesdrop on a take-over bid by the Kremlin.
Does it not seem infinitely more probable that the campaign
ponsored by Congress in Nyasaland was no more than a pro-
ramme of civil disobedience? And who should be blamed for
nat? Can you say that you ever provided the people of Nyasa-
nd with constitutional passage-ways to political advancement?
ix years after your policy of partnership was born, some seven
housand settlers in the territory possess more power than its
wo million seven hundred thousand natives.

Having seen the strident career of white supremacy receive no

even temporary check during its years of trial, the Africans
Nyasaland may be forgiven for having wondered what co
stitutional protest was likely to accomplish for them. And
the 1960 Constitutional Conference approached, their distr
must have turned rapidly to terror, as they foresaw themsel
sacrificed finally to settler rule. How would you and the me
bers of your government have acted in similar circumstance
Your public admiration of the Boston rebels under George
would seem to commit you clearly enough to the principles
civil disobedience. Is it reasonable to abuse your subjects
drawing encouragement from your example?

Your associates in Southern Rhodesia have followed th
leader and thrown themselves head over heels into a riot
repression. They too claim a conspiracy of violence against t
State, though it must be admitted that they are either less aw
or much less able than yourself, for they have produced no e
dence at all and been unable to promise any. Having outlaw
the Congress movement and detained its leaders, they ha
busied themselves in disfiguring the statute book with the m
repressive measures that have ever mocked the principles
parliamentary rule. Outdoing even the Nationalists in mu
lating the rule of law, the governing party you control has provid
itself with powers of arbitrary arrest and made the most elem
tary African opposition into a criminal offence.

If its objects were to terrorise African sentiment into s
mission and break the hold that the Congress has upon Afri
allegiance, it has failed ludicrously in both. For far fr
stilling African hostility, it has inflamed it; while by arrest
moderates and radicals alike, it has offered its opponents
obduracy of extremes and united them on the rack of Congr
martyrdom. Above all, by preventing the Africans fr
organizing themselves peacefully for change, it has left only
avenue of civil disobedience open to opposition, and stimula
the very violence against which it now pretends that it
obliged to protect itself. When even boycott is banned a
political weapon, revolution remains the only recourse left
oppressed. Can that be what you and your accomplices actu
want?

What in all this have you gained? The shooting of African
white territorials from Southern Rhodesia has infuria
Nyasaland beyond the possibility of compromise, and mad
difficult for the most sympathetic British administration

oncede the ultimate authority over the protectorates that you emand. Can you really expect to wring dominion status from ne Constitutional Conference? When Britain will be standing rial before its Commonwealth? No doubt you can go it alone or a little while, governing Central Africa by the gun till the un cannot govern any longer and hostility spills over at last nto revolution. No doubt too you can postpone that calamity y abdicating to Dr. Verwoerd in a Nationalist-dominated union, wild final fling of white supremacy. But the price of that ostponement would be surrender to a double violence with all scape-hatches locked.

Consider yet, in the few months left of choice, the agony that nadows your present course. It is not only yourself, but the nree hundred thousand settlers who fumble after you that you re committing to calamity. But then perhaps one must stare alamity in the face, as you are surely doing now, to recognize its atures and find in them the courage to escape. Then indeed ne savage stupidity of what you have done will no longer natter, as a new society grows out of the rubble of the old, overing it over in time as a Troy upon Troy, Africa leaving its lood once again on the step below. But however you choose, frica will endure and advance by its very endurance, a continent limbing slowly on its knees. In the end, it is only your own art of it and the part that should belong to those who follow ou that you can destroy.

EMIGRANT SHIP

The Pilgrim Poppa, grilling manly torso,
Sprawls on the deck in Port-Said-purchased hat;
Here, by this floating Serpentine (but more so)
The Pilgrim Momma chides her Pilgrim Brat.

They talk of Wogs and Niggers, trash and treasure
And bargaining. The urgent wail of sex
And Tin Pan Alley stirs in strident measure
The unfulfilment of our lower decks.

They sense no lure in the Arabian magic
Vast, to the East, across the narrow sea,
Nor know the Western shore where, bright or tragic,
There swells a continental pregnancy.

The tales of Sinbad, scimitars and raiders
And of strong, silent Englishmen—each ghost
Is lost upon this lido, like the traders
Who still hawk bodies from the evening coast.

Tonight the dance, the celluloid emotions,
Bingo and cards and couples in the dark,
Where burning limbs (smothered in soothing lotions)
On passion's frail, synthetic tide embark.

I am alone. No destiny indentures
My foot-loose fortune to the Southern Cross;
Unlike the true adventurer's adventures
Mine is some phantom ship or albatross,

Or world of ancient mariners, whose histories
Still haunt such seas from the abyss of Time,
And out of Africa the ancient mysteries,
Old hopes, old fears, the Nemesis of crime.

For here, where once the seas were rent asunder,
I hear the bondsmen moan and Pharoah boast
Before those cliffs of water fall in thunder
Upon the chariots of the mighty host.

REGINALD REYNO

THE SENATE FARCE

STANLEY UYS

Political Correspondent of the 'Sunday Times'

No tour of the Houses of Parliament is complete without a visit to the famous enlarged Senate. The guide escourts his party to the public gallery and they peep down into the Chamber. He explains that there has been a big change. In the old Senate—the one which expired with the passing of the Senate Act in 1955—the 30 Government Members used to sit on one side and the 18 Opposition Members on the other. Now the Government has 78 Members, and they stretch up one length of the Chamber and down the other, leaving only a tiny corner on the President's left for the remnants of the Opposition—12 men clinging on valiantly, like the man in the cartoon dangling over a precipice and clutching at a stem of edelweiss.

The first meeting of the enlarged Senate in January, 1956 was a gala occasion. One of the newcomers was Senator Louis Weichardt, former leader of the Greyshirt movement in South Africa. "The Greyshirts," he explained, "were liquidated for something far superior to take their place." This tribute, presumably, was directed at the Nationalist Party of which he had now become a respected spokesman. Another newcomer was Senator Jan Grobler, one-time member of the Nazi-type "New Order," started during the war years by Oswald Pirow (now prosecuting in the treason trial).

Of almost every enlarged Senator it could be said, "thereby hangs a tale": Senator H. A. de Ridder, notorious for his anti-Semitism; Senator J. J. McCord, English in name only and author of "The South African Struggle," sometimes distributed free to visiting newspapermen to give them a proper perspective of South African history; Mrs. Mathilda Koster, the Nationalist Party's only woman parliamentarian—a solitary and reluctant concession to the emancipation of women; "Mussolini" van Wyk, etc. . .

The enlarged Senate costs £220,000 a year. At the last full-length session (lasting nearly six months), 4 Government Senators made no speeches at all, 7 made only one speech each, and 8 made only 2 speeches each. One Senator, beginning "I would like to congratulate the Minister . . .", spoke about 100 words in 7 minutes, and nothing else for the rest of the

session. He could calculate his emoluments at £3 the spoken word, or £285 the speaking minute. Commenting on an increase of £400 in the free trunk-line telephone calls made by Senators, the '*Cape Times*' said: "This raises the query whether some Senators perhaps talk more on the long-distance telephone than they do on the floor of the House."

In January this year, at the start of the Senate session, Senator J. M. Conradie, the United Party leader, moved: "That this House is of opinion that the Senate Act, 1955, be repealed and a new Senate constituted on a recommendation to be made by a Speaker's conference."

The motion crystallised the feelings of the entire Opposition, and of many Nationalists too. Introducing the motion, Senator Conradie quoted 'Dawie', the political columnist of the Nationalist newspaper, '*Die Burger*': "No one is in love with the Senate Act. Clearly, it is abnormal machinery necessitated by an abnormal situation. When the deadlock has been resolved, naturally, it will be possible to return to normality." That was written in 1955. In September, 1958, 'Dawie' was still writing: "It is no secret that, although I am a friend of various Senators, I am no friend of the Senate in its present form. As far as I am concerned, the sooner it can be reconstituted, the better."

Not only 'Dawie,' but Nationalist M.P.s too, have sniped at the Senate. At a meeting of the Nationalist parliamentary caucus this year, the Government Leader in the Senate, Senator Jan de Klerk (Minister of Labour), protested that Government Members of the Assembly were referring to their brother-Nationalists in the Upper House in "contemptuous" terms. The reason for this friction is well-known: having achieved parliamentary status through the medium of the enlarged Senate, the Senators have been casting covetous eyes on the more treasured Assembly seats.

The debate on Senator Conradie's motion was illuminating. Rejecting the motion, Senator de Klerk explained that the Opposition had "compelled us to make use of this remedy for the sake of the continued existence of a European civilisation, for the sake of this great and holy calling of a nation." If any change was necessary in the composition of the Senate, added Senator de Klerk, the Government would effect it "in its own time, in its own way and . . . when it may be considered necessary."

Even more illuminating, was the exchange between a Gover ment Senator and Senator Leslie Rubin, one of the four Senato elected by Africans.

Senator Rubin: "I am going to tell this House what I kno supporters of the Government are saying, and have been sayi since 1955. They say it even in this House, Mr. Presiden quietly, over a cup of tea. What they are saying broadly reflec an attitude towards this Chamber which varies from a feeling uneasiness about it to one of downright shame . . ."

Senator J. I. de Wet: "Israel calls the hon. Senator!"

Senator Rubin: . . ."they have failed miserably to do the duty as members of the highest House in the land."

Senator de Wet: "May I ask the hon. Senator a question?

Senator Rubin: "Yes, Mr. President."

Senator de Wet: "Can the hon. Senator tell this House ho much money he and his three colleagues here have made out the Coloured races?"

Senator Rubin: "That remark, Mr. President, will bear o something I have to say a little later about the degrading dept to which the standards of this House have been lowered since t Senate was enlarged."

On a previous occasion, Senator Rubin had been the object an adolescent Nationalist boycott because he had criticise certain members of the police force for their lawlessnes A Government Senator, H. J. van Aarde, had reacted calling upon the Government side to ignore Senator Rubin f the rest of the session. When next Senator Rubin stood to speak, the Government Senators rose in a body and marche out, scowling and muttering. Senator Rubin brought the hurrying back, red-faced and angry, by causing the quorum be to be rung. The farcical boycott collapsed.

Then it was Dr. Verwoerd's turn to renew the boycott. was then Minister of Native Affairs and Government Leader the Senate. This boycott was sparked off by a remark Senator Rubin's that, although some Government Senators we still walking out on him, he was pleased to see that Dr. Verwoe was not among them. Flushed with annoyance, Dr. Verwoe exclaimed: "If that's your attitude, I shall leave the Chamb immediately." And dutifully followed by a host of enlarg Senators, the future Prime Minister stalked out of the Chamb This boycott did not last long either.

The passing of the Senate Act in 1955 was a significant event

e regime of the Nationalist Party. It marked the end of one apter in the constitutional deadlock over the Coloured vote he Malan chapter), and the start of another chapter (the rijdom chapter).

Malan had tried, from the time of the Nationalist Party's cession to power in 1948, to secure the removal from the ommon voters' roll of the remaining handful of non-Whites—me 40,000 Coloureds of mixed descent living in the Cape rovince. The obstacle confronting Malan was the two-thirds ajority—of the Assembly and Senate sitting jointly—required y the South Africa Act. Malan never overcame this obstacle, id he went out of politics leaving a legacy of failures in the nsuing constitutional struggle.

His Bill to remove Coloured voters from the roll, passed by an rdinary sitting of the Assembly with a simple majority, was uled invalid by the Appeal Court. So was the fanciful High ourt of Parliament Bill, designed to constitute Parliament as a ourt of appeal superior to the Appeal Court (for the purpose of evalidating the Coloured vote Bill). Malan then sought the elp of Opposition Members, but the South Africa Act Amend-ent Bill, to repeal the entrenched clause affecting voting rights nd to validate the Coloured vote Bill, lapsed when the two-irds majority was not forthcoming. Later, the Appellate ivision Bill, to split the Appeal Court into two, was withdrawn y Malan when the breakaway Opposition group, the Con-rvative Party, failed to solicit sufficient votes among the pposition for a two-thirds majority. Finally, in 1954, the eparate Representation of Voters Act Validation and Amend-ent Bill was defeated at a joint sitting, in spite of the energetic fforts of the Conservative Party to procure the vital extra votes.

On this note of failure, Malan resigned from the Premiership. he significance of his methods was that, as he blundered from ailure to failure, he gradually abandoned the sledgehammer for ompromise.

Mr. Strijdom's particular contribution to the settlement of ie constitutional issue was to cut the Gordian knot. He ereby performed the first wholly totalitarian act of the ationalist regime. The Senate Act was not simply undemo-ratic: it was fantastically, brazenly so. It was more an act of iolence, a physical assault, than a legislative step. Malan had treated before this decision, but Strijdom had no qualms. le enlarged the Senate to provide the required two-thirds

majority; and, to be on the safe side, he thought, he also enlarg the Appeal Court. Strijdom's right-hand man in those days Verwoerd.

When the Senate was constituted by the Act of Union in 19 it was intended as a house of elders and review. Senators to be at least 30 years of age, and elected (not nominat Senators had to own immovable property in the Union wo £500 over and above any special mortgage. Strijdom fores that these qualifications would prove restrictive and he abolis them. A wild scramble followed among Nationalist Pa supporters for the Senatorships, and with 48 extra seats to d out, the Nationalist Party, faithful to the spirit of the Sen Act, charged £20, win or lose, for anyone entering the Senat ship stakes. Thus the enlargement of the Senate was not o politically profitable for the Nationalist Party: it was p profitable!

Originally, the Senate consisted of 48 members: eight elec by each province, eight nominated by the Government, f elected by the Africans, and two elected and two nominated represent South-West Africa. The election of the 32 Senat by the provinces was on a basis of a proportional representati When the Senate was enlarged from 48 to 90 Members, system of proportional representation was also changed to under which the majority party in a province took all Senate seats for that province. By this "winner-take-a system, the Nationalist Party emerged with 57 of the 65 s allocated to the provinces.

The present composition of the enlarged Senate is: Gove ment-supporting Senators of various kinds, 78; United Pa Senators, 8; Senators representing the Africans, 4.

One of the changes brought about by the Senate Act wa double, from four to eight, the number of Senators nomina by the Government to represent the non-Whites. The offi phrasing, taken from the Act of Union, was that they "shal selected on the ground mainly of their thorough acquaintan by reason of their official experience or otherwise, with reasonable wants and wishes of the Coloured races in So Africa" (by Coloured is meant non-White). Senator Ru took the trouble to examine the Hansard report of the Senate session (1958) to see how these four nominated Sena had executed their duties. He found that one of them had spoken once during the session; and that two others had spo

number of times, but that neither took part in the debate on ie of the most vital Bills, namely, the Bill to increase African xation. Senator Rubin also found that two of the nominated nators avoided speaking on another highly contentious measure, e Native Laws Amendment Bill.

"My point, Mr. President," said Senator Rubin, "quite mply is that Hansard shows quite clearly, certainly as far as that pect of their work is concerned, that far from these three on. Senators having done their work, they have failed miserably do their duty as members of the highest House in the land."

It should also be noted that a Nationalist who stood as an artheid candidate in the African elections to the Senate, and as defeated overwhelmingly, is today a Government nominated nator—"representing" the non-Whites.

The enlarged Senate is Parliament's constant embarrassment. xtra benches had to be fitted in the Senate Chamber, the dining om had to be enlarged, extra office accommodation had to be und in a building already bursting at the seams. Yet in their ur years of office, the enlarged Senators have performed only o noteworthy functions: they provided the two-thirds ajority required to give South Africa a pure-White voters' ll, and they helped to elect their former leader, Dr. Verwoerd, to the Premiership. Some say that the vote of the enlarged nators was decisive in Dr. Verwoerd's election. Noteorthy, but not notable, functions.

The term of office of the enlarged Senate expires next year, d agitation for its reform is starting up again. Next year, too, e four Senators representing Africans will be abolished under e mis-named "Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Bill." is will reduce the Opposition in the Senate to eight—all nited Party Senators from Natal.

The United Party, therefore, has a remedy in its hands. If the overnment fails to abolish the enlarged Senate next year, it n walk out and leave this grotesque institution to the Nationals. If it fails to do this, it will no longer have the moral right refer to the enlarged Senate as a farce, because it will have come part of the farce itself.

REVOLUTION: FURTHER REFLECTIONS

JOE MATTHEWS

Former National President of the African National Congress Youth League

It is extremely difficult to conduct a really profound and co prehensive discussion on revolution in South Africa tod Frank, open and unrestricted analysis is just not possible. T participants in the discussion who are fully aware of all inhibiting factors tend to leave much unsaid that could be sa especially if they do not themselves believe in the permaner of the Establishment. And the Statute Book is so strewn w broken glass, one must walk carefully not to cut one's fe

Certainly it would seem as if the first essential in the discussi is to make an attempt to attach a more precise meaning to word 'revolution'. Briefly a revolution is a rapid redistributi of power which is caused by the growing disproportion betwe the real strength of a new and rising class, and the amount political power allotted to it. And it is a change in econon conditions (a change in the methods of production, that which first shifts the balance of strength in favour of this n force. Thus a revolution always involves the displacement o ruling class by another class which does not have its right share of power.

Furthermore, the new class that is destined to replace the one in authority unites around it all other classes and interes constituting the vast majority of the population, that have interest in the replacement of the ruling class. The revolutio in other words, must be in the interests of the mass of the peop

The above description would exclude such phenomena as fascist dictatorships in Germany, Italy and elsewhere. Th dictatorships left the fundamental economic structure intact a sought to preserve the existing relationships between the class Their purpose was counter-revolutionary.

Examining the South African situation in the light of the abo definition of revolution, what do we find? What classes competing for power in South Africa? What are the prospe of revolution? Is it round the corner?

In considering revolution in the South African context, should beware of the racial approach—no matter how diffic this may be. In other words, the blithe assumption that

volution will be a simple Black versus White affair must not be cepted without much more thorough research. History lows of examples where White persons fought one another der the compelling pressure of economic forces despite the esence of a huge depressed non-White group in the same untry. One example that springs immediately to mind is the nerican Civil War. There is also our own 1922 rebellion. both the above instances it must be admitted that the oppressed cial groups played a negative, neutralist role. Still, this ould serve as a warning against the simple racialist thesis of volution. Racialism *per se* cannot be the main vehicle of volution. It can only be one of the objective factors that ight have to be borne in mind.

It is true that looking at the situation to-day it is hard to see w any sizable section of the European group will side with the pressed. But then—at the moment—conditions are "nor-al". Revolutionary situations are not normal.

I have not had an opportunity to study the work by Prof. inton, "The Anatomy of Revolution". Nevertheless I think at, with a few qualifications, the features of revolution which regards as essential can be conveniently used, even if just as basis of discussion.

It may be a complete misunderstanding of Prof. Brinton, t from glimpses of his work gathered in the article by Julius win which began this series,[1] my impression is that the aracteristic features of revolution are not treated dialectically. To say that certain well-defined circumstances must be present combination before an attempt at revolution is likely to cceed is not enough. The circumstances may not for in-nce be contemporaneous. The factor of economic develop-nt takes generations, and revolution may mark its climax. n the other hand, the factor of armed force may play no direct rt during revolution and a great part in the consolidation of e changes that result. Furthermore, there is the question the vital relationship between the factors that constitute a volutionary situation. They interact, each affecting the other, d the role of each will not be equal. It is thus not simply the ming together of four or five factors that produces a revolu-nary situation. It is a complex, many-sided phenomenon.

In our country the industrial revolution has considerably celerated the growth of those classes that will eventually have

[1] 'Revolution round the corner?' Africa South, Vol. III No. 1.

to struggle for mastery. True enough the whole country benefited from the prosperity of industrialisation. But in w proportions have they benefited? Has the percentage share the wealth of the country risen uniformly for all classes? one can deny that the actual earnings of African workers, instance, have increased during the last ten years. Yet, wh considered in relation to the wealth produced and the co tribution they have made to its production, their position worse than before. It is equally true that developments in last ten years have created tremendous potential opportuni for the middle and working classes among the oppressed peop but these classes have been shut off from sharing in and utilis those opportunities.

One very wealthy African medical practitioner, on be asked why he was so fond of buying expensive American c every year, replied, "a car is the only real home of an Afri which belongs to him". What he meant, of course, was t this was the only way of utilising the money available to h The facilities for investment in real estate hardly exist for African in South Africa. The aspiring African middle c cannot accumulate the capital necessary to develop an ent preneur class. And it must be remembered that real estat fundamental to the development of a middle class.

And a middle class must be distinguished from the compra stooge class that the Nationalist Government is trying to br into existence. Servile chiefs in the employ of the Gove ment, civil servants, traders whose progress depends entirely Government favours, patronage and hand-outs from the Ba Corporation, these can hardly be said to constitute a mid class.

Similar frustrations afflict the working class. The bulk this enormous group consists of Africans who produce m *per capita* than their brothers elsewhere on the continent. their advance into skills is taking place in spite of, not because the policies of the South African ruling class.

The proletariat and other labouring classes, together with middle class, are broadly speaking the classes that are emerg and destined to combine for the ousting of the present ru class. Examination of trends will indicate this, although must be admitted that pressure from them has not reac dimensions that present any immediate challenge. And pressure is daily building up. This fact is not altered by pe

m, or the failure of this or that campaign conducted by the erator organisations of the oppressed. To base the prospects revolution on the outcome of a single strike or campaign rays a clear superficiality of outlook.

t is worthy of mention that the Freedom Charter adopted by Congress Movement reflects precisely the aspirations of all striving classes for democratic change. That is why it is so iculous to describe the Freedom Charter as a Socialist or mmunist programme. As to which of these classes will be leading force in a democratic revolution, it is difficult to dict.

n the typical colonial situation, members of the foreign perialist nation do not settle in large numbers in the colony. small caste of officials and businessmen take up temporary idence; and much of the actual administration of the ntry, with its coercive machinery in the army, the police, the courts, is manned by the indigenous peoples. Naturally the clamour for independence grows louder, the imperialist ver finds a vast section of the machinery of rule in its colony oming increasingly unreliable.

n South Africa, on the other hand, the "foreigners" settled arge numbers and made the country their home. Because of s, it is possible to establish a complete monopoly of govern- nt, including all the machinery of coercion, in the hands of the lers. This appears to place the South African ruling class in inassailable position as long as the Whites are united. And it his factor which causes Julius Lewin to rule out revolution efinitely.

Closer scrutiny will show that this circumstance is only partly advantage. A metropolitan power has generally a secure ne base. Any difficulties in the colony do not result in ect disturbances at home. The enemy—the colonial people emain a danger at a distance. Let us take, say, the situation Algeria, which is not necessarily the best example. There, metropolitan power has poured in half-a-million troops to press the freedom struggle. The war is financed by the nch from a relatively undisturbed economy in France itself. n South Africa, however, the situation is totally different. ingle integrated economy dependent on the labour of what be called the colonial people has been erected. The onial people rub shoulders with their local imperialists to an r-growing degree; they are everywhere and in everything.

The imperialists have no base from which operations can conducted in relative security.

And that is the nightmare of the strategists of White supremi One can almost see the general staff of apartheid arguing favour of the creation of secure White bases in which there no Africans present; which do not depend on the Africans labour; which are not part of a mixed society. Is not perhaps the real reason for the suggested balkanisation of So Africa into White and Black areas, despite the clearly fanta nature of the whole concept?

The close juxtaposition of the imperialists and the colo people they rule within the bounds of a single state p problems as much for the adherents of freedom as for thos oppression.

Inefficient government as a revolutionary factor can mean one that ceases to obtain the co-operation, willing unwilling, of the population. It cannot mean inefficiency merely technical sense. It is probably best expressed in word "disintegration" used by Prof. G. D. H. Cole in article on this subject.[2]

The question still remains as to whether or not revolutio South Africa is round the corner. In the life of a people years is a very brief period. Is that what is meant by expression, "round the corner"? Or is it fifteen years?

No date can be fixed for a revolutionary outbreak, nor profitable to speculate on when it is likely to occur. Re tions are not made to order.

The true task of the democrat is to analyse the main fea of our socio-economic structure and to trace its developn For from this will emerge the changes needed in our soc and this in turn will raise the question of the forces that will to co-operate in order to make possible the re-organizati society on a different basis. Only from such an analysis flow the tasks and activities of the democratic forces i country today.

Faithful participation by all democratic forces in those and activities which face the freedom movement now is profitable than idealistic speculation as to whether o revolution is around the corner.

2 'The Anatomy of Revolution', Africa South, Vol. III No. 3.

THE PLACE OF BOYCOTT

STANLEY TRAPIDO
Lecturer in Native Law and Administration at the University of Cape Town

discussion conducted in '*Africa South*' on the mechanics of al change have assumed that the tactic of boycott will play important part in the struggle for emancipation in South ica. Non-Europeans have a long tradition of waging boycott paigns; and in attempting to discern the course of future itical activity, it might prove profitable to investigate this ory.

What do we mean by boycott? It is generally defined as a certed effort to withdraw, and to induce others to withdraw, m political, economic, or social relations with offending ups or individuals. It is a practice that has been resorted to, one form or another, for many centuries, though the term lf is of comparatively recent origin. Captain Boycott, an h landlord agent, had reduced the wages of his tenant farmers l compelled them under protest to complete the harvesting his crops. On rent day, Boycott sought to evict his tenants, o reacted by calling a mass meeting where Boycott's own ployees were pursuaded to desert him. In addition, the Irish tionalists launched a campaign to ostracize Boycott and his ily, the action being designated a "boycott" by Father John Mailley.

Boycott was often the only means by which the Asian peoples ld reply to the assault upon their countries by the Western wers. In 1905 the Chinese launched a boycott of American ds as a protest against the treatment of their countrymen in United States; and after the Nanking incident in 1929, a ilar boycott of British products was organized. The part ed by economic boycott in the struggle for Indian freedom well enough known.

Indeed the first non-Europeans to employ the boycott in th Africa were the Indians. In 1907, the Transvaal Indian mmunity, under the leadership of Gandhi, refused to register der the pass law regulations introduced by General Smuts. n years later, the first big African boycott took place, when ican mineworkers protesting against rising prices directed ir anger against the concession store-keepers with whom y traded. White reaction was to set the pattern for later

movements towards African economic advancement. The '*Natal Mercury*' wrote of "the sinister influence of the Industrial Workers of the World notoriously financed by Germany".

The first major attempt by non-European organizations to launch a political boycott came in 1935, at the time of the disenfranchisement of the Cape Africans, when Africans responded to the Hertzog-Smuts legislative programme by calling a series of conferences that culminated in the summoning of an All African Convention.

This gathering, probably the most representative of non-European leaders yet assembled, rejected the Government's proposals that a Native Representative Council be established as a substitute for the Cape African franchise. On this score the conference was adamant. Yet within a short while an African delegation, many of whom had been the leading spirits in the All African Convention, was surrendering the common roll franchise for the parliamentary seats (three in the House of Assembly and four in the Senate) provided under the Representation of Natives Act, and accepting the advisory Natives' Representative Council. For the next thirteen years the question of boycotting this differential representation was to haunt the non-European political scene since, for a variety of reasons, the African National Congress chose to accept the concessions.

Then, in 1943, the Smuts Government created a Coloured Advisory Council. The Coloured community, led by the Non-European Unity Movement, an offshoot of the All African Convention, successfully boycotted this advisory body, reopening in the process a vituperous debate on the advisability of supporting differential institutions.

The polemics in support of boycotting the "dummy institutions" insisted that the African leaders were playing the "herenvolk's" game. They were deceiving the African people into believing that they were represented in the Councils of State thereby blunting their potential militancy. The N.E.U.M. demanded the boycott of all inferior institutions in the strategy of total withdrawal. Such a policy, however, was diametrically opposed to that of the African National Congress which was quite unlike the N.E.U.M., committed to a policy of frontal attack on authority. The parliamentary representatives and the Native Representative Council, it was therefore argued, provided additional platforms for the political activities of Congress. The clear result was that the All African Convention and its

allies, in conformity with their policy of withdrawal, spent most of their energies in denouncing the African National Congress and its supporters.

The political boycott tended, therefore, to peter out in a series of destructive and sterile diatribes. Yet the militant language, if not action, of the Unity Movement was to have some small effect on the A.N.C. The Congress Youth League, influenced by some of the radical conceptions of the Convention, provided an important pressure group within the African National Congress; and as a result of its activities and influence, the Congress adopted its now famous Programme of Action. This set out a series of tactical weapons that might be employed by the A.N.C., including the organization of boycotts, campaigns of civil disobedience, non-co-operation movements, and one-day stoppages of work.

Clearly it was necessary that the Congress put its house in order. Just previous to this it had defined its attitude to the visit of the British royal family. "As a protest", they declared "against the barbarous policy of the Union Government" in denying elementary rights to Africans, and "in view of the fact that these injustices were perpetrated in the name of His Majesty, George VI", the Congress proposed to boycott the activities that surrounded the royal visit. Very little effort was made to organize the boycott, and in the end it was a miserable failure—so much so that the President-General of Congress travelled to Eshowe himself to meet the royal family.

At much the same time, however, the potential of the boycott was being demonstrated by the Natal Indian community. In 1946, the Smuts Government introduced the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act, which set out to deprive Indians of the unrestricted right to own land. In an attempt to sugar the pill, two White "Indian Representatives" were created; but the Indian community rejected both aspects of the legislation, and not one of the thirty thousand persons entitled to register did so.

The best known, and probably the most successful, application of the boycott tactic by the African people can be found in the innumerable bus boycotts, the first of which took place in 1943 when the price of bus fares between Alexandra Township and Johannesburg rose from 4d. to 5d. The poverty-stricken Africans retaliated by walking the nine and a half miles from their homes to the centre of the city where they were employed, and after

ten days the bus companies restored the old fares. In Novembe 1944, the companies again raised the fares, and before a boycot could be organized, the police placed a ban on all gatherings o more than twenty people. Nevertheless the word got round and for six weeks the people of Alexandra Township refused t use the bus service. Ultimately the companies gave way again and the fares were restored to 4d.

When, at the beginning of 1957, the fare was raised once more the people of Alexandra recalled their resounding sloga "Azikhwelwa" (we shall not ride), and were joined by th people of Sophiatown, Western Native Township, and Lad Selborne in Pretoria. A little later Eastwood, Germiston an Edenvale were boycotting their bus services, till finally th commuters of Jabavu and Moroka, whose fares had not risen came out in a sympathy boycott, together with Africans i Port Elizabeth, a thousand miles away.

The Nationalists hastened to change an economic boycot into a political show of strength. The Minister of Transport, Mr Ben Schoeman, returning from a visit to Europe, declared, " they want a show-down they will get it. The Government wi not give way, no matter whether the boycott lasts a month o six months." Throwing every weapon of mass intimidation the could muster into their campaign, the Nationalists tried to brea the back of the boycott. But in the end the boycotters wo and Parliament voted a subsidy for the bus company.

And it is not only bus boycotts that have been staged. Com mercial and industrial firms who chose to victimize strike found the non-European community boycotting their product

The Transvaal Chamber of Industries, in a confidential memo randum, referred to a strike of Indian workers in a textile facto during May, 1957. The strikers were *locked out* (a term which easily interchangeable with boycott) and replaced by Africa workers at lower rates of pay. The memorandum noted th the company was confronted by a deputation from the A.N.C the Natal Indian Congress, the Congress of Democrats and t Liberal Party, urging the company to enter into negotiatio with the Textile Workers' Union. According to the memora dum, the A.N.C. then wrote to the company and accused it employing African labour below the normal rates of pay order to break the strike. "The letter threatened", so t Chamber of Industries claimed, "that unless this practice w immediately ended, a boycott against the firm's products wou

e organized."

The Chamber was obviously perturbed by the "intervention f non-European political organizations in a workers' strike . . . nd more specifically the use of the boycott of products as a eapon to achieve settlement of an industrial dispute." The hamber of Industries could see the writing on the wall; it was vident that the non-European population was learning that "its urchasing power can be used as a weapon in its general political ruggle." The Chamber found itself conceding that boycotting as a fairly common weapon used in commercial circles, and nat there were also historical precedents where "the boycott as been used in South Africa by Europeans against Europeans, nd by Europeans against non-Europeans." The latter reference as to the vicious boycott of Indian traders led by leading ationalists, current as recently as July, 1957, when the Nasionale ugbond conference "viewed the support given to Indian aders by Afrikaners as a great danger to the Afrikaans people."

To date the leading exponents of the economic boycott have een the totalitarian clique who bring conformity to Afrikaans olitical, economic and cultural life. It is an axiom of the ociology of nationalist movements that they are closely associated ith, and are in fact channelized by, an entrepreneurial class. nd Afrikaaner nationalism is no exception. In 1939, an Eko- omiese Volkskongres brought together Nationalist politicians, nanciers and ideologists. Politicians like Drs. Verwoerd, önges, Van Rhijn and Diederichs were present, while financier . S. Louw played an important part with I. M. Lombard, putedly secretary of the Broederbond. The Nationalist machine t to work eagerly. Every effort was made, to quote the leading frikaner Nationalist financier M. S. Louw, to channelize Afrikaner savings in Afrikaans financial institutions." The frikaner Nationalist was induced to insure only with Afrikaner surance companies, to bank only with Afrikaner banks, to uild his home through Afrikaner building societies. It was Dr. iederichs, now Minister of Economic Affairs, who told the konomiese Volkskongres: "As regards the relationship between siness and sentiment, it has been our standpoint that business uld not be based purely on sentiment, but that an Afrikaner siness could in no way exist without sentiment." To this end rge sums were set aside for propaganda purposes, the racist tionalist press put in harness, and the innumerable cultural ganizations that lead to the Nationalist machine busily

employed. From the pulpit and the classroom the call went fort to urge Nationalists to buy Afrikaans and not to purchase fro firms hostile to "the Afrikaans way of life". If there were sti any doubts as to the relationship between Nationalist busine concerns and the Nationalist political ideology, a recent pro nouncement by M. S. Louw must have dispelled any remainin illusions. "If we (the Nationalists) want a republic", he state "we must see that our economy is more independent."

It is clear that the Nationalist political machine and Nationali capitalism are very closely related. The police state created b the Nationalist Government has left very few legal channe open to the opponents of apartheid, but, for the time being boycott remains. Because the Nationalists have in the pas made no distinction between their economic and politica objectives, they are now in a particularly vulnerable position. A the Chamber of Industries noted, "the non-European populatio is learning that its purchasing power can be used as a weapo in its general political struggle." And this purchasing power enormous. The 1957 president of the Association of Chambe of Commerce, Mr. W. P. Rousseau, stated that African purcha ing power for the year of his term of office was £365,000,00 or a quarter of the total national income.

In the past, whilst Nationalist capital was still in its embryoni stage, it needed only to call upon the "volk" to support i business and financial institutions. This, however, is no longe the case. If these institutions are to progress, they must have wider appeal and they are now engaged in attempting to captu the non-White market. The macabre irony of the non-Europea population paying for its own subjection may not have occurre to the Nationalists. It has certainly occurred to the leaders the Congress movement. Hence their call for a nation-wid economic boycott of business houses that are dominated b leading Nationalists. In the past other pressures have failed t convince the Nationalists of the malignancy of their ways. It possible that an economic boycott will go a long way to creati the environment in which social change will take place. Micha Harmel has put the point well. "There have been", he note "plenty of examples in history where a combination of facto have been compelling enough to make a ruling class give wa for urgent and overdue changes, without dragging the peop through the agony of civil war." Boycott alone will not achie this end—but it could very well provide one of the factor

THE AFRICANISTS CUT LOOSE

PETER RODDA

Our special correspondent at the recent Africanist Conference.

While White South Africa celebrated the Van Riebeeck week-end (4th—6th April) with volkspele, sport and sun-bathing, the Africanist movement, which had broken away from the African National Congress five months previously, held its inaugural conference in Johannesburg's Orlando Township.

Although the conference answered some important questions about the nature of the movement, a number of important problems remain unresolved. Perhaps its most significant event was the virtual repudiation of the movement's semi-articulate wildman, Josias Madzunya, who failed to gain a place on the executive of what now calls itself the Pan-Africanist Congress. Madzunya's hysterical pronouncements on "God's apartheid", (Africa for the Africans, Europe for the Europeans, Asia for the Asians), and his overt racialism had severely embarrassed his less bitter colleagues. Madzunya pledged himself to the movement he had helped to forge, unilaterally appointing himself its 'watchdog", but it is certain that his star is at least temporarily very much on the wane. And with the shelving of Madzunya, the new leaders of the movement have moved to the fore from the shadows of theory. Passionate but restrained, young, fluent, sophisticated and well-educated, the first president, Robert Sobukwe, a lecturer at the University of the Witwatersrand, appears the embodiment of the reigning group in the movement.

Sobukwe delivered a weighty theoretical address to the conference at its opening session, but in the events leading up to his address clues to the less philosophical elements of African-ism had been revealed. First, an emotional and sometimes eccentric and exclusive Christianity. Three ministers graced the platform, and in prayers and addresses they referred to "the hooligans of Europe who killed our God and have never been convicted" and the legend of Christ's education in Africa, while cheers greeted the salute to "a black man, Simon of Arabia, who carried Jesus from the Cross". A rather sinister post-conference article in '*The World*' discusses the formation of an African national church which "would play a leading role in Africanist affairs, just as the Dutch Reformed Church did in Nationalist Party affairs". The movement's religious overtones

obviously tie up with its anti-Communism: "In our conferenc and meetings there is no place for God . . . The younger gener tion is turning away from God . . . Because of ideologies mar people have been led away from God," said the ministers.

Then there is the Africanists' claim to be more in tune wi events throughout the rest of Africa than the A.N.C., manifest in their invitations to Dr. Banda and then Kenneth Kaun to open their conference. The recipients of the invitation being in "detention" at the time, could not be present, b the delegates were assured that they were there in spiri Manifested, too, in the obviously sincere pleas that appeared banner form and decorated the conference hall—"FRE BANDA, KENYATTA, KAUNDA," "IMPERIALISTS QU AFRICA," "AFRICA FOR AFRICANS, CAPE TO CAIR MOROCCO TO MADAGASCAR," and the triumphant readi of telegrams of good wishes from Dr. Nkrumah and Sékou Tour

And then the conference took some time to shake off the feeli that the movement's disapproving elder brother, the A.N.C was watching over its shoulder; and the turbulence of its brea away led to a feeling that the A.N.C. might attempt to disru their conference in return for the torrid time the Africanis had given the A.N.C. leadership last year. So when a group singing delegates arrived late there was a scramble to man t defence barricades. The A.N.C. had proved its point.

It was only when Sobukwe began his long address that t Africanists appeared to attain an independent status. In elabora political terminology he put forward the Africanist creed, wi former treason-trialist, A. B. Ngcobo, interpreting into Zu with great mental agility and gesticulatory acrobatics su expressions as "epoch-making achievements", "employ brin manship stunts", "the false doctrine of African exceptionalism

The Africanist stand on contemporary international politi said Sobukwe, was that of positive neutralism, borrowing t best from East and West; believing in political democracy defined in the West, but favouring a more equitable distributi of wealth. He refuted racial myths, and cheers greeted his sta ment that no race was superior or inferior. However, "in Sou Africa we recognize the existence of national groups which a the result of geographic origin . . . The Europeans are a fore group with exclusive control of political, military and econon power . . . True democracy can only be established when t African group comes into its own. Freedom of the Afric

only be established when the African group comes into its n. Freedom of the Africans means freedom of every one, luding Europeans in this country . . . People will live and be erned as individuals, and not as sectional groups. We reject rtheid and so-called multi-racialism. Multi-racialism is dering to European arrogance, a method of safe-guarding ite interests. The logical meaning of multi-racialism is portional representation, and implies basic differences between ional groups . . . and that the best course is to keep them rt in a form of democratic apartheid . . . We believe that ryone prepared to accept and give loyalty to Africa is an ican."

The few important gaps in the theory of the Pan-Africanists been provided in an earlier address by Mr. Zack Mothopeng, r to be elected to the organization's national executive. He there could be no co-operation at this stage between the icanists and Whites until the contradictions between the ional groups had been resolved by the Africans. The African-, he said, wanted a non-racial democracy in which the African jority would rule. They did not believe in race, only in nanity.

Many have encountered, but few have commented on, the antic revolution that accompanies the political revolution are living through in Africa. Sometimes one feels sheer rchy is loosed upon the world of language. The Africanists port the derogatory connotations of the term 'multi-racialism' n other parts of Africa, where British colonial practice has ned it into a swear-word, and use them against the Congress vement. So to them the term means "racialism multiplied", ile to White supremacists it means miscegenation rampant. And herein perhaps lies the Africanist's greatest responsibility: resist the temptation to manipulate language and encourage rds like "African" to mean all things to all men. If they are ere in their refutation of "race", then they should encourage icans of Indian, English, Dutch and other extractions to them, instead of vigorously discouraging them as they are ng now. It is disquieting that there are men in their ranks like dzunya, who is on record as saying "no White man is sincere." ir present policy sounds dangerously like the statement of ndell, who once justified the policy of a party he led in va which preached multi-racialism, but was only open to ites, by saying, "The Party may open its membership to

Africans and other non-Europeans when the multi-racial nati has been achieved." The Africanist line implies somehow fir and second-class Africans, with skin-colour being a factor classification. In other words: "All who give their allegiance Africa are Africans, but some Africans are more African th others." And their substitution of group generalizations—th are surely equally fallacious—for racial generalizations appe still to over-simplify the South African situation. There can no short-cuts to democracy.

On political commentators, too, lies a heavy responsibility that of deciding whether the new movement can become t purveyor of a "nationalism" unique in the world's history "continentalism" with an ideological foundation, or writing off as the mere chauvinism into which it could, of cour degenerate. And if it should fall between the two and prove be a virile inclusive black nationalism, it will be necessary these commentators to come to terms with it and help others do so. Fatal to this would be the confusion of majority nation ism with threatened, vicious, exclusive minority nationalis a misunderstanding which would encourage black nationali to take on the trappings of the Afrikaner variety.

The Pan-Africanist Congress is still in its formative stages, a has yet to become a serious force. Policy on means rema uncertain; if those Africanists who refuse co-operation common grounds with other organizations have their w then the movement seems bound to end up in negative, isola theorizing, a nuisance to all except the supporters of the *st quo*. They plan a mass recruiting campaign, for at present th numbers are negligible. (Controversy raged at the confere as to the number of delegates present, and how many they rep sented, but it was largely a splitting of hairs).

The history of the A.N.C. reveals the constant failure dissident and splinter groups to effectively challenge it, and ability to tighten up in the face of criticism. Something should be seriously considered by all of us in Congress is elimination of the movement's internal colour-bar. This b move, however difficult to implement, would be a mig blow against racialism, and would also cut the ground from un the feet of the Africanists who claim that we subtly bolster apartheid. The historic reasons for this structure have cle disappeared.

CONGRESS AND THE AFRICANISTS

WALTER SISULU

mer Secretary-General of the African National Congress. Now banned from holding office and standing trial on a charge of High Treason.

recent months much has been published in the South African ress about the 'Africanists' and their attempt to capture the adership of the African National Congress. The struggle ached a climax at the Transvaal Provincial Conference of e A.N.C., held under the auspices of the National Executive on the 1st and 2nd November, 1958. The Africanists tempted to "pack" the conference, but most of their supporters failed to qualify as delegates. They then tried to break the conference by force, and, when this attempt was defeated, ey withdrew, announcing that they were leaving Congress and tended forming a new organisation.

The whole affair has been much exaggerated in the newspapers, pecially in the so-called 'Bantu' press. Newspapers tend to rive on sensations, and some of them were obviously motivated malice towards Congress and a desire to emphasise and add to difficulties. In reality, the Africanists were never able to uster much support or gain much influence in the A.N.C. eir departure has greatly pleased the great majority of ongressmen, who regarded them as a noisy and disruptive ique, and who consider all the talk of a "major split" in ongress as absurd.

It is unlikely that the Africanists will make much progress or aintain much cohesion among themselves now that they have ft Congress. They appear to have little or nothing in the way a constructive policy or original programme to offer to the blic. They have had a lot to say, it is true, but so far it has en exclusively destructive and critical of Congress leadership. l the leaders have shown themselves to be quarrelsome, ruly and ambitious; one doubts whether they will ever achieve uch agreement on aims and leadership.

Yet it would be wrong for any student of politics in this untry to ignore the significance of this development. Even ough the Africanists have not evolved any definite programme d policy, the general trend of their ideas is manifest: it lies a crude appeal to African racialism as a reply to White rogance and oppression. The principal target of their attacks the broad humanism of the African National Congress, which

claims equality but not domination for the African people, regards South Africa as being big enough and rich enough sustain all its people, of whatever origin, in friendship and pea

This broad outlook of Congress finds its clearest expressio the opening sentence of the Freedom Charter, which bol declares that "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, Bl and White". It is precisely this formulation which is m strongly attacked by the Africanists. In their letter of cession from the A.N.C., they declare that "the Klipto Charter" is "in irreconcilable conflict" with the 1949 Congr "Programme of Action", "seeing that it (the Freedom Chart claims that the land no longer belongs to the African peo but is auctioned for sale to all who belong to this countr Leaving aside the inflated polemical language of this statem (characteristic of all "Africanist" writings), the intention clear: it is a denial that any section of the population other t the descendants of indigenous Africans have any rights in country whatsoever.

There are several other issues used by the Africanists in th attacks on A.N.C. leadership and policy. They bitterly nounce the Congress Alliance—the working partnership wh has developed between the A.N.C. and the Indian Congr the (White) Congress of Democrats, the Coloured Peop Organisation and the Congress of Trade Unions. They that the alliance "waters down African nationalism", and cha that it is dominated by the Whites of C.O.D. and the Indian the S.A.I.C. They say that the Whites in the alliance are sincere and cannot be relied upon in the struggle to end W supremacy. They say that the A.N.C. leadership is C munistic and out of step with the nationalist movement in rest of the continent, which has no alliance with other ra groups. They say that the Congress leadership has abando traditional Congress policy "as it was formulated in 1912", that they, the Africanists, are "launching out as custodians' that policy (Letter of Secession, November, 1958).

In the first place, it should be stated as emphatically as poss that the Africanists' principal charge—that Congress departed from its traditional purpose and policy—is untrue unfounded.

The constituent Conference of 1912, at which the Afr National Congress was established, set forth the follo objectives:—

(1) To unite all the various tribes in South Africa;
(2) To educate public opinion on the aspirations of the black man of South Africa;
(3) To advocate on behalf of the African masses equal rights and justice;
(4) To be the mouthpiece of the African people and their chiefs;
(5) To represent the people in government and municipal affairs;
(6) To represent them in the Union Parliament, and generally, to do all such things as are necessary for the progress and welfare of the African people.

Within the framework of these broad general objectives, ngress has continued steadily, up to the present day. It has nsistently demanded "equal rights and justice". It has ver advocated the replacement of exclusive rights for Whites, established by the Union's Constitution, following the pre-dent of the two Boer Republics, with exclusive rights for ricans as now proposed by the "Africanists". In putting rward this conception, it is they who are departing from the iginal objectives and purposes of the founders of Congress; is the present Congress leaders who are the true continuers d custodians of those purposes and traditions.

An important policy statement, known as the "Bill of ghts", was drawn up in 1943 by a committee composed of ading Africans from various parts of the Union. It was ued by the A.N.C. at the time, in a pamphlet entitled African Claims", as a formal statement of Congress policy. declared, *inter alia*:

"We, the African people in the Union of South Africa, urgently demand the granting of full citizenship in South Africa. We demand abolition of discrimination based on race, and the extension to all adults regardless of race of the right to vote and be elected to Parliament, Provincial Councils and other representative institutions. We demand the right to an equal share in all the material resources of the country. We demand a fair redistribution of the land as a prerequisite for a just settlement of the land problem."

Finally, I may cite the Programme of Action of 1949, which e Africanists continually declare to be inconsistent with the eedom Charter, and which they claim as "their own" pro-amme. "In 1949 we got the African people to accept the tion-building programme of that year," declares the Afri

canists' letter of resignation of last November. Actually 1949 Programme of Action was a regular Congress docume adopted at a national conference on the initiative of the Congr leadership and issued over the signature of the present writ Only one or two of the Africanists had any hand in it.

The 1949 "Programme" was really a plan of work, deal mainly with proposed methods of struggle, such as strik civil disobedience and boycotts, but it opened with a sh political preamble. This preamble consists primarily of endorsement of the "Bill of Rights," cited above, and emp sised the demands for the immediate abolition of all criminatory laws and the participation of Africans in all Coun of State.

The Freedom Charter of 1955 is in a direct line of success to the various documents cited above, and to the many ot statements of Congress policy and principle down the yea Beginning with the statement that South Africa belongs to people who live in it, but that our people have been robbed their birthright to land, peace and liberty by an unjust form government, it goes on to claim that every man and woman sh have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate for elect to all bodies which make laws, and that the rights of all peo shall be the same, regardless of race, colour or sex. Charter goes on to demand equality in every sphere of life, its ten famous chapters, which are identical in spirit and clos parellel in content to the eleven points of the "Bill of Right as published in "African Claims", and specifically endorse the 1949 "Programme of Action".

The above, of course, is no more than a brief sketch of evolution of Congress policy down the years. Nevertheles is sufficient to demonstrate amply that, while A.N.C. po has naturally evolved down the years, in changing circu stances at home and abroad, becoming more detailed and clea in formulation, it has retained throughout a fundamental c tinuity and consistency which is striking and remarka Tested against the facts, the Africanists' accusation that Cong has departed from its traditional programme connot be sustain

Nor is it true that the African National Congress has pursued a line of exclusive "Black chauvinism" and host to other racial groups, as now advocated by the African From its earliest days, Congress has rejected the whole ideo of "master races" and "servant races" as expressed in

stitution and structure of the Union It has repudiated the of "driving the White man into the sea" as futile and rionary, and accepted the fact that the various racial groups outh Africa have come to stay. It has consistently sought o-operation of other political groups and other races, of ious, liberal and leftist groups and organisations, in its struggle reedom and equality. Indeed there was a time when the gress leadership, contrasting the relatively enlightened y of the "liberal Cape" with the blatant "inequality in ch and State" of the northern republics, placed too heavy liance upon the goodwill of White leaders, and tended to t to such early manifestations of 'apartheid' as the 1913 l Act by sending futile deputations and appeals to Whitehall. the disillusioning years that followed, the African people Congress have learned to put their trust not in aid from rs, but in their own strength and organisation. Neverthe- Congress has at all times welcomed and taken the initiative chieving co-operation with other organisations representing rent population-groups, provided always that such co- ation was on a basis of equality and disinterested adherence mutual aims. It is this consistent Congress policy of unity anti-racialism which has borne fruit in the present-day gress alliance, which is continually broadening its scope winning the support and allegiance of increasing numbers of h Africans, and which has won the A.N.C. world-wide iration and respect. This policy enjoys the support of the whelming majority of the Congress membership, who gnise it as being in the best traditions of the organisation. y attempt by the Africanists to reverse the policy of alliance replace it with one of narrow sectionalism and exclusiveness been crushingly rejected by the membership in provincial national conferences.

hus, the co-called "African nationalism" of the Africanists s out to be a mere inverted racialism, foreign to the spirit traditions of the African people, and more in line with the kaner Nationalist Party than with the progressive liberationist onalism of Congress. This type of racial exclusiveness has n condemned the world over, and not least by the pro- sive African national movements of this continent. The nt All-African Peoples' Conference at Accra roundly demned, in a formal resolution,

the practice of racial discrimination and segregation in all its

aspects, all over the world.''

The fact that, due to differences of historical development a present conditions, African liberationist movements in ma other parts of the continent have not found allies in their strug among other population groups, unreservedly accepting equali self-government, independence and democracy as their p gramme, is unfortunately misunderstood or distorted by t Africanists to imply that they oppose such alliances on princip Nothing could be further from the truth. Africa and its peop have suffered too much in the past from racialism and t ''master race'' ideology to adopt any such dangerous doctrin Nothing has brought greater credit to the A.N.C. in the e of Africa and the world than its steadfast refusal to respond the vicious persecution of the Nationalists and their p decessors in the Union Government by a blind and irratio ''anti-Whiteism''. It has shown the African people to larger-minded than, and morally superior to, their oppresso it strikingly refutes the ridiculous claims of ''White South Afric about alleged African ''immaturity'' and ''unreadiness for se government.''

The isolation and repudiation of the Africanists became m complete with their open sabotage of the Congress cause af the National Workers' Conference of March, 1958. T A.N.C. and the other Congresses had decided to demonstr during election week against the undemocratic travesty o ''General Election'' which debarred the majority from participation. All the forces of oppression were mobili against the proposed demonstration. The Prime Minis threatened retaliation ''with the full might of the State''. T United Party called upon the Government to take firm act against Congress. The police force, the Native Affairs Dep ment, and the army were called into action against the propo general strike. Newspapers, ranging from the Nationalist United Party dailies down to the so-called 'Bantu' pr preached continually and vociferously against Congr Employers of labour and Verwoerd's ''loyal chiefs'' added t threats and warnings.

When the Africanist leaders Madzunya and Leballo joine this all-out campaign against the people, they were hailed in daily papers as ''the most responsible and powerful Na leaders''. Overnight they had become heroes to the uphol of White supremacy. And overnight they forfeited whate

ll respect or confidence they might still have enjoyed within ranks of Congress.

ongress is a broad and tolerant organisation, firmly wedded democratic principle and refusing to impose any single blogy upon its members. But, at the same time, the A.N.C. not merely a debating society, and cannot tolerate open otage of its struggle. The National Executive promptly elled Madzunya and Leballo for their treacherous activities, it is notable that this action was warmly applauded by nches throughout the country. It was the end of the icanists' noisy career in Congress. True, ignoring his ulsion, Mr. Madzunya announced himself as a "candidate" the position of President of the Transvaal at the November ference in Orlando. And true to form, his clique, attended a number of armed supporters, came to Orlando hoping to eat its tactic of smashing the conference. But this time the igress membership was ready for him, and in no mood to rate any further mischief. When they saw they were numbered, the Africanists suddenly withdrew, and, as we e seen, announced their "secession". It was a damp squib. or a few days some newspapers tried to build up the "major t" in Congress as a sensation. It soon became apparent, vever, that the departure of this faction had strengthened the anisation, not weakened it, and that they commanded no port inside or outside Congress. The "sensation" petered . The national conference of Congress in December ved to be a remarkable demonstration of the confidence of people in the present leadership, the Freedom Charter, and Congress alliance.

or however much free publicity the Africanists may receive the anti-Congress press, they are not likely to succeed in ding any stable organisation or win much support for it, still offering any serious challenge to the leadership of the people he African National Congress. Many of them are not really ous; they handle "politics" like professional browsers, as ugh the South African struggle will be resolved in a study. y use Africanism as a sort of escape from the discipline, the l slogging day-to-day work, and the possible personal dangers ch face the ordinary Congress member. Pride or con- nce will not allow them to withdraw from politics altogether, hey think the best thing is to play safe, become sofa critics of igress, and use revolutionary language occasionally at Con-

ference, safe in the knowledge that the Government will r take any action against them.

Yet, these truths should not blind us to the fact that there a men and women amongst them who genuinely believe that t salvation of our people lies in a fanatical African racialism a denunciation of everything that is not African. And such policy is not without its potential mass-appeal.

It would be unrealistic to pretend that a policy of extre nationalism must, in the nature of things, always be unpopul The people are quick to detect the insincerity of the m demagogue, and they have confidence in the courage and wisd of their tried and trusted leaders. But in a country like Sou Africa, where the Whites dominate everything, and wh ruthless laws are ruthlessly administered and enforced, the natu tendency is one of growing hostility towards Europeans. In f most Africans come into political activity because of th indignation against Whites, and it is only through their educat in Congress and their experience of the genuine comradeship the struggle of such organisations as the Congress of Democ that they rise to the broad, non-racial humanism of our Congr movement.

With a State policy of increasingly barbaric repression of African people; with the deliberate destruction of every fo of normal human contact between people from differ population-groups; and with the systematic banning isolation of the convinced and fervent anti-racialists among Africans from political activity, there is no knowing what future will hold.

The Africanists have thus far failed, but their mere appeara is an urgent warning to all democratic South Africans. Africans have set a wonderful example of political wisdom maturity to the rest of the country, but they are not perfect, more than any other community of men and women so beset. In certain circumstances, an emotional mass-appeal destructive and exclusive nationalism can be a dynamic irresistible force in history. We have seen in our own cou how—decade after decade—the Afrikaner people have follo yet more extreme and reactionary leaders. It would be foolis imagine that a wave of Black chauvinism, provoked by the savag of the Nationalist Party (and perhaps secretly encouraged financed by it too), may not some day sweep through our co try. And if it does, the agony will know no colour-bar at al

SPORTS TEST FOR SOUTH AFRICA

D. A. BRUTUS
Hon. Secretary, South African Sports Association.

TH AFRICA, it is generally admitted, is sport mad. The ensive daily press and radio coverage, the interminable iments in bus and bar, and the thousands who flock to the rtsgrounds all testify to this. There are some who say that is just an escape for the masses from the pressing problems multi-racial society, that the electorate can play, because professional politicians get on with the dirty work. Cer-ly, South Africa has succeeded very well in expelling the -problem from sport—up to now. But there are ominous s that all this is changing, and leading sports officials are ering "big match jitters". The news that the Inter-onal Olympic Committee is to discuss South Africa's colour- in sport has only added to the unease they previously felt. or sport in South Africa means 'white sport', something uliar to the country and vastly different to the meaning given he term elsewhere. Selection on merit—the fundamental port—is meaningless in South Africa, except in relation to 3 million White South Africans. No one of the 12 million -Whites is ever considered for a national team, no matter t his ability or how clearly he merits selection. And so our rt is a fraud, and our international reputation for sports-ship acquired by deceit.

he rest of the world is not unaware of this, and the South can violation of the principles of the Olympic Games, as odied in their fundamental article—"No discrimination is nitted on grounds of race, religion or politics"—has already n challenged. But the big test lies ahead.

or almost every South African national sporting body which its only White South Africans, and which is recognized by international bodies, there exists a parallel non-White body, rally with a non-racial constitution, which is doomed to play natches in the locations and denied all chance of ever pro-ng national representatives. Some 200,000 non-Whites icipate in sport every week, but not all of them are still ent to be excluded from sport as they are excluded from other res of civilised living. And some sharp clashes have taken e in various branches of sport.

The most notable, since it resulted in a victory for the no White body—on the grounds that its constitution is open to South Africans—was that in Table Tennis. After some s years of negotiation, the non-racial Table Tennis Board w granted membership of the International Table Tennis Feder tion, and the Europeans-Only Table Tennis Union was expelle In 1957, for the first time, a team took part in a World Champio ships (at Stockholm) which did not represent White Sou Africans alone.

For four years the non-racial Soccer Federation, with membership of 50,000 members, has challenged the recogniti granted the White body by the international association. Th far the White body (20,000 members) has retained its se in F.I.F.A., mainly because of strong support from Britain, b its position is becoming increasingly precarious.

The national non-racial bodies for Athletics, Boxing, Cyclin Lawn Tennis, Netball, Softball, Baseball and Weightlifting, have the same aspirations to be recognized as national sporti bodies, or at least be enabled to provide candidates for natio teams. All of them encounter the same frustrations. And last year a super body was set up, the South African Spo Association, to co-ordinate their work, both internally a externally, and with special reference to international recog tion. It was this body—now supported by eight national bod and with a still-growing membership of about 70,000—whi influenced the International Olympic Committee to investig the colour-bar in South African sport, and which cabled t President of Brazil to stop a segregated soccer match betwe a bleached Brazilian team and an all-White South African o

Apart from these internal pressures, there has also been so overseas interest. At the time of the Commonwealth Gam at Cardiff last year, a protest was organized by Mrs Glad Griffiths of Penarth, and more than a thousand signator protested at the exclusion of non-Whites from the Sou African team. The Campaign Against Racial Discrimination Sport, a permanent body headed by Fenner Brockway, organiz a letter of protest to the London "*Times*" which was signed 20 leading British sportsmen, and the Movement for Color Freedom held a meeting in Cardiff on the eve of the Gam Through the valiant efforts of Welsh sportsmen, the matter placed on the agenda at the meeting of the Federation, London officials suppressed it in "the interests of harmon

l the absence of representatives of four-fifths of the South rican population was ignored at this meeting of the "great nily of nations."

Recently there were statements by Mr Reg. Honey and mmandant-General Klopper, Chairman and President re-ctively of the South African Olympic and Commonwealth mes Association, that non-Whites would be allowed to present South Africa if they were fit, but that there had been ne capable enough in the past. Yet Ron. Eland, a Coloured eightlifter who was clearly the best in the country and s unable to find a place in his country's team, qualified to present Great Britain at the 1948 Olympics and Empire mes and did well in his events. More significantly, in the A. team to the Melbourne Olympics in 1956, there were non-hites who made the team by "passing for White". This has en admitted by a leading Nationalist paper, which added at when their origins were discovered, they were persuaded go into "voluntary retirement". This apart from our non-hite soccer players who are winning laurels in Holland, Britain, d Portugal, and the many fine boxers—Jake Tuli was never le to challenge the White South African champion, but cceeded in winning a British Empire title.

The superiority of non-White table tennis players was demon-rated when a match was arranged during the visit of the gyptian Judge, Abou Heif, Vice-President of the International ble Tennis body. When the best of the non-racial and White odies met, the result was a resounding defeat for the practi-oners of apartheid.

The White bodies can, of course, use all the resources of a ciety designed to protect their interests and to preclude n-White development. Dissident non-White soccerites were omptly awarded control of a location stadium by the Johannes-rg City Council (perhaps as a reward), and this may lead to her soccer bodies hiving off and accepting control by White ficials. An exclusively Bantu Athletic Association, which is epared to accept affiliation to the White body under "con-tions of trusteeship" effectively able to keep their aspirations check—their representatives, for instance, must be White, d the body is itself directly under the control of the Chamber Mines,—has been offered many facilities, including free comodation for 600 from the Durban Municipality during its ampionships. Perhaps the most revealing instance has been

in weightlifting. For more than 10 years the non-raci federation has sought recognition for its lifters, only to meet with a blank wall from the two White bodies. Recently th secretary of a small non-racial union, piqued at criticism resigned. He applied to the White body for the affiliation a society yet to be formed, which would accept the colour-ba Needless to say, he was given immediate consideration, and th frustrated federation was told that it would not be possible consider its affiliation until this matter was cleared up.

The sports bodies can also rely on the resources of the Stat and have made good use of them. Most of the White-controlle press, including papers with a largely non-White circulation, a unsympathetic to non-White aspirations in sport. The Gover ment press has a stock response: these demands are the work "political agitators". Apparently it is unthinkable that an outstanding sportsman should aspire to represent his country, he is a non-White. But then it is rarely conceded that th country also belongs to the non-Whites: they are at be awkward aliens who must be rapidly transported to son Bantustan outside the civilised territories. White politician even when in opposition to the Government, are solidly unite on this question: they all agree that sport must be kept Whit and that the Black must be kept in his place. And all rema blissfully unconscious of the nonsense which their politic hysteria makes of the whole concept of sport.

The thirty standing trial for High Treason and the Congre movement startlingly erupted onto the sports field on the rece issue of a tour of South Africa by a team of West Indian cricketer vigorously opposing it. This tour, under conditions of apar heid, has received the blessing of the Government "becau it is in conformity with the policy of the country", but has be strenuously opposed by sportsmen, including cricketers, led the South African Sports Association. The West Indi Board of Control has recently decided that it is also opposed the tour because of the conditions of racial discriminati required.

When the White soccer body was challenged at the Wor Federation, it was able to produce a letter from the Governme stating that it was opposed to any mixed sport in South Afric The Government also refused passports for non-White spoke men, both in 1956 and 1958, which may explain why, thou superior in the field, they were outplayed in the conferen

om. The most blatant example of State interference in sport curred in March of this year. On the eve of their departure the World Championships, the Table Tennis team of non-hites had their passports seized. This may yet prove to be a al blunder. The International Olympic Committee is were on government interference (Peron had hurriedly to smiss his State-appointed Olympic Council on the eve of the 56 Games or face exclusion from the Olympics), and this clear idence of interference may yet lead to South Africa's being dered off the international sports field.

The resolution of the West Indies Cricket Board not to accept vitations to South Africa as long as there is racial discrimination sport here is a lead that might well be followed. And the esident of Brazil is to be congratulated on ordering a Brazilian ccer team to take no part in segregated sport in South Africa. it while Australia, England and New Zealand tour South frica, they are conniving at the imposition of apartheid in icket. Worse, in inviting racially exclusive teams, they are ndoning the export of apartheid to their own countries. And e countries which compete with South Africa at international ents, knowing well that no non-White South African, however orthy of selection, can become a member of the team, are cepting a particularly distasteful form of racial prejudice. White South Africa must, of course, do everything in its wer to seal up this small crack in the grim edifice of apartheid. nce this fissure grows, the entire indivisible structure of racial le is threatened by collapse. For once White South Africans n be influenced in their judgments by merit, they will certainly me to think seriously of White and Black sportsmen alike. nd in a country which eats, drinks, lives and sleeps sport, the tire mental climate of the country could be changed.

Sport dramatizes their dilemma and exposes the anachronism apartheid as few other things do: White South Africans must t only succeed in imposing their racial lunacy on the entire pulation of the country, they must also succeed in selling it to e entire world at international sporting events. The sporting orld is, in conscience, bound to reject it eventually, and artheid may well face its severest test then. For South Africa's ort-mad White population will either have to conform to e principles of international sport or be doomed to dispirited mes of jukskei in its own backyards.

ORLANDO REVISITED

ANTHONY SAMPSON
British Author and Journalist

"REMEMBER the rule here," said my companion in the ca "just keep on driving. Never stop. It doesn't matter if car's broken down, or someone's dying. Just keep on drivin It's probably the beginning of some sort of trap."

We were driving into Orlando, nine miles out of Johanne burg—the beginning of the great black metropolis that serv the white city. It had grown still bigger in the two years sin I was last there: the new location of Meadowlands, next door Orlando, which houses the families evicted from Sophiatow had spawned right over the hill; Meadowlands, the segregato dream, with the houses split up into groups according to tribes a little residential Zululand, Swaziland, Basutoland, and so on and the tall brown-coated police moving all over it, to make su there are no strangers in the ethnic paradise.

But Orlando, the older part of the city, built in the 'thirti is still relatively accessible, too big and untidy to be proper disciplined: whites are still to be found there from time to tim I was on my way to a party at the house of the jazz composer a commercial traveller, Todd Matshikiza.

We drove through the rocky dip that marks the beginning Orlando—speculating vaguely on that favourite African topi whether Orlando could be sealed off by troops if necessary, a deciding that it would be difficult—and were back once again the vast bungalow encampment, with the little rudimenta houses, like the wooden models that you put on a monopo board. Everything is horizontal, as if a great wind had blown the tops of everything, leaving only the huge vertical hoardin advertising soap and cigarettes, staring over the location li big-brother placards.

We reached Todd's house, past five ditches and six boulde The neat little room inside, with its small tables, low roof a miniature Utrillo reproductions on the walls, seemed like scale model of a white man's room—so that when it filled up wi thirty guests, lying on the floor with faces pressed close to o another and profiles looming everywhere in the flickeri lamp-light, the people looked like Gullivers in Lilliput.

I was asking Todd how it was, if things were getting as bad he said they were, that Africans were still so polite and happ

oking in the streets of Johannesburg.

"Gee! The African Iron Mask! He says one thing, and links another: when he nods," said Todd, nodding wisely, you think he's agreeing with you, when actually he's saying es, I'm hearing what you say, white man.' "

"Ya, it sometimes leads to some unfortunate misunderndings," said a large African professor sitting on the sofa, lking very slowly. "You see the Africans don't just *like* ying no: they find it easier just to agree and avoid argument ith the whites or Indians: and then, of course, they go back their own people and say the opposite. So, of course, the her people are rather puzzled, and rather think they've been t down."

The room filled up to squeezing-point, and a noisy contingent om Sophiatown, sounding as different as Frenchmen from vedes, arrived and introduced themselves in fulsome terms, d the whole party loosened up. Elaborate cocktail snacks ere handed round and balanced on knees.

Zeke, the doyen of African writers, was leading a discussion the floor about the need for an African artists' circle. There as some opposition to the idea. "But I find my position as a riter is so lonely, so isolated," he said in his fine deep voice, that his loneliness seemed to echo round the room: "I know at there must be hundreds of people scribbling in backyards no don't know where to start—running like rivers in the sert."

"Ya—rivers in the desert," said Dam-Dam softly from the rner, in a black suit with huge cuff-links and a carnation ttonhole. He was the leader of the Manhattan Brothers, the ost famous singing troupe in black Africa. And his approval, ming from that tall, suave body, gave finality to the idea.

"We don't just want to be writers," said Zeke, "we want be *non-white* writers"—using the word in the proud way of ople who are used to being non-everything—non-Europeans, n-voters, non-travellers, non-drinkers, non-starters.

"But not like in Russia," somebody chirped in: "we don't nt to be told what to write."

"No, not like Russia," said Zeke: "like Africa."

In the corner where I was sitting, Leslie, a Coloured carnter-intellectual inclined towards Trotsky, was telling how t morning he and Todd had gone to buy a *salami* at a shop in vn. Leslie was one of that small number of Coloureds who,

fed up with the colour snobbery of their own people, prefer t go about with Africans—partly for principle, partly for fun They wanted a big, fat *salami*: "The white girl just wouldn believe it," said Leslie: " 'You don't want *that* one,' sh screamed so that you could hear her the other side of the stree man! 'The native boy can't want *that* one'."

Then Leslie became involved in an argument with the qui round-faced teacher next to him—one of the teachers who ha reluctantly accepted the new Government "Bantu Education and was presiding at a school where house-cleaning and diggin were taught as school subjects. He was a meek-seeming, ver polite little man. Leslie, who had been telling a string of anec dotes about his bitter encounters with the white world, bega talking about what would happen "when we have our freedom.

"I don't quite see how we Africans," said the Bantu teache "after all the humiliations that have been heaped upon us by th white man, can allow whites to have votes in our country."

"No, we must remain *human*," said Leslie, dropping th "h" and giving the word an urgent stress: "Whatever happen we must stay as *human* beings. We mustn't treat the whites a they treat us. The most important thing we have is that we' human beings. We mustn't lose that in the revolution . . .

Then, just as all the talk in the room was in danger of becomin whisked into the old vortex of race and bitterness, the litt jazz pianist Salisbury Klaaste slumped to the piano in the corn and began rather drunkenly dragging his thin pointed finge over the keys. Sal had taken his B.Mus. at the universi two years before and, after refusing a job helping a white ma study primitive African music, had become pianist to th "Jazz Dazzlers". His small and nervous body, hunched forwar with his huge sad eyes staring out above his turned-up nos seemed to fit the piano exactly, like a working model. H played with a few tunes, muttering angrily while people advise him, and then began a lurching, sentimental ditty. Immediate everyone in the room began shouting "Dam-DAM-Dam-DAM Dam-DAM," until the tall and elegant figure rose from the floo scraping the ceiling, his white cuffs shining from the darknes His huge mouth opened like a flower, curled round at the edge so that it seemed that some bellowing sound would come ou and then very softly, in an extravagant brogue, he sang:-

"Did your mother come from Ireland?
For there's something in you Hirish . . ."

There was tremendous applause, and then Sal, looking in-gnant and hurt, began playing a simple tune on single notes: The Xhosas always economise in their notes, you see," he d, pointing a menacing thin finger at Leslie: "Just using the minant and tonic, like this . . ."

"You're not a white lecturer: *you* don't need to economise," outed Todd. "There's no shortage of notes *here*."

Sal, looking very cross, went on playing tribal chants for a hile, and then very suddenly switched to a caricature of a obbling Indian love-song, such as you hear coming out of the ke-boxes in the Indian part of town. At once another man ood up from the corner—Gwigwi, the saxophonist, composer the African hit tune, "Fish and Chips." He stood very imly, gazed haughtily round the bodies draped round the room, d then abruptly, with a quick flick of his head, threw himself to a crazy Indian warble, shaking his fingers to play an imaginary ake-charmer's pipe.

After a minute Sal stopped, Gwigwi folded on to the floor with thump, and the room shook with clapping. Then Sal and wigwi did a quick tour of the world, crooning a preposterous alian lament, gurgling some Russian nonsense, and squeaking piece of Chinese cacophany; together they romped happily er the 2,000 years of civilisation from which they are supposed be so mysteriously excluded.

Sitting almost on top of me was a contented drunk—a veteran frican double-bass player of the 'thirties. He was trying, with good deal of dribble and splutter, to explain that this was not together a normal African party, and to make himself polite the white face which was evidently conspicuous in his cloudy sion. I was brusque and uneasy with this attention; and en I noticed guiltily, when he turned his attention to an frican beside him, how much more courteously and effectively was received, his incoherencies being countered with re-suring flattery and congratulation: "That's it, Willie—have a ood time, boy—quite right, boy."

Sal at the piano, conducting a fitful history of jazz, touched on melancholy repetitive tune which sounded like the insistent uestioning of a child; there were cries all over the room of Marabi! Marabi!"—the nostalgic old backyard jazz of the hirties, which still emerges from crackling records in the rvants' huts. Willie the drunk, at the first sound of the arabi, raised his body from the sofa and began shuffling to and

fro, his shoulders shrugging up and down to the rhythm, and his mouth fixed in a faint and happy smile, dreaming of the days when he plucked his double bass to shuffling African dancers up and down the cities of the Union. Almost everyone began shuffling at one another, as if they had suddenly been caught on one of those shaking platforms at a fair-ground. "Gee, those Marabi days," said Todd, whose life had been measured by jazz styles: "we just went on, boy—on and on!"

Todd, Gwigwi, Dam-Dam and the rest shuffled along, advancing and retreating like tentative courting couples, wrapped in their own memories of Marabi. We slipped away, leaving the shuffling and singing to go on through the night and on through the next Sunday morning, the party guests trapped together by the talk and music like ship-wrecked people in a boat.

As I drove out through the steep valley where the edge of the straggling location looks over the stony veld, a torch waved frantically at the car. "Remember the rule, never stop!" And then I made out the tall brown helmeted figures of African police: I slowed down, looking to see if there was a white man there who could stop me. And then the black sergeant gave a grunt of "Aaaah! *Umtungu*"—white man— with that ambiguous emphasis, and waved me on to the open country beyond.

THE NYASALAND CRISIS

M. W. KANYAMA CHIUME

Member of the Nyasaland Legislative Council and Publicity Secretary of the now banned Nyasaland African Congress.

LES of a massacre plot in Nyasaland, the declaration of a State Emergency there and in Southern Rhodesia, the arrest of ndreds of African leaders throughout the Federation—all this lowing upon reiterated threats by the Federal Prime Minister a "Boston Tea Party" to force dominion status in 1960—e suddenly brought about a crisis in Central Africa which has eady been described as the worst in the Commonwealth since Indian independence struggle. Its repercussions for South l even East Africa must be enormous . . . yet the focus is one the smallest and most neglected territories in Africa.

About seventy years ago, when the European powers rushed parcel out Africa into their respective "possessions," asaland became a British protectorate. The agreement took ce with "the consent and desire of the chiefs and people," the proclamation phrased it; and this free consent was sible principally because of the faith which the people of the ritory had in the missionaries of the Church of Scotland, who been working among them since the 1860's.

Since Nyasaland is a protectorate and not a colony, her people urally aspired to and expected political development towards -government, an ultimate abdication of British rule. Nothing ore Federation led them to believe that this was a hopeless ition; and their trust in Britain was so great that they lingly sacrificed themselves in the last two world wars to end what they were told was freedom for all. Victory mised them the right to decide their future and develop ir own form of government.

When Federation was imposed on Nyasaland, therefore, and ver over the destiny of some seven million Africans in the ntries of Central Africa surrendered to less than three hun-d thousand Europeans, the people of Nyasaland did not have be persuaded to oppose the scheme. They recognized a ayal of the very principles of self-determination to which ain had subscribed in signing the Universal Declaration of man Rights, an end to all their hopes for democratic govern-t. For the architects of the Federation, Sir Roy Welensky

and Lord Malvern, made no secret of their distaste for 'Ghanas in the vicinity of White Southern Rhodesia. Sir Roy has state often enough that he does not envisage equality between th Africans and the Europeans of Central Africa within the for seeable future, and his attitude was accurately reflected in th constitution of the new State.

Federation offered too a frustration of their longing to liv with decency and dignity in their own country at least. For th people of Nyasaland saw—and still see—no difference betwee Southern Rhodesia and South Africa; except perhaps that th Union is outspoken about her oppression of Africans, whil Southern Rhodesia imitates the oppression and not the ou spokenness, hiding its hands behind a smoke-screen of words The people of Nyasaland do not need to be told of conditions i South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, there is hardly a family le that has not sacrificed a member to work on a farm or in th home of a Southern Rhodesian White, or in the gold mines o South Africa. Their knowledge of settlers is deeper and fa more personal than that of those who read up race relations i books or propaganda pamphlets. It is because of their dete mination that what they worked under and saw in Souther Rhodesia and the Union should not be allowed to spread int their own country, that they give to the Nyasaland Africa Congress their unswerving support in its opposition to the Centr African Federation.

Developments during the six years since the imposition o Federation have given Nyasaland no cause for complacenc The Federal Constitution Amendment Act and the Feder Electoral Act gave the settlers of Central Africa further oppo tunities to entrench White dominion. That the African Affai Board, which was established to safeguard African interest named both bills as discriminatory, did not appear to matter the British Government. Then, early in 1957, the Briti Government entered into an agreement with Sir Roy Welens under which the Federal Prime Minister was given direct acce to the Queen; the Federal Prime Minister was granted a pe manent seat at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conferenc and the Federal Government was given powers to create its ov civil service and appoint its own diplomatic representativ abroad. In the words of Sir Roy Welensky, the effect of t agreement was to "rule out the risk that a future Labo Government in Britain would try to inflict some of their ha

ted ideas on the Federation'' In fact, the effect was to give Federation virtual dominion status by the back door. How d that our African neighbours in Tanganyika and Uganda uld be given repeated concessions towards self-rule by the he British Government which expects us to accept a per-nently inferior status in Central Africa!

One of the main arguments in favour of Federation has always en economic. Nyasaland is reputed to be relatively poor, one member of the Federation whose resources have been st exploited. It has no major industries, and its people are sants or labourers upon the tea estates. Some 300,000 of able-bodied male population are employed outside the ritory, in the mines of Northern Rhodesia and South Africa, the farms of Southern Rhodesia. And the total Nyasa pulation is only 2,700,000. Can Nyasaland exist on its own nomically? And how is it to solve its migratory labour oblem? Exponents of Federation ask these questions as if nomic development and national independence were mutually clusive. It is the belief of the Nyasaland African Congress t the very reverse is true—that only with freedom will a manent solution to the country's economic problems become ssible.

In any case, whatever happens, Nyasaland Africans would efer freedom in poverty to plenty in servitude, though it is t yet our experience that servitude brings plenty. Nyasaland, wever, is not as poor as the world is made to believe.

The Financial Secretary said in March, 1958 during a Legislative uncil debate that before Federation was imposed the country s viable, could balance its own budget, had a surplus, and leed could have developed on its own. And this statement s confirmed by the Governor of Nyasaland when he was in tain in the same year. Of course, those who support leration reply that development would have been slow. t the Africans of Nyasaland would prefer slow, ordered elopment to the sort of lunatic lavishness characterised by the up hospital in Blantyre—which harbours an official colour bar! Nyasaland could stand on its own feet if the civil servants, o are now administering the country without the mandate of people, began concentrating on the development of the ntry for its own sake, rather than moving up and down the ritory as if they were paid agents of Sir Roy's Federal Party. e very agricultural policy of the Administration inhibits any

full-scale agricultural drive by the people. Instead of hoein their gardens in peace and producing more food and more cas crops, villagers live under the terror of agricultural instructor and police who have the power to arrest them on the flimsiest o pretexts. The Co-operative Department, which in a countr like Nyasaland should provide an opportunity for poor people an peasants, through their pennies and farthings, to participate i the economic development of their country, is the most primi tive department in Nyasaland. Headed by a Commissioner wh has never seen the inside of even a Co-operative Summer School it has a European staff holding senior posts equally uneducated i co-operative techniques. Paradoxically, the African staf members, who have greater experience and better training, a occupy inferior positions in the department and cannot influenc or help to initiate policy. The violent contrast with simila departments in East Africa, where proper staffing and technique have resulted in increased earnings and a marked improvement i the standard of living of the Africans, suggests that Nyasaland being deliberately looted of its able-bodied men.

The very fact that the Government is not prepared to ceas issuing licences to recruiting agencies is sufficient proof that it those who recruit rather than the recruited who benefit fro this detested and detestable traffic in human beings. Th argument that Nyasaland Africans would still go to South Afric and Southern Rhodesia, whether recruited or not, should mak unnecessary a commerce which for years now has corrupted th minds of the young and completely destroyed ordered fami life. As it is, powerful recruiting agencies are allowed by th Government to entice teen-agers into believing that the best wa of earning their money is by migrating to Southern Rhodesia o the Union, so that the youth grow up believing that manual wo can only be done in the mines and farms far away from hom The rottenness of such a system cannot be overemphasised; places the burden of maintaining families on those least able bear it, the women, the aged and the sick, corrupting commun and personal relationships alike.

This wastage of human resources, and the untold harm that does to the social and economic development of the country, c be prevented by adopting a creative approach to the proble A better agricultural policy, the giving to the Co-operati Department of the place and the staff it deserves, and a vigoro campaign to reorientate the people in and outside the scho

n, would help to maintain the bulk of the able-bodied ulation in the country. Such a policy would include the ition of recruitment and would ensure that the best use ible was made of the available labour. On many occasions existing industries and agricultural undertakings have com- ned of lack of labour; and the Government itself, when work ed on a secondary school in the Northern Province, found f in similar difficulties.

With its labour properly used—on the co-operative basis n which churches, schools, clinics and postal agencies are t and roads constucted even now—and with a creative drive agriculture, co-operatives, and secondary industies for the efit of the country rather than absentee landlords, the country ld produce the capital needed for ordered development. riotism for this is there in abundance; and under an African ernment enjoying the confidence of the people, the capacity faith and sacrifice will be a powerful economic factor. Shire Valley project, for instance, to provide power and laim a large tract of land for agricultural development, will welcome under an African government, as there would then no question of the uncontrolled influx of Europeans, and danger of the land's being accordingly alienated.

ndeed, the agricultural potential of the country is immense, fish potential inadequately exploited, and its geological lth not even fully surveyed. Thirty-eight economic minerals e already been found in the territory, including coal, copper, l, lead, iron ore (of 60-70% extraction compared with a ish average of 30%), manganese, mica, platinum, titanium thorium, the last an especially important discovery as rium is a radio-active material used as an alternative to nium. The unwillingness of the concession-holding com- ies to exploit these minerals on any large scale can only be lained by their wish to retain Nyasaland as a reservoir of ap labour for their other African enterprises.

Even before Nyasaland was forced into the Central African eration, there was trade between the territory and adjoining es; and experience in other places has shown beyond any dow of doubt that political unions are not the prelude to nomic associations. An independent Nyasaland would trade h her neighbours because such trade would be of mutual efit; though doubtless the territory would look more to the for education, trade and economic associations, in the wake

of political sympathy.

Independence can only benefit Nyasaland's economic develo ment. But independence is essential too, for her politic advancement. Despite the professed aim of the Governor a the British Government to advance the country constitutionall there has been so little political progress in the past seventy yea that of the 23 members of the Legislative Council, only 5 are or were before the arrests—Africans. These are elect indirectly, through local councils, and not one of them is member of the Executive Council, which is nominated in entirety by the Governor. This position can hardly be regard as an advance on the position that existed before Federatio

The Africans of Nyasaland intend to escape from Federatio however long and bitter the struggle; they are determined have self-government. They no longer believe that Britain c protect their future; they have come to realize that they alo can safeguard their interests, through their own freely chos government.

In their struggle, they have found in Dr. Banda the leader whom they had so long been looking. Leaders indeed they h had, but men less experienced and vital, so that Congress w riddled with government spies and informers, and lacked efficient and expanding organization. Dr. Banda has brought new policy to Congress—its aim has always been secession a self-government—but he has certainly brought new leadersh new inspiration; and within a short time of his arrival, Congr was taking shape as a modern, militant, political organisatio Our 83 branches swelled to 200 within five months. sincerity and courage brought a new and virile consciousness the people, till he became the talk of every household in Nya land. At every step he took outside his home, there w thousands to cheer him and wish him luck and long life.

It is against this background, and against the background avowed settler intentions to force a showdown with the Africa that one must view the actions of Sir Robert Armitage and Lennox-Boyd on the one hand, in proclaiming a State of Em gency and deporting Dr. Banda and his colleagues; and reaction of the people of Nyasaland on the other, who recogn in the repression a clear Government attempt to destroy th only means of opposition to settler domination. Seeing th hopes fade, their leaders deported, the people rose up in th despair to show their indignation.

uch has been said of a "planned massacre" of Europeans, ns and "moderate Africans". It is a crude fantasy, and lication of the miserable evidence contained in the White er can only reinforce this opinion. The Congress has r been anti-White or anti-Asian; Dr. Banda has proclaimed himself over and over again, and demonstrated it by living ng Europeans at Limbe. When he toured the country, he n visited or stayed in European and Asian homes.

he core of the accusation set out in the White Paper is tained in the report of a meeting of 150 Congress delegates l in Blantyre on January 25th. It is to be noted that Dr. da is said not to have been present, although the Governor ms to have some unspecified reason for believing that it was l at his direction. The evidence of the meeting did not h the police for three weeks; and one wonders what ucements were offered during that period to the informer, ich would overcome the 'oath of secrecy' and the 'threats of th'. It is more likely that, in a country where spies and rmers are so commonly employed by the police, it took those e weeks to decide upon exactly what story it would be st politic to invent.

On page 8 of the White Paper, it is reported that the murder European and Asian men, women and children was ordered. l yet no European or Asian has been killed throughout asaland, while 50 Africans, including a woman and a child, e been shot dead by the security forces. Whose, indeed, was e massacre plot?" In February, Dr. Banda actually handed r firearms, taken by individual Africans from the security es, to the police. Is this the action of an organisation templating massacre?

he appointment of an independent commission to investigate hese allegations is to be welcomed; but no lasting peace will ow until the constitutional question is settled, and the future he people of Nyasaland properly assured. Immediate steps uld be taken to end the State of Emergency and thus remove atmosphere of tension and distrust; and to release the ngress leaders, so that they can take part in talks on a new stitution, based on universal suffrage and territorial self-ernment. The right of Nyasaland to secede from the Federa- must be recognised, for only then will her people be free to elop their resources, economic and human.

RIDER AND HORSE IN NORTHERN RHODESIA

KENNETH KAUNDA

President-General of the banned Zambia African National Congress, now rusticated to distant district of Northern Rhodesia.

'PARAMOUNTCY of native interests' was the political sign-po of Northern Rhodesia up to 1948; and this was interpreted mean ". . . if and when the interests of the indigenous peop conflicted with those of immigrant races, those of the form should prevail." This, however, proved too much for tho settlers to swallow whose unyielding ambition was the amalg mation of the two Rhodesias and a freer hand with the Africar And so in 1948, this policy was arbitrarily replaced by one 'Partnership', which was later to become the foundation sto of the new Federal State.

Lord Malvern, Welensky's co-principal architect of t Federation, has, just like his friends, never hidden his cru scorn for African opinion. As the Federation's first Pri Minister, he described partnership as "the same as exi between rider and horse"—the settler, of course, being t rider and the African the horse. In March this year, he told t House of Lords, in London, "Africans are all liars, until th are very much advanced." ('*Northern News*', 26/3/59).

It is to these prophets of apartheid posing, circumspectly, believers in partnership, that the British Government sold when they imposed Federation upon us in 1953. They ma high-sounding declarations that hoodwink the world into beli ing that they are liberals, while they quietly manipulate co stitutions that in effect place all political power in their han

It is one of these constitutions that the Zambia African Natio Congress, which I was leading, was challenging when it v declared illegal by Governor Benson. Before and up to time of Federation, the constitution provided a qualitat franchise for all British *subjects*, provided they

(*a*) earned a minimum of £200 per year, or had property the value of £240;

(*b*) could fill in a prescribed form in English before a m istrate;

(*c*) were of or above the age of 21 years, and were criminal or insane.

ricans being British *protected persons* were, through this agement, debarred. Let it be noted however, that British enship was on sale at the profitable price of £5 each—in a try where the average wage of an African was as low as per month. Africans did not buy this "precious" political modity, not only because it was too expensive, but also use they believed, as I do, that there is no need for anyone where to buy foreign citizenship in his native country. s, up to 1953, only 3 Africans had considered it worthy to st in this extraordinary debenture.

ntastically too, in a territory where Blacks outnumber tes some 30 to 1, the Legislative Council consisted of 12 ted European representatives, 4 Africans strained through all most obliging meshes, 2 Europeans nominated to represent can interests, and 8 officials.

was in such a political context that Mr. Nkumbula and I sident and secretary of the African National Congress ectively) presented our proposals to Governor Benson in uary, 1958. We demanded 21 elected Africans, 14 elected peans and 7 officials, with an elected Speaker. There was e universal adult suffrage, but Africans were to elect Africans Europeans were to elect Europeans, with officials holding balance of power. We also proposed an Executive Council Africans, 3 elected Europeans, and 3 officials, with the ernor retaining his seat as president.

must confess here that I thought our proposals so moderate, emed to me difficult for the Government to dismiss them. it didn't take me long to discover how wrong I was.

remember Governor Benson asking me—"Mr. Kaunda, 't you think Europeans could paralyse government if we pted your proposals?" In reply I said, "Are you implying, r Excellency, that for our demands to be met we have got to n a position to paralyse government?" My question was er answered. Instead, a new constitution was concocted. he current one provides that there shall be a Legislative ncil of

lected European members (ordinary seats .·. necessarily European) .. .. —	12
lected European members (reserved seats) .. —	2
lected African members (special seats) .. .. —	6
lected African members (reserved seats) .. .. —	2
ominated members	2

Officials .. .. —

It also provides for an Executive Council, presided over by t
Governor, of

Elected European members .. .. —
Africans .. .. —
Officials .. .. —

The Federal franchise arrangements, which Northern Rhode
has adopted, divide people into three categories—the *Ordina*
Special and *Ungraded Human Beings*.

(*a*) *Ordinary Human Beings* are those who earn £720 per ye
or own buildings or land worth £1,500; or
earn £480 per year, or own buildings or land wo
£1,000, plus a primary school education of a cert
standard; or
earn £300 per year, or own buildings or land wo
£500, plus four years of secondary education of a cert
standard.

(*b*) *Special Human Beings* are those who earn £150 per ye
or own buildings or land to the value of £500; or
earn £120 per year, plus a two years' secondary educat
of a certain standard.

(*c*) *Ungraded Human Beings* are those who cannot qua
under (*a*) or (*b*).

Note should be taken of the facts that Africans by law
occupy land, but not own it; and that, in any *ordinary* cons
uency, *special* voters can only count one-third of the *ordin*
In other words, if in a particular constituency 300 ordi
human beings and 1,000 special human beings voted, the la
could only count as 100. Western values, I believe!

Of the 8 African seats, 6 are called special seats, and
rural. Candidates contesting these rural seats must each
two-thirds of the chiefs of the constituency to sign certific
approving their candidature; and, further, each one of t
chiefs must approve of the candidature in the presence
representative of the Crown duly appointed by the Gover
It should be noted that apart from the travel difficulties invo

ese wide-flung constituencies, chiefs are no longer on
fs by the people and the people by the chiefs'' terms with
people; they are on the government pay-roll, just as are
equired representatives of the Crown. Chiefs who show
dependent rhythm when the tune is called are soon enough
ed out of office.

view of this, candidates who succeed in obtaining these
ficates are, quite naturally, suspected of being in the govern-
's good books, are considered ''yes men''. In other words,
an voters, after qualifying on so expensive a franchise roll,
in rural areas no one but a government-approved candidate
te for; they do not have, and are not intended to have,
hoice.

ually monstrous is that in practise it is not possible for an
an to contest and win any of the 14 ''European'' seats, or
fluence the election of a European, because only a handful
ricans have qualified as *ordinary voters*. On the other hand,
ver, European pressure-groups have found stooges among
ans to stand on their party tickets.

far, two of the six special constituencies have not polled,
use candidates could not get the necessary two-thirds of the
s there to approve their candidature. The Governor has
caught in one of his own political traps. And the results
e six African constituencies that have polled are simply
ling. What we in Zambia feared has come only too true.

elensky's United Federal Party	..	..	..	—	2
offat's Central Africa Party	..	..	..	—	2
rican National Congress	..	..	..	—	1
rican Independent	..	..	..	—	1
					6

fact, in the one instance where the A.N.C. has won, the
e show is being challenged by Mr. Beckett of the U.F.P.
lleges he has evidence to show that Mr. Nkumbula was
orted by District Commissioners on instructions from
.

cording to the constitution, the Governor had to consult
Roberts, leader of the majority party, when making his
intments to the Executive. The '*Northern News*' of 27th
h reported an unnamed prominent U.F.P. member as
g, ''The Governor has met our demands most satisfactorily.
t we might say 99½% of what we wanted has been granted.''

Of the 10 seats, 5 have gone to the U.F.P.—4 Whites and African. Of the nominated African Minister, the '*Sunday Ma* of 29th March, 1959, says, among other things, "As the caucu of the United Federal Party has unanimously endorsed the n appointments, the only conclusion possible is that Mr. Robe is satisfied that Mr. Mwamba (African Nominated) is sympathe towards the aims and ideals of the U.F.P." The remaining seats have been filled by government officials whose past reco show that on all major issues—including the establishment Federation—they have voted with the settlers.

Africans who have been trapped by the new constitution n stand flabbergasted. Even Mr. Nkumbula of the pact-huntin bargain-striking Congress, who agreed to give this constituti "a fair trial", has expressed his "extreme disappointmen with the result of the elections. ('*Central African Post*', 23/3/5 On the other hand, settlers are jubilant, and are now busy themselves in preparing another and perhaps final assault on t Colonial Office, in their mad drive to make over Central Afr in the image of the Union.

These are only some of the many reasons why we of the banr Zambia African National Congress chose to oppose and boyc the elections, drawing down upon ourselves as a result wrath of Governor Benson and his satellites. He has accused of planning mass intimidation, disorder and violence. I can no more here than point out (in view of the fact that a commiss has been appointed to probe into the banning of Zambia) tha he had evidence to prove his allegations, he certainly would have hesitated to prosecute us in the public courts.

In view of his failure to do so, I conclude that the banning Zambia, the arrest and rustication of all its leaders, issue fr fear of its policies and demands for *self-government now* based *one man, one vote*. I might add here that the banned Zamb cry of "Africa for Africans" was no more than the legitim cry for *majority rule*. We had, and still have, no desire to d away Whites from here. Time and again we have said what still say now, that those Europeans who are willing to work peace and harmony under a democratically elected Afri government are more than welcome here.

For us, rustications or no rustications, Zambia or no Zam our demand is *home rule and secession* from this fraudulent abominable Federation now!

THE CRUCIBLE OF PRIVILEGE: SOUTHERN RHODESIA

JOSHUA NKOMO

President of the banned Southern Rhodesia African National Congress.

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is experiencing a tical storm which has taken the lives of over 50 Africans, sent many hundreds to gaol or detention, most of them with harge of any kind preferred against them. Sir Roy Welensky found reasons for the crisis outside the territories—he blames Accra Peoples' Conference; he talks of Communists, plots agitators.

ut he deliberately passes over the real reason for the crisis—policy of 'White supremacy,' which springs from Southern desia and from South Africa. For it is this that has brought ion and disorder to the once tranquil land of Lake Nyasa. Britain too must bear her responsibility for this. She, as rdian of the two Protectorates, has refused to listen to the s of the African people not to hand them over to a clutch power-hungry settlers in Southern Rhodesia. Her Govern-t devised a policy of "partnership", and without defining it, ded it over to Lord Malvern and Sir Roy Welensky to shape the crucible of White privilege and African repression that today. I must emphasize that the British Government knows , and that, knowing it, it denies to the Africans in Northern desia and Nyasaland their right to secede. Clearly 'protec-' would seem as capable of conflicting meanings as 'partner-'.

he dominant partner in the Federation, and the source of t of our present troubles, is Southern Rhodesia. It is a self-erning colony, self-governing that is as far as the two hundred sand settlers are concerned. When this status was attained 923, the settlers immediately formulated a land and property cy which became the basis of political power. A franchise d on high property and educational qualifications was oduced; and by raising the qualifications from time to time, by denying the Africans adequate opportunity for education economic advance, the settlers have been able to retain tical power for themselves to the almost total exclusion of African majority.

he present franchise qualifications, for the Ordinary roll, are

(a) citizenship of Southern Rhodesia or the Federation;
(b) age over 21 years;
(c) continuous residence of 2 years in the Federation;
(d) adequate English to fill in a voting form without assistanc
(e) one of the following educational and financial qualific tions:
  (i) income of £720 p.a. or £1,500 worth of immovab property;
  (ii) income of £480 p.a. or £1,000 worth immovab property, plus primary school education;
  (iii) income of £300 p.a. or £500 immovable propert plus 4 years secondary education.

There is also a lower roll, for which the qualifications are (a (b), (c) and (d) above; plus either £240 p.a., or £120 p.a. a two years' secondary education. When the number of voters the lower roll reaches 20% of the other voters, however, t roll must be closed. In effect, therefore, these sets of qualific tions are even more restrictive than those for the Federal vot even the 4 African members of the Southern Rhodesian parliame being elected by an almost wholly *European* electorate.

The centre of the struggle for a share in the political contr of Southern Rhodesia, therefore, pivots upon the question the franchise. The property qualifications detailed above are high that the fiction of the Common Voters' roll can no long be maintained. For the wage structure of the colony is deliberat designed to prevent Africans from getting onto this roll. M skilled jobs are jealously reserved by the European trade unio for Europeans only, and the minimum wage for an Afric unskilled labourer is £6—£7 per month. The Native La Husbandry Act is ostensibly intended to produce a middle-cl of African small farmers, holding land in freehold instead communally. But so far, its main result has been to fo thousands of Africans off the land—providing a useful float labour for European enterprise.

The path to advance through education is blocked almost surely as that through economic development. In 1956, 355,6 African children attended school.[1] Of these, 91% were junior primary schools, and only 1% in secondary schools (i in a position to gain one qualification for the *lower* voters' ro

And most important of all, Southern Rhodesian land pol stands in the way of African advance, and remains one of

[1]Faith Raven, '*The Constitution and Race Relations in Central Africa*', Africa Bureau, 1

n grievances of the African people. The history of how the cans of the territory were robbed of their land goes back to des' fraudulent treaty with Lobengula, and the massacre the Matabele following their rebellion in 1896. And the l Apportionment Acts of 1931 and 1941, ostensibly passed the protection of what land had been left under African trol, have been used for the purpose of dispersing and overishing the African population and retaining political economic power in the hands of the settlers. Under these s, some 2,150,000 Africans (2,070,000 according to the 3 estimate) have rights to only 56,980 square miles of [2] while 200,000 Europeans (160,000 in 1953) enjoy some 128 square miles. It should further be remembered that most the European inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia are town ellers; so that of all the "European" land, only a small portion has been actually developed. This is all the more ing in view of the dispossession of thousands of Africans ler the new Husbandry Act.

The Apportionment Act and the Urban Areas and Accommoda- n Act have, of course, also been used to enforce segregation iving areas in the country and in the towns; so that there had be amendments recently to allow even a few inter-racial os to be established, and a hotel where "foreign" non-Whites ting the Federation might stay. Since the consent of the l authority has to be obtained before an inter-racial club is l, and it must concern itself purely with cultural, religious welfare activities alone, the value of this relaxation of the our bar may be seriously questioned. So might the concession certain "civilized" Africans may be exempted from carrying ass. Is a pass exemption, after all, not just another kind of ?

was the increasingly oppressive pattern of Southern Rho- an legislation, combined with the inadequacy of a number of ll African organizations who had no right to speak on behalf he African people as a whole, that led to the reconstitution he African National Congress of Southern Rhodesia in 1957, orporating the Southern Rhodesian Youth League. We based policy on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ecially the right of adult suffrage and the rights of individuals roperty; and we gained—for all Sir Edgar Whitehead's pictur- ue contradictions—the clear support of the African masses.

[2] Hailey, '*An African Survey*'.

Our aims were—and, for all the arrests, remain—

1. To recapture human dignity for the Africans, which h been destroyed over a number of years;

2. To restore the land and property rights of Africans; a

3. To gain universal franchise so that the African may pl a full part in the political life of the country.

Congress has never restricted membership on racial grounds there were several European members, and one was arrest for his pains.

Our programme brought panic to the settlers. Hundreds our supporters were brought before the courts almost throug out the whole of last year, but in 98 cases out of 100 they we acquitted. Realizing their weak position in the courts of la the Government arbitrarily declared a State of Emergency the 26th February, 1959, banned our organization, and arrest and detained officials and many members without bringing a charges against them. No satisfactory reasons have been giv for these stern measures. Sir Edgar Whitehead says that t situation in Nyasaland warranted them. In the same statement, reveals that preparations were under way before Christn 1958, or months before any crisis in Nyasaland gave him shabby excuse.

We have, in fact, no alternative but to conclude that present situation, with all the repressive measures in Cent Africa, was planned by the Southern Rhodesian and Fede Governments for the purpose of crushing African organizati and eliminating the African leadership. The Bills before Southern Rhodesian parliament are proof of this. But the Gove ment will discover that bannings, imprisonment and terrori will never crush African resistance to oppression. If there is be any hope of peace and prosperity in our country, we are m convinced than ever that the time for a fundamental revision the political, social and economic system, is *now*. And b fundamental revision, we mean the immediate concession of participation in political control to the Africans, not just removal of specks of discrimination here and there.

We are aware that the Rhodesian settler politicians have b very much encouraged by the apparent success of South Afri apartheid policies. They have largely copied the disgus pattern, substituting for apartheid the label of partners as if to say that the African must be a willing partner in own subjugation. But the events of the past two months h

ar exposed the partnership myth that even some of the ing settler politicians have had to make shame-faced admis- s of the failure of their policies. In this connection, the forma- and general drift of the Central African Party is not without ificance.

here is still time for Southern Rhodesia to retreat from dis- r, and with dignity. We of the Congress, by the very nature our policy, offer the settlers the opportunity of beating a eat in time. We ask for the reconsideration of discriminatory s—the Native Affairs Act, the Urban Areas and Accommoda- Act, the Pass Laws, the Electoral Act, the Unlawful anizations Act, the Preventive Detention Act. This would l to a tremendous reduction in tension, and leave the way n for the peaceful evolution of democracy. What we are ng for immediately is therefore direct participation in the itorial legislature and government. And we ask not as pliants, but as a people who know that their rights cannot efinitely be withheld from them. The door is still open. o can tell if it will be open forever?



AN IOTA OF DIFFERENCE

MOSES MAKONE

One of those arrested during the recent Southern Rhodesian round-up of African leaders

On the night of the 26th February, I was asleep in my house a Mabvuku, 12 miles from Salisbury, when at about 2.30 a.m. heard a knock at my door. I woke up, switched on the light went to the door, and unbolted it with my right hand, resting my left hand on the door frame. When I pulled the door back my left hand was immediately handcuffed and a European police man entered into the house and proceeded to handcuff my righ hand without uttering a word. I was shocked. After a few seconds I asked, "What's wrong"? Two European and three African policemen, who were all in uniform, had by this time now entered my house. They left me standing alone. The two European policemen went into my bedroom, woke up my wife and children, and turned the house upside down in search o books and letters. These they bundled together and threw into a bag.

They then told me to come with them. I was taken to a truck while my wife was asking, "What have you done"? What is this all about"? I said, "I don't know". My wife was upset and terrified, to say nothing of my children.

The truck then went around and picked up two other people—the Reverend Katsande and Mr. Chikore. We were then taken to a big lorry, around which were four other trucks. These trucks unloaded fifteen people, and we were all thrown into the lorry and driven to the Police Depot in Salisbury.

When we arrived at the Depot, it was still dark. We were taken before a group of plain-clothes men who sorted us into groups of "Stars". Some were told that they were "One Star" men, others Three or Four and so on. I was almost the last to be classified in this way, because the police officer several times called for Savanhu Makoni and no one responded to this name. I was asked what my name was, and I told them that I was Moses Makone. I was then told that I was a "Two Star" man and sent to this group. The seven groups were put in separate open-air enclosures. Here the handcuffs were removed. We remained standing around until daylight came and one saw where one was and with whom. We still did not know what it was all about and nobody told us anything. We the

an to tell each other how we had been arrested.
Abel Dube said that he had been told that he was being ested because he was a Congress man. This was the first e I realised I had become a political prisoner.
We remained in the Depot until 12 noon, when we were dcuffed again, now in twos with the other hand handcuffed a bar in a lorry, and taken to Kentucky Gaol near Salisbury. arriving there we were thrown into four cells, fifty to h. Each cell was about 21 feet by 6 feet.
About 3 p.m. we were given our first meal—very rough alie-meal porridge and beans—served in enamel and tin tes. We were also given three blankets each—no beds, no ts, no pillows or sheets. None of us had any pyjamas or nge of clothes. We just lay on the cold cement floors, but nd it difficult to sleep.
The following morning members of the C.I.D. came and ched their tents in the prison. The next day they began errogating us. Again it was quite some time before I could questioned because the name they called was Savanhu koni. I did not answer to that name. They ultimately ked me what my name was and then interrogated me. I told em that I had never been a member of Congress, but had been airman of the Mabvuku branch of Mr. R. S. Garfield Todd's rmer United Rhodesia Party. They asked me all sorts of things virtually my life history—and whether my wife was a politician not.
Our first difficulty was that of not having sufficient fresh air d exercise. We were allowed only 30 minutes in the morning d afternoon in the open air. The rest of the time we spent cked up in the cells. This led to several complaints being dged to the authorities, until three of our spokesmen were moved from the prison and sent to Khami Prison. The bad od of the prison, overcrowding, and stale air began to tell on e health of the men. Several of them fell sick. I also fell k and informed the authorities. They thought I was putting a show and were preparing to send me to Khami. Medical amination, however, showed that I was really sick.
At this time my friends had made representations on my half to Sir Edgar Whitehead, the Prime Minister. They ccessfully showed that I had been wrongly imprisoned and that ad never been a member of the African National Congress. vas finally released after spending 38 days in prison.

PORTRAIT OF A FAILURE: SIR ROY WELENSKY

FRANK BARTON
Former Editor of the "Central African Post", Northern Rhodesia

WHEN Roy Welensky succeeded Lord Malvern as prim minister of the Central African Federation, destiny placed in th burly ex-engine driver's hands a chance given to few men o few nations. For, although it was Malvern who became th Federation's first prime minister, it was Welensky to whom th real task fell of forging the three territories of Southern Rhodesia Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, with their conflicting loyaltie and widely different ways of life, into a new nation. Durin Malvern's two years in office the task was essentially one o ironing out the manifold administrative kinks in the new Establishment, of constructing a civil service and a pattern o development. Everyone knew that once Malvern had super vised this, he would hand over his power and his opportunity t the younger, more imaginative and better equipped Welensky How has his successor handled his inheritance?

It remains for the historians to record—and some of them ar already recording it—that in the three years since Welensk assumed political direction of the Federation, the racial situatio has deteriorated to the point of despair; that the Federation ha cried out, and still cries out, for a leader who will—even at th late hour—act with a vision and a drama which can save th situation and lead all the 7,500,000 peoples of the new Stat away from the rot of revolt and repression and towards th accomplishments of a genuinely shared society.

Why has Welensky failed? He had the courage to succeed he had neither the vision nor the intelligence. A consumma politician who reached his peak and made his reputation i Northern Rhodesia without the responsibility of a portfolio, h has remained an eye-to-the-ballot politician at a time when re statesmanship is the crying need of Central Africa.

The thirteenth son of a Lithuanian Jew and his Afrikaner wi who trekked by ox-wagon from the Union to a Rhodesia th barred no holds, Welensky was born "on the wrong side of th tracks" in Salisbury. His family lived just above the borderli of poor whites. His first job, at 15, was as a storekeeper, but was not long before, like his brother Ben, he was "on the ra

ways'', first as a fireman and later as a driver.

At 21 he married a good-natured, strong-willed Scots Afrikaner girl who used to serve him tea in a Bulawayo café For 30 years, all the way up the ladder, she has been his constan sheet-anchor. In a land not renowned for its happy home life the Welenskys have remained the traditional devoted couple Their circle of friends may have widened to include such place as Chequers and Clarence House, but it has not, since the reached the top, excluded so much as the humblest ganger the knew in the old days.

Bulawayo then, as now, was the railway headquarters of th Rhodesias, and it was not long before the young Welensk began to take an active part in the growing White railwaymen trade union. He still believes it was this that made the railwa bosses banish him to the ''black north''—to Broken Hill, th bleak lead and zinc mining town in Northern Rhodesia. I those years of the early 'thirties, he did not fit easily into the lif of the mining camp and railway club. There was a stron fascist element in the town, most of it made up from the Sout African Afrikaner miners. Welensky would have no part o them. Once he went to the engine shed to take his train out an found the cab plastered with anti-semitic obscenities—directe at his part Jewish blood. It is curious that a man who ha endured such discrimination should be the main pillar of th discrimination practised against millions of non-Whites in th Federation.

Welensky's personality and organising ability, however, soo got the better of the rowdies. He revived the defunct branc of the railway workers' union, and soon the bosses 700 mil away in Bulawayo were wondering if they had done the rigl thing in ever sending him north. But it was too lat Welensky was on a road from which there was to be no retur His trade union was to send him to the Northern Rhodes Legislature, which in turn was to become the springboard for seat at the Commonwealth premier's conference table.

He was still engine driving and leading his union betwee parliamentary sessions. By the beginning of the war, he w accepted by all the White workers of Northern Rhodesia—i. the miners and railwaymen—as their leader; and chewing h nails in apprehension at the power the man wielded, the governo of the day made Welensky Director of Manpower. His ma job was to keep the copper mines producing. Probably to co

bitter pill of a trade union leader working with the bosses, 1941 Welensky formed the Northern Rhodesia Labour Party, it immediately became the biggest group in the Legislature side of the British Colonial officials. Characteristically, it a labour party modelled on its South African counterpart, med to fight competition from the Africans.

Now began the incredible seven year rule of power without ponsibility. Welensky ruled the Council from the back nches. He gave portfolios to his subordinates, but though a mber of the Cabinet Executive Council, he refused to accept ministry himself. Nobody could understand what his game s. It soon became clear. Without a portfolio he was ject to no responsibilities, no questioning in the Legislature. ne had taken one, he would have by inference have aligned nself with the Colonial Office officials. And for the role he s about to play—flaying them at every possible opportunity—t would have been impossible. Far better to sit in the mmittee-roomed Executive where he could mould decisions all the ministries, and then return to the back benches and rate the portfolio holders in his best gallery-playing style. t worked like a charm. Between 1946 and 1953, when he ered the Federal Parliament, he built a reputation far beyond borders of Northern Rhodesia as a champion of the settlers the man who could be relied upon to give the Colonial ice better than he took. There is no doubt that, besides ealing to the public, these tactics paid off in practical results, Welensky squeezed more and more out of a reluctant White- until, although still in the minority, the unofficial members the Executive Council could outvote the officials. When leration was finally imposed, Welensky became second-in-mmand to Sir Godfrey Huggins and took, one fancies with a nk, the portfolio of transport, which gave him control over Rhodesia Railways.

Certainly a part of his success has been due to his treatment of, thus his treatment by, the Rhodesian Press. He is on first-ne terms with dozens of Rhodesian, South African and English wspapermen. He has cultivated their friendship until it is a del of what the relationship of a politician on the make and Press should be—always "good for a quote", always "ready play ball". When his car breaks down on the way back from vernment House and he accepts a lift from an unknowing tor-cyclist, he makes sure that this "human interest" tit-bit

finds its way into the eager hands of the reporters; when a flustered airport manager produces a cup of tea for him during a terminal building press conference, the busy eyebrows will rise, and Welensky will enquire about "tea for the gentlemen of the Press"? When none can be produced at short notice, he purses his lips and gently refuses to drink his own.

A great deal of his success, and the thing that may hasten his downfall, is the over-fine art he has developed of being all things to all men. To the Afrikaner he will recall his Afrikaans mother; to the ultra-Britishers, England becomes "home" for him; to the European trade unionist he is "one of you"; he even tried to tell the Africans of turbulent Nyasaland that he "was as much an African as you." It did not go down very well.

He has a rare, gracious streak which, unlike many of the other sides he arranges to catch the light, is genuine. His sworn enemy in the last Federal Parliament was Nyasaland's Wellington C. Chirwa, who needled him more effectively and more often than the rest of the opposition put together. But after returning from a Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference in London, he confessed to friends that he considered Chirwa more capable than Nkrumah.

Though posing as a humble man, he does not like being humbled. Northern Rhodesia civil servants who crossed him, intentionally or otherwise, have counted the cost high. He has been known to have the Chief Secretary and another senior government official standing outside his office in Lusaka like guilty fourth-formers waiting to see the headmaster. His vanity is quick to rear at a slight.

He is capable of incredible inconsistencies which in a more mature political society would seriously handicap him. An example of this occurred during the recent Federal General Election when a thoughtless Dominion Party spokesman said that in certain circumstances his party might disregard the courts in the interpretation of the constitution if they were returned to power. Welensky, who badly needed an election gimmick seized upon this and played it to the full, talking about the sanctity of law and British regard for it. Yet five months earlier, he had hinted darkly at another 'Boston tea-party' unless Britain played ball with him in 1960 when the Federation seeks more autonomy. What he actually said was that if the 1960 talks failed, "then I personally would not be prepared to accept that Rhodesians have less guts than the Americans

olonists''.

It was during the Garfield Todd crisis last year that the true orth and colour of Welensky emerged, and on this alone he can e condemned out of hand as a leader to whom words like rtnership are no more than eleven letters in the alphabet. ne word from Welensky during the Todd affair and the situation —for Todd—would have been saved. But Welensky chose to t the Southern Rhodesia premier roast on the spit and, when he as nearly done, declare that the issue was one of personalities, ot principles.

For his relations with the Africans, there is little to be said. he simple truth is that, born and bred in the country though e is, he understands them no better than he does the Eskimoes. nly lately has the truth slowly broken upon him that he cannot rry them with him on the same tide of oratory, bluff and charm at won and keeps for him the bulk of European support.

He has been told by Whitehall that he has two years in which o produce evidence that the Africans can be won over to ac- epting Federation, and his dilemma is to accomplish this ithout antagonising the Europeans. Up to the Todd affair, e had the stature to have attempted and, perhaps, achieved this acial double. He threw away the chance, and his conduct ecently has confirmed his failure. By his stern handling of the Nyasaland emergency, where as Minister of Defence he des- atched European troops from both Rhodesias, he may have ained the support of the bulk of the European population f the Federation, but he has surely antagonised for all time the ,660,000 Africans of the protectorate, and the rent in the ederal fabric that has appeared in its most picturesque corner is kely to spread that much more rapidly southwards.

What of his future? As the Black nationalists spur on the White nationalists, he is likely to lose more and more ground, nd by the time the Federation's big hour strikes in 1960, when e will go to London to seek dominion status, the shaky oundations of the Federal State may be insufficient to support im any longer. As the racial situation deteriorates, the Dominion Party will gather strength.

Welensky was at his strongest and most effective as a leader f the opposition. The way things are going in Central Africa oday, he may very well find himself in that position again.

AN INTERVIEW WITH TODD

Our Salisbury Correspondent, Mr. Denis Grundy, approached Sir Roy Welensky, the Federal Prime Minister, and the Hon. R. S. Garfield Todd, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia 1954-58 and present Southern Rhodesian Leader of the Central Africa Party, with the following questionnaire. Sir Roy refused to reply. The answers of Mr. Todd appear below.

1. Does Mr. Todd consider the prospects of the Federation—three disparate States of which two are constitutionally bound to the direct rule of the British Crown as long as the majority of their inhabitants wish—more sanguine than sanguinary?

I consider that the prospects of the Federation are hopeful rather than fearful. It is in the best interests of all the people that the Federation should succeed. Seven million people wish to lead a happy and prosperous life, and the fact that there are differences between the races and between individuals within each racial group does not make it impossible to establish a wider unity based upon a firm foundation of mutual respect. If however, any one racial group holds that success means dominance for its group, with demands for exclusive rights in the political or economic life of the country, and pursues this attitude with sufficient strength and determination, then the Federation may well disintegrate. As we know that there are significant numbers of people from each racial group who recognize the desirability of working together, of giving honour to individuals for their qualities regardless of their colour then there is hope.

2. If the above position is acknowledged, what form or degree of enhanced status does Mr. Todd think the Federation is likely to achieve at the 1960 talks with the British Government?

The Federal system allows for wide latitude in an approach to government. No two federal systems are identical, and each is designed in such a way as to make it able to deal with the problems peculiar to its own circumstances. In our case we have to concern ourselves with three States that are very different in their degree of political and constitutional advancement, in their levels of economy and in their racial structure. Under the terms of the Federal Constitution, each of the three States can look

vard to governing itself in so far as all territorial matters are cerned. By general agreement, a substantial proportion of powers of government have been given to the Federal nority, which deals with such subjects as defence, public lth, control of imports and exports, railways and meteoro-y, for the whole Federation. On the other hand, there are erences of attitude regarding some responsibilities, as to ether they should be Federal subjects or territorial ones. For mple, while Southern Rhodesia agreed that the Federal vernment should be responsible for National Parks, Northern odesia was not prepared to relinquish control over her own. der our Federal Constitution, it is possible to reconsider the isions of responsibility and authority as between a State and Federal Government, and the Constitution provides that, ot less than seven or more than nine years from the date of coming into force of this Constitution, there shall be con-ed a conference consisting of delegations from the Federation, m each of the three territories and from the United Kingdom, sen by their respective governments, for the purpose of iewing this Constitution". I hold that we should now give most serious consideration to the desire of many Nyasaland icans to break away from the Federation, a happening which ght well lead to a similar demand from Northern Rhodesia which could, in turn, drive Southern Rhodesia to seek nittance to the Union of South Africa.

n considering this desire for self-government for Nyasaland, might be found desirable to restore to the State many of the ctions of government which are now Federal, such changes be made after full discussion and agreement between the eral Government and the self-governing State of Nyasaland. the 1960 Conference it will be necessary to consider a time-e for the grant of self-government to Northern Rhodesia to Nyasaland within the Federation. If in 1960 it were agreed Northern Rhodesia would become self-governing in 1965, might be assured that at that date a full revision of the sion of powers of government as between herself and the eral Government would be made. A similar procedure would place for Nyasaland if it were decided that she would be n self-government in, say, 1970. In suggesting the dates of 5 and 1970 for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland respectively, ld that these dates will arrive before a desirable degree of urity will be in evidence; but I am afraid that, as far as

Nyasaland is concerned, self-government will have to be granted earlier than 1970. As soon as the United Kingdom Government has assisted these two territories to their new positions as self-governing States, with agreement reached on what responsibilities of government will be transferred from the Federal sphere back to the Territorial sphere, then the United Kingdom should withdraw from this part of Africa.

If, for reasons of national pride, responsibilities of government were unwisely claimed by the new States, it would be hoped that the new Governments would soon learn by experience and before too much harm had been done, that such responsibilities could be better shouldered by the Federal Government itself and that they would be returned. On the other hand, it might well be found that some subjects such as Public Health which is now a Federal matter, can best be carried out by the State. Where changes of this type were to be made, appropriate financial adjustments would accompany them. A plan such as this would secure full status for the Federation and make it a self-governing nation within our Commonwealth by 1970 at the latest.

3. Should the outcome of the 1960 talks prove unsatisfactory, would Mr. Todd conceivably favour a merger between Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa?

In 1923 Southern Rhodesia rejected a proposal that she should become of province of the Union of South Africa. There are far stronger reasons today why she should not wish to join a neighbour which moves towards the establishment of a republic and which has a second official language. It is by no means sure either, that South Africa would wish to have us as a province. A large proportion of our European population would object very strongly to a move in this direction, and they would be joined in their objection by the great majority of our two and a half million Africans and our Coloured people and Asians. The Nationalist Government would ask its own terms and no one could object to that, but I cannot believe that the terms offered would satisfy more than a small percentage of our total population. In 1923 the European electorate made the decision; but if the proposal were to be made at this time, I believe that the whole population would have to be consulted and its consent obtained. In 1953 it was found desirable to broaden the economic

is of the economy of Southern Rhodesia and a decision was de to turn to the north, not to the south, and we are now llenged to make a success of the Federation. As this question been put to me personally, I would answer that under no cumstances would I favour a merger. If there are enough ple who feel as I do, then we have no option but to make a cess of 1960 and the years beyond also.

Bearing in mind that Her Majesty the Queen is not sovereign of the Indian Republic, does Mr. Todd consider that a unilateral declaration of a Rhodesian Republic could be made without breaking constitutional ties with the British throne and the Commonwealth?

If the Federal Government, by unilateral action, declared elf a republic, it would set itself against Her Majesty's Governent in the United Kingdom and would be refusing Her Majesty e Queen the right to continue to carry out her responsibilities Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Such action would be ndemned by the whole Commonwealth, with perhaps one ception, and I believe that our defiance of Her Majesty's overnment and our refusal to permit Her Majesty to carry out r responsibilities to about four millions of her subjects would ean that we would be excluded from the Commonwealth. e self-governing countries of the Commonwealth are today ost seriously concerned with the situation in Central Africa , with only one exception, they believe that racial policies e not in harmony with the spirit of the Commonwealth.

Does Mr. Todd endorse the political principle that "government should be with the consent of the governed"?

I believe that government should not only be with the conat of the governed, but that eventually it *must be* with the nsent of the governed. This consent may be a consent of quiesence, as it has been in Southern Rhodesia for many years; t those who believe that as long as Europeans control the deral elections and therefore the government and the army, ey will remain happily in control of the situation, are deluding emselves. If seven million African people, although they have vote, decide that they will not be governed by a European

government, then the situation could be made quite untenable and the resolving of it would only be a matter of time. I believe that in the case of our Federation, taking world influences into consideration, the time would be short.

6. Would Mr. Todd care to comment on the published views of the Dean of Salisbury that the blame for the emergency must be laid firmly at the feet of the Europeans?

I would rather say that the responsibility today lies with the European, for we have the power in government and as a people we have provided most of the leaders so far. The situation today calls for wise and sympathetic leadership, and the challenge is for us to provide it. If we allow the Federation to fail, then we are blameworthy. Of course we are to blame to a large extent for the mistakes of the past five years, for we have not succeeded in implementing the policy of partnership, simply because we have refused to face its implications.

7. In contrast with those of Southern and Northern Rhodesia, the Federal franchise at present virtually excludes the African from casting a vote in an ordinary constituency. Does Mr. Todd consider this inequitable?

I made my protest against the provisions of the Federal Electoral Act at the time it was considered in Parliament. It is true that there are African representatives in the Federal House, but it is also true that such special representation is not considered satisfactory by the African people themselves. Although it is estimated that 80,000 Africans could have registered on the "B" roll, fewer than 800 had done so at the time of the Federal election last year. In Northern Rhodesia the new electoral law has been gladly received by the African people, and 8,000 people registered in a short space of time. In Southern Rhodesia the response has been much less satisfactory, but the main difference between the two situations is that the Northern Rhodesia Government used its influence to encourage people to enrol, while in Southern Rhodesia no such encouragement is given. The Federal Government did try, by quite widespread propaganda, to persuade Africans to register on the "B" roll, but the "B" vote is recognized by Africans as being so inferior in

ue to the "A" vote that they are not prepared to exercise ir rights in this regard. I believe that the Federal franchise is the largest single road-block on the way to partnership. s a great pity that the Federal Government did not tackle its nchise problem in the light of the Tredgold Report, for it will v almost certainly be an item on the agenda at the 1960 talks I do not believe that it is best considered at such a Con- ence.

At the Northern Rhodesia elections last March the African vote for candidates of the United Federal Party was almost negligible. What significance does Mr. Todd attach to this?

The United Federal Party, largely because of its Federal tion, has become synonymous, in the minds of Africans, with doctrine of European supremacy. The last Federal election s simply a call by the United Federal Party for support for a vernment which promised to secure dominion status on the esent almost entirely European Federal franchise. The Federal rty had already shown that it could persuade Her Majesty's vernment in the United Kingdom to accept a Federal franchise which was quite unacceptable to Africans. This law dis- minated against Africans who were educated and responsible izens and who wished to exercise their influence in govern- nt but who did not qualify on economic grounds. A large portion of these people felt doubly aggrieved because, as chers, medical orderlies, agricultural demonstrators, they re employees of one Government or another and their aries were too small to allow them to qualify for the vote ich they believed they were entitled to exercise. No Govern- nt which takes such action is likely to gain the confidence of s, the most important political group amongst the African ople. The influence of this group is widespread and very great; as the Northern and Southern Rhodesian sections of the deral Party are so closely linked to the Federal section of the rty, they both share in the lack of confidence by the African ople.

In furthering the advancement of the African in public services and private industry, does Mr. Todd think that the principle of the "rate for the job" should be rigorously applied?

There is no doubt that when the "rate for the job" can b applied rigorously, the Federation will be in a very much sounde position economically than it is today. Wealth cannot be create by legislation, however, and the economic growth of th country and the improvement of pay and conditions will hav to march hand in hand. I believe that the conditions of pay an service which have been won by European craftsmen should b rigorously maintained, and that as other jobs can be shown to b worth higher rates of pay, these should be given. Now that th Industrial Conciliation Act has been passed, all workers will b able to concern themselves with the widest interests of labou The last employer which will be able to come into line will b government itself. In Southern Rhodesia, if the present Europea rates of pay were applied to African school teachers, grade fo grade, the wages bill would probably exceed £7,000,000 pe annum, and with other costs in education the total account fo African education would consume almost half of the tot annual revenue. There will have to be a much greater domesti output before the principle of the rate for the job can be rigo rously applied. It is to be hoped that the period of adjustmen will be as short as possible, and during that time the presen rates as applied to Europeans should be given to people of an race when they come to the same bench, desk or footplat

10. Would Mr. Todd favour legislation, Territorial o Federal, that enabled local authorities to set asid areas for unfettered non-racial occupation, residen tial, industrial and commercial?

I would favour legislation to free the whole of the commerci and industrial areas of towns from racially restrictive claus immediately, and I believe that it would be a sound policy set aside "open" residential areas, but with sound tow planning policies including minimum-value building clauses.

ATIVES NO LONGER KILL TWINS

COLIN LEYS

Author of "European Politics in Southern Rhodesia".

RATCH a Rhodesian and you'll find a South African' was the gestion offered me by a journalist soon after I arrived in tral Africa. It is a useful general prescription against being eived by 'partnership' humbug. For this humbug plays a l role in White Rhodesian attitudes.

ny group of people engaged—however reluctantly—in pressing another needs a rationale, and the more guilty that feel about it, the more this rationale consists of humbug. tler felt no guilt, and the Nazi ideology, though full of ene rubbish, contained little cant.) Most White Rhodesians their 'Britishness' above everything, and most of them have n brought up on vaguely 'public school' values. Consently they are not only very sensitive to criticism, but also onsciously guilt-ridden, and the evidence for this is the ath-taking hyprocrisy of the official 'partnership' ideology—ath-taking in scale and breath-taking in *naiveté*. (As a friend arked recently, after reading Lord Malvern's speech to the se of Lords: 'You *can't parody* these people'.)

he edifice of systematic humbug which is the modern trine of partnership is getting widely known. For anyone cares to study it in detail, it is paraded in all its pathos by G. Paver in his recent book 'His Own Oppressor', and brilly dissected by Cyril Dunn in his 'Central African Witness'. grasp its full significance, it must be seen as emerging from the ite Rhodesian's past, not merely as a shack-built affair ily run up to satisfy a dubious Colonial Office in Westminster. true that the attempt to systematise the doctrine is recent. its key elements are as deeply rooted in White Rhodesian chology as those of apartheid are in the neuroses of the Volk. me elements of White attitudes are hangovers from the iest period of settlement, the 'pioneer' phase. Central ca was supposed to be full of undervalued assets, and Rhoa was in a position to make a takeover bid. The pioneers, the settlers who came after them, were there to realize assets. A few of them shared the less material visions of des, and perhaps some could imagine a Southern Rhodesia sformed by investment and colonization into a new Cape

Colony. But the keynote of this period was, quite simply, gold Bulawayo was a mining town, full of speculators and assayers The settlers were mostly prospectors and farmers, largel amateur, whose approach to these jobs was to persuade African to dig for them on the sites of abandoned Bantu gold-workings to clear the bush where they had pegged out farms, or to her the cattle taken as spoils of war. Few had much capital, and fron this early period dates the reliance (pioneered further south on pressures other than wage-incentives to make Africans wor for White men; exasperation with the labour thus procured and phoney rationales for maintaining the discrepancy betwee White and Black pay-scales.

The 'frontier mentality' is often appealed to nowadays a a rather attractive explanation of some White Rhodesian attitudes For instance, it is said to account for an individualism which partly responsible for impatience with Colonial Office 'inter ference', and a self-reliance which makes Africans' lack of skil all the more incomprehensible and irritating to the averag European.

The trouble with this view is that there really were som self-reliant White individualists in the 1890's and after, some them men who had been roaming the country for years befor the Pioneer Column crossed the Limpopo. Selous is the mo famous of these, and he was followed by others like Chirupu Stevenson and Sir Stewart Gore-Browne in Northern Rhodesi But that generation is all but extinct, and the new one is singu larly lacking in the kind of individualism and self-reliance required by the 'frontier mentality' theory. There can in fa be few people with such a strong *collective* sense of dependen on the laws which shield them from (African) competition White Rhodesians today. Even the physical reminders of th pioneer period in the towns—colonnaded stucco stores an swing-door bars—have almost all been superseded by the co crete and glass of a highly regulated and cosy partnership betwe White capitalists and White artisans.

But the frankly materialist attitude towards the land and resources which dominated the pioneer period, and the sen of exasperated dependence on its African population, remai these correspond to a continuing reality. The Africans we regarded as, in effect, sub-human. They were cruel and bac ward. They spoke no English. They had more cattle than w good for them, yet were surly and resentful when these we

ten away. They were dangerously numerous in relation to e settlers, and had to be kept in a state of intimidation after e conquest by periodic exemplary beatings and worse. That ey rebelled in 1896, and nearly decimated the White popula- n, confirmed the very worst of the beliefs about them.

These beliefs went unchallenged by any important voice in e outside world. The protests of the Aborigines Protection ciety were dismissed as ignorant sentimentalism, while the tish public at large was riding on the full tide of imperialism. d so the real legacy of this period remains the fact that the rican population as a whole have never been accepted as ssessing the 'full human endowment'. By too many of each ceeding influx of settlers they have been regarded chiefly ne of the liabilities encumbering a real-estate venture, which White man hopes to turn into a going concern. And this, course, is what the central distinction of the 'partnership' ology—the distinction between 'civilized' and 'uncivilized' rsons—is really about. The idea of an 'uncivilized person' a modern (and very British) formula for talking about a form life which is not really a *person* at all.

n the second phase of settlement, the incoming Whites were longer strictly 'pioneers' ,but the kind of jobs they came to do mains significant today; gold small-working, railway building l operating, public works, mine engineering and management, lding. In this society the foundations of job reservation re laid; because capital investment was being pushed ahead the Chartered Company in order to get the mines and farms ing, and for this imported skills were needed. When the t phase of development proved disappointingly slow, White sans began a long struggle with employers and government get security against replacement by Africans.

The Company was the government. While Rhodes lived, thern Rhodesia was really run, as far as the settlers were cerned, like one of the proprietary colonies of America, h as Penn's Pennsylvania. 'Mr. Rhodes' periodically toured country, hearing grievances, making personal loans, promis- a bright future; and even after his death, Jameson maintained nething of this atmosphere for a few years. But after this the artered' was a more remote body with a fairly impersonal ministrator. In extracting from this form of government laws development spending designed to make their living stand- s more secure, the settlers formed an attitude towards govern-

ment which has also survived. They had come into the country on 'patriotism plus 5%', and the government's job was to underwrite this proposition.

Here is another key element in 'partnership' thought. The reiterated desire that party political divisions should remain on the 'real' (as opposed to 'racial') issues is of course one way of expressing a desire to maintain the general *status quo* of European supremacy; but it also expresses a more particular desire to maintain what is really a *communal* (White) parliament, a responsive and informal (White) administration, the *family* atmosphere of the White Whiggery. Government has always been a friend to the White Rhodesian, no matter what party has been in office (and it is no accident that one party has in fact been in office since 1934). 'Partnership' means preserving this.

Yet another strand in current settler attitudes is traceable to this period; in the early 1900's the Company turned its attention seriously to European farming, and began the chequered chapter in settler experience so vividly evoked in Doris Lessing's 'The Grass Is Singing'. This was *real* settlement. There were (and still are) relatively few White farmers; but unlike, for example, miners working on wasting orebodies, they represent the White population's faith in its own permanence. Yet of all groups in the White population, this was until recently one of the most economically insecure, and even now the image of the prosperous tobacco farmer is a misleading guide to White farming as a whole. During the depression, the farmers required a particularly wide range of discriminatory measures and subsidies to keep them on the land; their insecurity and the remedies adopted for it epitomized the insecurity of the high-consumption White population as a whole.

Speaking generally, the depression years produced the apparatus of White supremacy in Southern Rhodesia as we know it—the Land Apportionment Act, the Industrial Conciliation Act, the Public Services Act, etc. Segregation was embodied in the law under the slogan of 'parallel development', without any interference from Britian. This was the work of settler government (responsible government was granted in 1923). And here above all, is the key to the *humbug* in 'partnership' ideology.

Its major tenet is that sovereignty belongs to all 'civilized' persons, discovered by criteria which take no account of colour. Yet there can be few electorates with so clear a notion of the

in which a White monopoly of political power is essential White social and economic privileges.

om the 1930's also dates the settler bugbear of 'outside rference'. As everyone knows, it was Lord Passfield's us 1930 declaration on the 'paramountcy' of native interests Northern Rhodesia which touched off the settler pressures h eventually led to Federation. But the settlers' morbid itivity to the new criticism is of more general interest. etrayed some of the guilt which underlies White ideology Central Africa. And it illustrated an already well-developed lency to project blame for internal difficulties onto scape-s. 'Outside interference' began to replace 'big business' 'monopolies,' and take its place alongside the Africans' kwardness, irresponsibility and idleness, as a general cause of culties which, in reality, were due to the high standard of which the settlers required an impoverished country to vide.

he years just before Federation saw two final evolutions of ler ideology. One was due to immigration. Many of the new-ers were fugitives from Crippsian austerity in England, er middle- and upper working-class people whose rejection he Welfare State ethos was highly consistent with the inegali-an values of White Rhodesia. There was also a new super-tum of the administrative and professional classes, and these ished some of the more articulate propagandists called for the final stage in ideological growth.

Parallel development' had to be exchanged for a coherent doctrine to form a basis on which the British Government ld agree to federate the Protectorates with Southern desia. It is fascinating to trace Welensky's transformation n being a militant trade union leader, and frank champion White interests, to being the oracle of 'partnership'. His logical and tactical mentors in this process are typical of astute new 'backroom' ideologists. (These are a kind of eral realists' whose liberal object is to keep more reactionary ticians out of office, and whose realistic method is to ensure the present government is always quick enough to take tionary measures itself.)

nd so the Central African Europeans confront reality with doctrine of 'partnership', the doctrine that the whole of this , with its 7 million inhabitants, can be run 'for the fore-ble future' by a government responsible only to a handful

of those who, in the eyes of the settlers, are 'civilized'—all t
settlers, and perhaps a few thousand Africans; the doctrine th
the 'real' issues do not (or must not) include the colour-ba
the doctrine that the 'average' ('uncivilized') African is ignora
and politically indifferent; the doctrine that the 'emerger
African is forming a new 'African middle-class' which w
identify itself with the settlers and their regime.

Not a very convincing doctrine, objectively regarded, and th
seems to be why it is often bolstered by mystical appeals to t
historic civilizing mission of the White man, with his 2,000 yea
of civilization behind him; to irrelevant and dubious theori
of Bantu racial characteristics, to time, and to anti-Communism
and why such phrenetic emphasis is placed on the theoretic
differences between the doctrine of 'partnership' and that
'apartheid'.

For the doctrine of 'partnership' cannot be abandoned, howev
unconvincing it may be. Its essential tenets spring from de
psychological imperatives of the settlers' situation.

Once we grasp that this ideology is indispensable, we c
begin to understand the ferocity which its protagonists a
capable of displaying towards African nationalism. The ve
phenomenon contradicts the 'partnership' ideology in a w
that is not necessarily true for 'apartheid'. According to t
former, most Africans are ignorant and politically apatheti
consequently manifestations of independent African mass orga
zation must be the work of 'agitators', malevolent, and se
seeking corrupters of the uncivilized masses. Against the
people partnership is engaged in a crusade. The champions
partnership look upon the ruthless imprisonment of 1,0
African leaders with the satisfaction of worthy policemen w
have rounded up a gang of racketeers. It is even clear from Wh
reactions to the emergency that the fifty obscure people w
have been killed in Nyasaland are widely looked upon as victi
not of the troops, but of the African Congress! (In the same v
Lord Malvern once spoke as if the people killed by the pol
in Nyasaland in the anti-federation disturbances of 1953, h
really been killed by Michael Scott). And the police-state appa
tus currently being rushed through to completion is not regar
as a grim necessity to preserve White control, but is welcom
by all White parties for the 'protection' it affords to the ordin
African.

In other words, there is a grim aspect to the 'partnersh

ibug. Its lack of contact with reality is appalling; yet since arports to embody all the moral values of the 'British way of , any challenge to it is treated as vicious, justifying rigorous ression.

is no accident that the recent wave of repressive measures justified as a response to a series of 'plots', alleged or hinted only the Nyasaland 'plot' charges were ever specified). nard Hofstadter, speaking of the extreme right in the U.S.A., aptly identified the readiness to believe in 'conspiracies' as *paranoiac stage* of reasoning on the part of any group of ple whose aims and beliefs have moved too far out of touch n the actual trend of reality.

ust how out of touch they are, Cyril Dunn poignantly reminds vith a Rhodesian newspaper headline whose fatuous ineptitude tures perfectly the ignorance, the doomed good intentions of rtnership' liberalism: NATIVES NO LONGER KILL TWINS THEY ARE PROUD OF THEM.

LABOUR AND CENTRAL AFRICA

BARBARA CASTLE, M.P.
Chairman of the British Labour Party.

THE crisis in Central Africa, which many of us believed wa bound to break around our heads in 1960, has come earlier tha we thought. And the point of explosion has proved, after all, t be Nyasaland. When I was in the Federation fifteen months ago I did not realize how imminent was the explosion there. Certainl there was restiveness in Nyasaland. Nearly all the people I me of all races—African M.P.s and members of provincial councils chiefs, European missionaries and Asians, too—pressed upo me how genuine were African fears of Federation and how muc the normally happy relations between Africans and governmen officials had deteriorated as a result. I remember, too, a hecti evening spent in the Ndirande Club at Limbe, being delightfull entertained by a large number of Africans who, after plying m with refreshments, drew their chairs round in a ring and argue with me for two hours excitedly, but always courteously, o the question of whether Nyasaland should secede from th Federation. They brushed aside my plea that it was far mor constructive for them to back the Labour Party's policy trying to liberalize and democratize the Federation as a conditio of its continuance. They clearly thought I was living in a drea world, and in the end I was disconcerted when, after what felt was an eloquent and unanswerable plea to them not t divide the African cause inside the Federation by contractin out, they cheered to the echo the simple and emphatic inte jection by Mr. Wellington Chirwa (then a Federal M.P.) "We will never accept the Federation. We intend to secede.

The truth is that neither I, nor any of us in Britain, had realize the extent to which Federal (i.e. Southern Rhodesian) pow was spreading through the Protectorates, robbing them of the traditional sense of security and bringing African fears to boilin point. Recent events, which have revealed the true intentions the Federal Government, have proved that the Africans had better assessment of the situation than we had. And that asses ment has driven them to take action on their own behalf in t belief that no-one else is likely to take it for them. The challen which faces us now is therefore threefold. First, how can w save Nyasaland from becoming another Cyprus, in which t

timate demands of the African people become lost to view in
icious round of violence and counter-violence? Secondly,
at are the principles with which we should approach the 1960
iew of the future of Federation? And thirdly, how can we,
practical politicians, ensure that those principles are carried
o effect?

None of these problems is easy to solve. If we are ever to
ve them, we must get certain basic facts clear. To begin with,
must not allow our assessment of the Nyasaland situation to
bedevilled with talk of either Communist or Mau Mau plots.
course, the return of Dr. Banda to Nyasaland last July has
tributed to the flare-up of the crisis there, because he is a
gle-minded and effective exponent of secession. I talked to
n in the House of Commons just before his return, and it
s clear to me then that he was implacable on this issue.
ied on him, too, my argument that the Africans in all three
ritories in the Federation should concert their strength in
ler to improve the Federation rather than abandon it. He
ened politely enough, but I sensed he was not impressed.
, like the Africans I met in Nyasaland, obviously believed that
encroachments of the Federal Government had already gone
far as to endanger the development of Nyasaland as an African
te, and he was determined to save what he could from the
ead of White dominance. Whether we agree with this
roach or not, it is a perfectly legitimate political aim.

t is clear, also, that the Accra Conference has contributed
the developments in Nyasaland—but not in the crude way
t Sir Roy Welensky believes. I know from the reports I have
eived from British M.P.s who were present at Accra that
s was far from being a Communist-run show. On the contrary,
. Tom Mboya, as Chairman, was scrupulously careful not to
the Russian and Chinese fraternal delegates dominate the
ceedings to the detriment of British or American represen-
ves. No, Accra had a different significance from this. It was
symbol of the spread of African rights in an African continent.
e presence there of representatives of African movements all
r Africa, some of them in government and some still fighting
the barest recognition, gave a tremendous impetus to the
m of "Africa for the Africans". But from all the reports it
uld seem that this claim is still being advanced, not in the
row sense of "Black racialism", but in the unanswerable
n of the demand for full democratic rights for all peoples.

The net of African nationalism is steadily tightening roun the last two remaining enclaves of rich, White settler privilege– Kenya and the Central African Federation—and inside thes enclaves the Europeans are making a last desperate bid to appl different conditions for African advance than are now accepted i the rest of Africa. These areas with large European minorities or with strong economic White interests, *do* present speci problems which will need all our tact and understanding t solve without violence—on either side. But certainly there i no hope of solving them unless we first clear hypocrisy out o the way and face the realities. The worst enemies of mult racialism or 'partnership' are those who elevate temporar political expedients like a qualified franchise into a permanen constitutional principle, and so make 'partnership' a synonyn for the indefinite denial of African democratic rights.

It would appear that some of the Europeans in Kenya ar beginning to realize this. For all its faults, the organization o moderates launched by Mr. Michael Blundell has produced statement with one important virtue: it recognizes that Keny is a state in which eventually the African majority must dominate Once this goal is accepted by Europeans and the correct principl taken as the basis of discussion, agreement about the rate o progress towards the goal becomes much more feasible. Unfo tunately, in the Central African Federation there is no sign y of an equivalent recognition among the Europeans of this fac If there were, the last thing they would be pressing for at th moment would be greater powers for the Federal Governmen and early independence from Westminster. If there is one thin which history makes clear (as events both in South Africa ar Southern Rhodesia have proved) it is this: to grant independen to a territory while power is in the hands of a racial minori is not progress towards democracy, but a retreat from it. Th very inability of even self-styled "enlightened" Europe leaders like Sir Roy Welensky to realize this simple truth prov that they are not fit to exercise the greater political powers f which they are clamouring.

Indeed, looking back at the behaviour of the Federal leade over the past six years, the fears of those of us who doubted t wisdom of rushing through Federation so quickly have be fully justified. It pleases Sir Roy to attack the Labour Party descending "to any level to damage the Federation". But t Federation has been damaged, perhaps irretrievably, by tho

have used it merely as a stepping stone to dominion status, have lost no opportunity of weakening Colonial Office trol over the two protectorates and who have pressed greedily bigger and quicker transfers of power to the politically renched White minority. In this way they have kept African s at fever-point. The contempt they have shown for those s, their refusal to modify their demands by one jot in order llay them, show that their desire is not for a policy of partner- at all. And now they are reaping the harvest of African stance in Nyasaland.

qually tragic has been the folly of the British Government supporting, and even encouraging, Federal ambitions over past six years. The agreement signed in 1957 between the onial Secretary, Mr. Lennox Boyd, and Sir Roy Welensky as eral Prime Minister was a gratuitous contribution to African s. The agreement not only enhanced the status and prestige the Federation by granting it increased responsibility for ernal affairs—at a time when the whole experiment was less n four years old and was still very far from being accepted by Africans—it contained a more sinister element. This was famous declaration that the British Government recognizes existence of a 'convention' whereby the Government "in ctice does not initiate any legislation to amend or repeal any eral Act or to deal with any matter included within the npetence of the Federal Legislature, except at the request of Federal Government." The purpose of this 'convention,' two statesmen declared, was to clear up any "doubts" ut the purpose and effect of Article 29(7) of the Federal nstitution, which provides that "nothing in this constitution l effect any power to make laws for the Federation or any he Territories conferred on Her Majesty by any Act of the liament of the United Kingdom." Thus the aim of the nvention" was to present any critics of the Federation who ht succeed the present British Government in office with *fait accompli* of virtual Federal independence. And, indeed, Roy went back to Salisbury to assure his jubilant European iences that he had "dished the Labour Party."

uch a convention has not, of course, statutory authority. annot over-ride Article 29. Nonetheless it is an indication he extent to which Sir Roy has been steadily mobilizing his es to make political war on any British Government which not give him his own way. It is an indication, also, of the

open way in which the British Government has sided with
present rulers of the Federation against the views of the Afri
majority. Another example of this bias was, of course, given
the Colonial Secretary when he over-rode the objections of
African Affairs Board to the Federal Franchise Bill. Thus
stage has been set for the present troubles which arise direc
from the growing African belief that the Colonial Office
no longer the will or the power to protect African rights
that their only hope was to organize to protect themselv

Over the past eighteen months the British Labour Party
become increasingly alarmed about these developments. In
first few years of the Federation's life, despite the Party's str
objection to the imposition of Federation, there was a genu
acceptance inside the Party of the need to try and make it wo
partly for economic reasons and partly, too, because the Pa
hoped that progressive racial policies operating in the Prot
torates would help to liberalize the Federation as a whole. B
following the British Government's treatment of the Afri
Affairs Board, the mood has changed. In March, 1958, the Pa
issued a statement which spelt out in precise terms the conditi
on which alone it believed the Federation could endure. Th
included "an unequivocal statement that the objective of
Federation is complete democracy and equal rights for ev
citizen"; the revision of the Federal franchise "to ensure genu
African representation in the Federal Parliament"; and
rapid elimination of racial discrimination in social relati
industry and education. And it added sternly that: "It will be
reference to the progress made in these matters that the Lab
Party will decide its attitude at the conference which is
review the future of the Federation in 1960."

The issue between the Labour Party and Sir Roy Welensky
therefore, clearly joined. The Labour Party does not only
the statement also points out) stand by the Preamble to
Federal constitution which provides that Northern Rhodesia
Nyasaland shall continue as separate Protectorates "for as
as their respective peoples so desire." It has also laid down
principle that the very existence of the Federation is still co
tional. This implies a power of interference by the Br
Parliament to ensure that those conditions are met, a right w
Sir Roy Welensky would bitterly repudiate. Indeed Lab
Members have also been sharply reminding the Southern
desian Government that its self-governing status does not

arte blanche to treat its African population as it likes. For a
g time the powers of the Secretary of State for Common-
alth Relations under Sections 28 and 30 of the Southern
desia Constitution Letters Patent, 1923, to veto measures
ch unfairly discriminate against African citizens, have fallen
disuse. But Labour Members are now invoking them against
Unlawful Organization Bill, the Preventive Detention Bill
the amendment to the Native Affairs Act recently introduced
the Southern Rhodesian legislature. Although the motion
ing on the Secretary of State to exercise these powers is an
fficial back-bench one, it has nonetheless been signed by a
e and representative group of Labour M.P.s.

is clear, therefore, that both main political groupings in
British Parliament are taking up their positions in readiness
the 1960 review. And it is against this background that the
ubles in Nyasaland must be considered. The Africans there
e launched a new and lively agitation for secession because
y believe it is their only hope. Faced with this, the British
vernment had two alternatives: either to suppress African
ation and thus risk forcing it into patterns of violence and
derground terror; or to seek to allay it by offering the Africans
stitutional means of defending themselves. The obvious way
doing this was by speeding up the constitutional reforms
ady promised for Nyasaland. Indeed, Lord Perth, Minister of
te for Colonial Affairs, was due to visit Nyasaland for consti-
onal talks at the very time that the disturbances began. If
British Government was ready to redress the balance of
ver between African and European in the Federation, and so
y African fears, it would have jumped at Lord Perth's visit as a
ven-sent opportunity. Instead, to the consternation of the
our Opposition, it announced that Lord Perth's visit was to
postponed because it had decided that "against this back-
und of violence and unrest . . . the proposed constitutional
s cannot at present be held." The Labour Party denounced
as the old, old imperialist tactic of refusing reforms until
est breaks out and then using the unrest as the excuse for not
oducing the reforms. Mr. James Callaghan, from the Labour
t bench, reminded the Government that an all-party parlia-
tary delegation to the Federation had recommended unani-
sly as long ago as 1957 that "a bold increase in representative
ernment in the Territories" was urgently necessary! But in

Was the Government's action due to stupidity or somethi more sinister? In the debate on Nyasaland on March 3rd, t Colonial Secretary revealed that he had very different ide about constitutional reforms for Nyasaland than either t Opposition, or the African representatives with whom he h had informal talks, had been led to believe. "I have repeated made it clear to the House," he said, "that the Nyasala Constitution, which came into being in 1956, would have run until May, 1960, when the life of the present legislatu expires." Challenged as to exactly what that meant, he adde "We would agree well before May, 1960, on what the chang thereafter were to be." Labour M.P.s were quick to point o that this would be too late to give the Africans effective repr sentation at the 1960 review. Only one interpretation can be p on this policy: that the Government is not sorry to see troub flare up in Nyasaland, for the disturbances enable it to suppre the African National Congress just as it is beginning to grow strength, to introduce sweeping emergency powers and to su pend constitutional talks.

Equally irresponsible and provocative was the Governmen action (again taken in the teeth of Labour protests) of allowi Federal (i.e. Southern Rhodesian) forces to be drafted in Nyasaland. This was followed by a further affront to the Briti Parliament in the deportation by Federal immigration authoriti of Mr. John Stonehouse, M.P. The fact that he had been deport from a British Protectorate, Northern Rhodesia, when on h way to visit another Protectorate, Nyasaland, brought hon sharply the extent to which the powers of the House of Commo are being undermined. The Commonwealth Relations Offi hurried out a document to prove that the Federal Governme was within its legal powers, since the Federal constitution giv it sole jurisdiction over immigration policy. Again the Labo Opposition called on the Government to protest against t action, tabling a motion declaring that "the entry of a citiz of the United Kingdom into a British Protectorate should not subject to the veto of the Federal Government." But in va The Government's determination to enforce the authority the Federal Government at every stage has only strengthened t demand of the Labour Party (made in its statement of Marc 1958) that in 1960 "there should be a review of the powers the federal and territorial governments so that the position of t Protectorates is safeguarded."

is because of the partiality persistently shown by the British ernment that the Labour Party views with deep scepticism stories of a "massacre plot," first revealed to an astonished mmons by the Colonial Secretary on March 3rd and later, er pressure from the Opposition for more facts, "sub-tiated" in a White Paper. But by now the Labour Party thoroughly alarmed by the revelations of the Government's od. We know from bitter experience over Cyprus how skilled Government is at obscuring its own designs by drawing red rings of "violence" across the trail. The Labour Party mptly, therefore, trumped the Government's card by offering o-operate in sending a parliamentary commission to Nyasaland nvestigate the background to the disturbances. The Govern-nt at first refused this out of hand, but, under the pressure public opinion, was compelled to make some gesture of sonableness. It therefore announced the appointment, not of a liamentary commission, (which would have confirmed the onsibility of the House of Commons for Federal affairs), of an independent inquiry under a High Court judge. On rch 25th last, the Labour Party issued another statement, coming the setting up of this commission, but urging that hould have adequate powers. The announcement since then he powers of the commission proves, alas, that they will be from adequate. The commission will sit in private; it will have the right to compel the attendance of witnesses; worst ll, those implicated in the inquiry will not be entitled to be sent when evidence is being given against them and nor will ir legal representatives. They will not even be allowed to w the specific charges brought against them. It is a parody n inquiry. The only ray of hope lies in the chairman, Mr. tice Devlin, a man of fearless judgment and formidable intel-. If any good comes of the inquiry, it will be because he has mphed over the difficulties its limited powers put in his way. What, then, of the future? Clearly, the position in Nyasaland remain one of stalemate until the commission has reported. , whatever the commission finds, the political needs of saland remain unchanged. Even if it can be proved that unrest e is beginning to take illegal forms, the solution is still the e. The African people must be allowed to organize politically, the African National Congress is the obvious political instru-nt for this purpose. It is the wildest folly that it should be ned. Moreover, as the Labour Party points out in its recent

statement, the need for constitutional progress in Nyasalan greater now, not less. Constitutional reforms, guaranteein majority of elected Africans in the Nyasaland legislative cou and the appointment of African ministers equal in number those of other races, must be put in hand immediately—bef not after, the 1960 review. Talks along these lines with Afr leaders should start at once. The "state of emergency", advan as an excuse for not holding them, must be lifted. Those ag whom criminal charges can be advanced should be brough trial; the rest must be released.

But, thanks to the folly of the British Government, these measures may no longer be enough. The Africans no lo have confidence that dominion status is not going to be imp on them, just as Federation was. The people of Nyasaland the right to know that, if they wish to leave the Federat the British Government does not intend to keep them against their will. Personally I still believe that the secessio Nyasaland from a Federation continuing broadly on the old would be a gesture of defeat—that what we must aim keeping our forces intact until 1960, when the whole pos must be fundamentally reviewed. But our only hope of doing is to assure the Nyasalanders *now* that when 1960 comes, sece will be on the agenda if by then they still insist on it.

On March 24th, the Government informed Parliament th would be shortly putting forward proposals on the best w preparing for the Federal review. And it promised that P ment would be associated "in an appropriate way" with machinery that might be set up. So far so good. Welcoming news, the Labour Party has suggested that a parliame commission should be appointed immediately to examine background of all the issues involved, and it insists that s commission "*should consider every possible alternative for the of the three territories.*" Stormy days lie ahead. The only w which we shall weather them is if the British Parliament re-a its full authority and comes to this tragic situation with an mind, ready to give due weight to the mounting anxieties African people and to take any steps that may be needed them at rest. It is for this that the Labour Party fights and prepared to face all the consequences.

"GUILTY UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT"

KENYA AT THE CROSS-ROADS

TOM MBOYA, M.L.C.

Chairman of the All-African Peoples' Conference, Secretary-General of the F Federation of Labour and Member of the Kenya Legislative Council.

In the turmoil of events, one may overlook the importanc the need for a sense of direction; and this, indeed, is the c of the struggle in Kenya. Ever since the first African elect in March, 1957, the African elected members have deman that Britain declare its ultimate objective in Kenya. For absence of any positive policy of transitional developm towards a known and accepted goal has resulted in conten forces laying emphasis on such development as will satisfy those aims beneficial to their respective groups.

Kenya's political development cannot ignore trends in neighbouring territories; nor the mood, atmosphere and p set by events in Africa generally. There have been those have attempted to isolate Kenya and to discover for it a un solution. One European settler leader stated late in 1 that Kenya could not develop into another Ghana—by whic meant attainment of independence on the 'one man, one v principle—or another Central Africa—by which he m 'partnership' as defined by Sir Roy Welensky. But ha stated that Kenya is different and denied to it this line of deve ment or that, these critics steer sedulously clear of commi themselves to any definite declaration of their own. A han of European settlers recently proposed that Kenya should dev towards self-government in pockets—that each of the provi should become a near-autonomous state, so that the 'W Highlands' could remain White. But this idea was so pate ludicrous that the bulk of settlerdom either strongly attacke ignored it.

What is Kenya to be? To the leaders of African opinion answer is clear—an independent democracy founded on univ suffrage, from which discrimination in all its forms is outla Their attention is no longer focussed on what Kenya is to bec but on how and when they can attain this clear objective.

And Kenya must be seen in the context of the African awa ing, as manifested in the All-African Peoples' Conferenc Accra in December, 1958. How can Kenya hope to escape the sequences of the discussions there? The Conference adopt

programme the co-ordination of all efforts in the African ggle for freedom, by creating facilities for co-operative on and mutual help. It passed resolutions on the particular blems or circumstances of individual territories, including on Kenya. But the constant theme was that Africa had to be d from colonial rule and White settler domination, and ernments responsible to the people established in their place. hout doubt, this has vastly increased the vigour and self- idence of the Africans in their struggle—the Kenyans need onger regard themselves as alone. Another development, lly important and much closer to home, was the establish- t of the Pan African Freedom Movement for East and Central ca at a conference of African leaders from East and Central ca held in Mwanza during September last year. This too at co-operative action and mutual help. When, in May, 8, seven African members were brought to trial on charges of minal libel and conspiracy, many nationalist organisations in and Central Africa sent contributions towards their defence, id a number of individuals and organisations in Europe and erica, while Ghana actually sent a defence lawyer—who was sed entry by the Kenya Government.

is impossible that Kenya should be considered in isolation events elsewhere in Africa, its development oblivious of political mood of the Continent. And the inconsistencies of ish policy in East Africa aggravate an already urgent grievance. le remaining silent on the future of Kenya, Britain has seen pronounce that Uganda, Tanganyika, Somalia and Aden are e developed towards democratic self-rule. Kenya cannot d to remain for long without a sense of direction. For the rtainty caused by this scrupulous silence is rotting patience trust.

frican fear and suspicion of White supremacy is justified and erstandable The African demands and must have a position eal effectiveness in the government as his only safeguard ast a possible South African type of European domination in ya and Central Africa. Despite African opposition in 1953, Central African Federation was imposed on the peoples of thern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Since then the Africans continued to plead for a reversal of this decision. They petitioned, made repeated representations, argued and ted. In vain. The British Government betrayed them—it ted the African Affairs Board advice on the Central African

Franchise Bill and the Constitutional Amendment Bill, both which were patent discriminatory measures—while Sir Ro Welensky has threatened and bullied them. And in 1960, th Federal Constitution is due for review. Welensky has public stated that he considers the grant of dominion status as the logic step to be taken next year; and, as if to give his subjects a for taste of what such independence will mean, he has encouraged situation in which the Congresses have been outlawed and the leaders detained for the impertinence of opposition to Whit supremacy. No further warning is necessary. Dominio status now would destroy all African hopes for developmer towards democratic government and lead to the disease of anothe South Africa. Small wonder then that the Africans in nearb Kenya fear for their future and demand an early proclamatio of Britain's ultimate intentions towards the colony.

The last two years have seen an intensified constitution struggle in Kenya. In March, 1957, the newly elected Africa members of the Legislative Council declared the Lyttelto Constitution void and rejected the two £3,500 a year ministeri posts offered to the African people. In July the African Electe Members' Organisation sent a two-man delegation to London, explain to the British Government and public its case in rejecti the Lyttelton Constitution, with its White-dominated Counc and Cabinet. In October of the same year, Mr. Lennox-Boy visited Kenya; and without consulting, or even discussing h proposals with all the racial groups, decided to impose a ne constitution.

The Lennox-Boyd Constitution conceded an increase of s more seats to the Africans, bringing their representation parity with the European settlers. But despite this appare advance, the Constitution still preserved European dominance the Council of Ministers, and introduced twelve new Legislati Council seats—4 European, 4 Asian, and 4 African—elected the legislature itself sitting as an electoral college. Since t legislature has an overwhelming European membership, a ca didate for these seats must receive the majority support of t European members in order to be elected. No wonder th that the Africans chosen to fill the four special seats tend to refle European political demands.

Unhesitatingly, the African elected members continued their boycott of the Council of Ministers, and during 19 pressed in the Legislative Council for the appointment of

nstitutional expert and the convening of a round-table nference. All their efforts, however, were defeated by a mbination of European settler representatives and Government tes in the legislature. Since 1957, the Asians have publicly clared their support for the African demands, and their presentatives have consistently voted with the African members all these issues. Even one European member, Mr. S. V. oke, has boldly broken ranks and supported the Africans in ir efforts, being censured as a result by some of his European nstituents. Yet the coalition of settler and Government presentatives has won the day. Mr. E. A. Vasey, Kenya's nance Minister, failed to win one of the twelve special seats cause Europeans disapproved of his public declaration that nya would one day have a predominantly African government. In January, 1959, the Africans decided to carry their resistance the Lennox-Boyd Constitution even further, by boycotting the sions of the Legislative Council until their demands were perly considered; and the Indian members—in accordance th a resolution passed at their Congress meeting in April, 58—decided to boycott the legislature indefinitely as well. February, the non-European elected members of the Legislative uncil, joined by Mr. Cooke, decided to send the first-ever nt delegation to the United Kingdom to press for a declaration policy towards Kenya, the appointment of a constitutional pert and the convening of a round table conference. This egation, which visited London in April, was historic and in lf fulfilled two important functions. It established once and all that the Africans are not alone in their dissatisfaction with present constitution, and illustrated that it is the European tlers who constitute the stumbling-block in any efforts to ive at a settlement. All previous talk by the settlers that y alone are capable of leading the country has been made icrous by their obvious disunity and lack of any leadership or icy.

Recent activities by Europeans have consisted mainly in itless cries for leadership and a positive policy. A Con- tion of European Associations was held in Nairobi on 10th rch, but all it was able to accomplish was a call for continued lonial Office control of Kenya for the foreseeable future. s is a complete reversal of their 1956 policy, which sought mediate self-government under European control. It is ious that European settlers are today caught between fear and

realism. They are afraid that democracy will mean an African government which will 'get its own back' by discriminating against them, and will tear down the fence protecting the "White Highlands". They are realistic enough to know—although they are afraid to say so publicly—that whatever they do African rule in Kenya is on its way. They do not know how to adapt themselves to this new situation and especially how to become part of it. In this, Tanganyika will perhaps provide them with an urgently needed answer. Meanwhile they look to Britain for help, and find little comfort in Britain's refusal to speak out and give them a lead. After the recent events in Central Africa, the Kenya European cannot hope to look to Roy Welensky for ultimate rescue.

In all this confusion, it is necessary to restate the African stand. The Africans demand that it be recognized that Kenya is an African country. It has 6,000,000 Africans to 200,000 immigrants, and any democracy must inevitably and rightly lead to a predominantly African government. As against a racialist Black State, the African has accepted the only rational compromise—a democracy recognizing the rights of all citizens regardless of race or colour, guaranteeing individual property rights and equality before the law, and upholding the civil rights of all citizens through the functioning of an impartial judiciary. The Africans do not and cannot agree that the "White Highlands" should remain the prerogative of any one race, nor can they accept segregation in schools and hospitals. The African leaders guarantee just compensation to any persons affected in the process of reorganizing the country's economic structure when independence is attained. As against this, the settlers offer nothing but undefined partnership and a great deal of vague talk about government by people of integrity and civilized standards. This is the same language that was used in South Africa in 1910 and in Central Africa in 1953; and the evident results are painful reminders to the Africans of the consequences to be expected from any simple faith in words, however sweet they may sound.

The Kenya Government is currently in panic; and arbitrary arrests and detentions continue to hound the Africans in the struggle. But the fight for self-government cannot be stopped by bars or by bullets. History has shown itself a faithful and victorious ally.

A SOUTH AFRICAN IN NIGERIA

EZEKIEL MPHAHLELE

Author and Journalist, now lecturing at the University College of Nigeria.

E moment I stepped off at Kano airport in Northern Nigeria elt a wonderful sense of release. Being here in Lagos feels e having jumped suddenly out of a nightmare. How else it be? There I was, on the night of September 6, walking oss from the giant KLM plane to the airport offices, to find migration, customs and other departments all staffed by icans. And then to be accorded such civility as I could er dream of in any government office in South Africa.

You leave Ikeja airport on the outskirts of Lagos and drive o the city. The headmaster next to you, who has come fetch you in his car, says you are welcome. The daily form greeting the Nigerian keeps to is "welcome!"—when you e been to town and have come back home, when you have n taking the air outside in the yard and re-enter the house. d more often than not, it is accompanied by a handshake. s man has the genuine self-assurance you will not easily find an African headmaster in the South to-day. He doesn't in terror of being sacked if he says anything the Government s not like. In any case, there is no Bantu Education for to administer. He talks to you, and you—you are half-ening. Because you are trying to find your mental bearings. see the beauty of Nigeria's national dress: not painted with zling colours, and yet bright and Oriental. The gestures he people strike a familiar chord as they speak, because you are African.

As you travel through the suburbs of Lagos, you are struck the number of whites living among Africans; by the vigorous of brisk trading; and by the lust for life that is not, as it is ng my people in the South, brought into relief because eone is trying to beat it down, because it seeks to vindicate lf. And you cannot help thinking of the suburbs you your-come from—drab and neurotic except on Thursdays, when can domestic workers are off duty and inject a new life into streets.

ou enter Lagos and there is the same feverish life you're d to seeing in other cities. But people are milling about arrow streets, crowded to a constant jostle. There is the

island portion of the town, a vast lagoon caressing its shore This is the metropolis, joined to the mainland suburbs by long and sturdy bridge. It is a fever of trading and bargainin Women sit in endless rows on the edge of the street, sellin their lengths of cloth and groceries and haberdashery. An in the vast markets, again women predominate. And yo wonder what is coming over Africa! In one respect women i South Africa are more emanicipated, and then in another th illiterate and semi-illiterate women of the north reach an almo frightening stage of self-reliance. Then again you remembe that African women in South Africa are at this very mome revolting against tradition and Government bullying.

Still more trading! Scores of bars and bottle stores, license to sell beers, wines and spirits to anybody. Several of the bars will carry slogans like "God be with thee" or "The Lo loves everyone." The African-owned buses running betwe Lagos and the provinces will carry similar slogans—"Thy w be done, O Lord."

The town is badly planned. Because there is only o bridge, lines and lines of cars and buses crawl like great snak every morning into the business centre, flanked by swarms cyclists who stream into town with a vengeance. There is n a single straight street in Lagos.

The Mosque is in the heart of the town. On Fridays you s myriads of African Moslems spill out of it. They cling to t walls outside, sandals off, listening to the big booming lou speaker.

You drop in at any hotel or bar or club and you have to sha off any bravado you may be thinking of exhibiting, because isn't needed! But as soon as you have been introduced as South African, you are treated with something like spec consideration or indulgence. A few come around you a want to know if it is true what they read about in the sca news reports concerning South Africa; if things are as bad Alan Paton paints them in the book which they heard read o the wireless. You fill in the details, but there are always t many for any one sitting. And you have now unleashed u ending recitals about the grandness and virtues of emerg Nigeria. . . .

Some parts of the town are ugly slums, glorified Sophiatov and Shanty Towns. But it has its beautiful sections, like magnificently laid-out civil servants' suburb of Ikoyi. A pl

il recently the preserve of the whites, now Africans have ered. And a number of blocks of flats here are occupied by h black and white.

A "Nigerianization office" is in existence. It promotes sciously the entry of Africans into government departments displace white colonials. A few whites still retain their s, as in Ghana. A few whites own large departmental res. But they don't get in the way, because they are here y on lease terms. Recently, I am told, a white man was arged with inciting a dog to bite an African. He was found lty and sentenced to a large fine and a stroke with the cane a black magistrate. The incident aroused indignation in expected quarters. On appeal, the corporal punishment s scrapped.

Impulsively, I should applaud the former sentence. For I n't see anything in it that is disproportionate to the charge. t I have suffered too much and seen too many people suffer en more in South Africa to applaud. If I thought at any time t the magistrate was being vindictive, I'd understand. But would not approve it.

And so you go from one experience to another. Yes, you're oreigner; but then justly one, not a foreigner in your native d. Soon I shall be visiting Ibadan in the north, the centre Nigeria's intellectual and cultural life. I know that I am in more startling experiences. The contrasts are very sharp tween the black man's life in South Africa and in Nigeria. ey act violently upon me. Here I am, moving where I e at any time of day or night, without the fear of being stopped a policeman who will shout at me for my pass; or a police- n who will rummage my pockets and bag in search of some- ng illicit—that policeman whom I learned to fear and later hate when I was twelve in the slums of Pretoria; that police- n whose shining badge and handcuffs have always spelt for the terror of police stations, cells and prison forts, and the bidding faces of magistrates and clerks of the Court—all ged to destroy me. No, there is no fear of meeting that iceman of whom my youngest son, aged four, asks, "Is he ming to arrest me, Daddy?" when he sees him pass in front our house. Here I am, breathing the ordinary air of freedom l testing its salty freshness as I stand on the bridge, looking across the glistening ripples of the lagoon. I am in the midst a friendly people whose temperament has nothing to do with

the romantic idea of the savagery, the torrid mood of the Equator.

It is a terrible thing, this importing one's prejudices into a community where they are even now already contraband, or have always been. For instance, when I am asked, as I often am, "are you natives in South Africa doing anything . . .?" my sensibilities are jolted. I find myself explaining the offensive use of "native" in South Africa (with a condescending capital 'N' in the white press). "We the natives of Nigeria" is a common phrase here, and an innocent one, too.

When I meet a white man I unconsciously get on my guard and over-emphasize my sense of independence. Many of the whites I have met here—on an intellectual level—don't encourage one to talk about South Africa. There is about them a mixture of righteous aloofness or indifference and a British dislike of anything that is regarded as distasteful or distressing. Not that it would matter one way or another what they thought about the South; they are such a small number anyhow. Still, their attitude cannot evade a foreigner.

Recently, I asked an African to do my laundry at his own fee. He also washes for a group of whites on the premises where I live. When they found out that he was doing my washing in the same bath he was using for theirs, they told him he must come and wash for me in the building I am occupying. When I was told of it, my temperature went skywards. It had touched the sensitized tissues of my response mechanism. I thought if it were a problem of soap and other things they would have given the washerman a hint. My intention was to say to them incisively if they ever broached the matter: "Being from South Africa, I understand." They haven't said anything about it yet. While I am about it, I want also to ask them and other whites if it is common in Britain to call men-servants "boys"—a word used freely here when a man is referred to. See what I mean?

I enter a European store, and, of course, I am confronted by a crowd of black assistants, placid, obliging, if rather non-committal, and all on their toes. Ah, what a difference—the whole atmosphere. But I'm itching for an encounter, such as is the lot of many non-whites when they enter a store in Africa's Deep South. There is a European manager in a cubicle there. Incidentally, I must see him about a radio I want to buy on a hire purchase agreement. I'm all keyed up. But there he sits

d talks to me, innocent as an egg, exasperatingly neutral! Again, as I speak to the intelligentsia I notice the complacency d solid sense of security with which they say, "The mosquito lped us, they're on the move. Such things (South African things") used to happen here. Now they're on the move. e Ikoyi, the civil servants' quarters? Only whites used to live ere. It's all changed now. They're on the move. Nigerian- ation is working. Here you're free to move about, to work here you like. Pity your country is so healthy for them. . . ."

True, the emblem on the flag of the Action Group, the Govern- ent party in the Western Region, is the mosquito. Ikoyi the pride of everybody. Nigerianization, in spite of many fficulties, is moving fast. It is estimated that over 1,000 igerians are studying law, medicine, nursing, dentistry, ngineering, or are in other professions and trades in the nited Kingdom, the U.S.A. and on the Continent. There constant movement of students and qualified men and women etween here and oversea countries. Against the vast popula- on of some 36 million, this number is small. And then none the four regional governments has yet initiated a high- owered literacy campaign or primary and secondary education ith half the requisite intensity. This should be a priority rogramme in any progressive state.

There are problems like tribal and language divisions which n deeper than many people here care to admit. There are orubas, mainly in the Western Region; Ibos, in the East; ausas, in the North; and quite a mixture in the Southern ameroons. The North is the biggest region, with some 18 illion, Islam being the predominant religion there. There e several dialects, much farther apart than our southern rnaculars. Again, West African communities are so feudal at one doesn't know what changes independence will bring the distribution of the country's income. At present the ealth of the country is in the hands of a small minority. overnment members are paid extra-huge salaries and plum owances, while the rest of the civil service groans dis- ntentedly. This is a legacy of the colonial system. The itish Colonial Service has always been the curly-haired boy British administration, and its members seem to have had eir pockets well lined against mosquito bites. So the Africans ve merely jumped into their shoes. It does not seem as if dependence will better the lot of the average worker for a

long time after 1960.

Naturally, the politics of a black nationalist state do not have the turbulent clashes that characterize the South African scene. Government and opposition in each region here tend to quibble about vague differences. The fundamental thing with them is independence. Such a set-up produces a totally different leader from that we are used to among the South African oppressed. The African leader in the South is made by the very conditions that are ranged against him and threaten to crush him. He has (or should have) a more definite and uncompromising basis of struggle. Up here freedom of association, of negotiation, of organization and speech, are abundant. So there is time and place for orthodox politics and an appeal to people's overwhelming religious sense.

Nigerians, generally, are anti-Communist. Their trade unions and political leaders, their press, often speak of removing "Communist elements." A number of people I have met don't have the slightest idea what Communism is—or socialism. They simply have a religious belief that it is something to be rejected. Yet I am also told that people don't starve to death here, because communal living still exercises a powerful influence on Nigerian life, as it does in the rest of Africa.

The students I teach here are much more stable emotionally and mentally. Nothing like the pupils I taught in Johannesburg. They are not harassed by the police, by hunger, by a constantly disintegrating community about them. They are not members of unsettled communities which are forever moving with baggage and all, impotent of any cultural stability. I've taught pupils in Johannesburg who hadn't had a meal for several hours.

All these aspects of Nigerian life strike a South African like me most forcefully. The windmills don't cause me sleepless nights. Still, I do often feel a little impatient at the next fellow who has a more contented disposition than South Africa has ever given me reason to have. I know the therapy of being away from it all will do me good. And that smoulderin anger I mentioned earlier: that will continue. In the meantime, what an exquisite sense of release! No policeman to frighten me; no white man to push me off the pavement; no one calling me "boy", or "Jim" or "John"; no reference book required; no influx or other controls. Just a little tremblin after the nightmare. . . .

THE UNITED STATES AT U.N.O.

WINIFRED F. COURTNEY

Referent on Africa for the United States Divison of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.

iss Marian Anderson, the great American Negro singer, is nown across the world as one of the ablest and most popular ltural ambassadors the United States has sent abroad. In the ewly independent nations she achieved both great personal ccess and warm affection. When Miss Anderson was noted the *New York Times* of November 26, 1958, as having "dis-nted" from her Government's policy as its delegate to the nited Nations Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee, she focussed ief attention on the sad fact that in colonial matters the U.S. otects the supposed interests of NATO and not those of fricans struggling for independence. NATO, says the State epartment privately, must come first.

Now Miss Anderson did not, of course, say "I dissent," ough she surely meant it, for she never took issue with the terpretation of her statement by the New York press. On e morning of November 25 she had, in her official capacity, oposed a delay on an issue concerning the Cameroons too mplex for discussion here. NATO powers were on one side the fence—hers. On the other were the former colonial pendencies led by Ghana and India—supported, as always, the Soviet bloc. One after another the dark-skinned dele-tes and their friends had taken her to task: they were sorry leed to hear such a proposal coming from so distinguished a presentative of the United States.

Miss Anderson must have been stung by the implication that e stood opposed to the interests of dependent peoples. She d perhaps not understood what representing her country on usteeship would mean when she accepted the post as one of e distinguished citizens, annually replaced, with which the S. decorates the U.N. Committees, to be whispered to m behind by wiser heads, and given "position papers" and epared speeches. But she has eyes, ears and a fine intelligence. At any rate, in her firm and beautiful speaking voice and in l knowledge of what she was doing, she said, "There is no e in this room who is more interested in the people whose e we are trying to determine than I. Like many of the repre-ntatives, I am a member of an instructed delegation, and we

are here to carry out what is wanted; otherwise we would not be here."

1958 was a strenuous year for African affairs at U.N. It might almost be called the "African year", said President Maliki of the General Assembly. General de Gaulle had taken radical steps in Africa. Guinea was admitted to U.N. membership with everyone's approval and even France's grudging permission. Premier Olympio of Togoland, independence in his pocket, returned triumphant to a U.N. where he had been for ten years a humble petitioner. Independence for the Cameroons was announced: only Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi will be left of the original ten Trust Territories in 1960. Anti-colonialism was in the majority; not yet two-thirds for the touchy questions, but this was clearly round the corner.

The one important exception in the previous Assembly to the U.S. pro-NATO stand had been on the resolution concerning the treatment of Indians in South Africa, when the U.S. agreed that South Africa should negotiate with India and Pakistan—a position repeated in 1958, colonial powers abstaining.

In 1958 we went one step further. Early in the session George M. Harrison, an American Federation of Labour trade unionist, came out strongly in support of the resolution expressing "regret and concern" at apartheid in South Africa. This reversal of previous positions was noted as far away as the *Detroit Free Press*, a remarkable event in a provincial country such as ours.

This resolution, ably shepherded by India's A. K. Mitra, had been softened to achieve U.S. support, a concession for which Mr. Mitra said he had been much criticized. But it achieved, in plenary Assembly, the record majority of 70—5, with 4 abstentions. Speculation was rife among observers everywhere—was the U.S. at last joining the side of the angels?

She was not, as subsequent voting proved, and the most likely explanation of this happy but isolated aberration was the report (unconfirmed) that Mr. Harrison had declared that if the U.S. were to take any other position, he would not be its mouthpiece. A banner year, if this is true, for non-decorative temporary delegates.

The South West Africa debate this year was hot and heavy, the Fourth Committee being deeply disturbed that even the hint of partition and annexation had appeared in the Good Offices Report. Here there was first a long procedural debate on the question of whether items (a) the Good Offices Committee

eport, (b) social conditions, and (c) legal action to ensure the fillment of the Mandate, should be debated separately or gether. South Africa, rather hopeful, one would guess, but partition and annexation, plumped for "separately": thout, if you please, hearing from those untrustworthy, representative and ill-informed petitioners, Messrs. Scott d Kerina, on the subject of Good Offices. (Mr. Louw quoted *rica South*, referred to as "a certain publication", to indicate r. Kerina's untrustworthiness.) NATO (U.S. included) umped for separately, too, and without petitioners.

But the Fourth Committee was of another mind. Who was to esent the reactions of the submerged South West African oples if not their only authorized representatives? And were rtition and annexation even to be remotely considered thout reference to the appalling social conditions (described the 1958 Report of the Committee on S.W.A.) which e maintained by the power that would administer and annex? ie U.S. and NATO said privately, "Keep them talking, n't shut the door on them!" But keep them talking under ch conditions?

The Committee, by a vote of 45—19 with 9 abstentions, d in effect to Good Offices: "You have not understood what e asked of you, and attempting to discuss your suggestion thin the limits asked would be betrayal of a sacred trust and a lpless people." So it was decided to discuss the items inter-pendently and to hear the petitioners without further ado. Mr. Louw, after suitable shock at the Committee's disre-rd of his warning of "serious consequences" should this p be taken, proposed an adjournment until he should hear m his Government. Four days and a week-end later he nounced the Union's decision to withdraw from this debate ly, somewhat less serious a consequence, one might add, n the previous departure from all debates.

Be it said to her credit, the U.S. joined the Scandinavian bloc inst the other NATO powers in voting to hear the petitioners item (b), a motion won 60—5, 9 abstentions.

Five other resolutions on S.W.A. were passed during the sion. On the tricky ones (1: reject suggestion of partition ile continuing Good Offices Committee for another year; express "deep concern" over social conditions) the U.S. d friends) abstained, in part because of membership on the od Offices Committee.

The remaining resolutions (II: transmit Report on SWA and observations of Fourth Committee to absent petitioners; IV: urge Trusteeship for SWA; V: resume discussion of possible legal action next session) were passed in plenary (as were all on SWA), and received U.S. support.

Michael Scott felt that the outcome—to have one more try at negotiation—meant only another year's delay. He would like to see the question of South Africa's possible violation of her mandate taken to the International Court for compulsory jurisdiction. Since the International Court cannot enforce its decrees, the Fourth Committee has preferred to exhaust all other avenues of approach. Meanwhile the *New York Times* of December 29, 1958, announced that the United States is hoping to help strengthen the Court "to help break the present trend toward making every international dispute a political crisis" and bring about arbitration.

I have dwelt in detail on South and South West Africa because these are complex and crucial questions in the U.N. to which much time was last year devoted. Algeria, an African question equally important, was less diplomatically complex, since no one really believed it would be solved in the U.N. The French Cameroons has been the scene of bloodshed for several years past, but such problems as exist for the banned U.P.C. party will probably achieve some kind of solution with the coming of U.N.-supervised independence. There is a border question between Ethiopia, and about-to-be-independent Somalia; but its solution lies largely between Italy and Ethiopia, and both countries agreed this session to find a mediator. Togoland's approaching independence was unanimously approved, as was U.N attention to Togolese requests for aid.

One other problem, however, needs more than brief discussion. This item bears the innocuous title of "General Questions Relating to the Transmission of Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories," but behind it lie the vast African possessions of Portugal and those of Spain, as yet sealed against international scrutiny. Other colonial powers (Belgium somewhat erratically) submit annual reports to the U.N (Sub-)Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories.

One can now read well-documented reports of forced labour and other indignities imposed on the great majority of Africans in Portuguese Mozambique and Angola, areas supposed to b

cking a colour bar. Prof. Marvin Harris of Columbia Uni-
rsity (New York), a reputable and scholarly visitor to Mozam-
que, has recently found the physical and economic restraints
Africans there similar to those in South Africa. Spain and
ortugal deny that they have any non-self-governing territories,
d claim that their African possessions are "integral parts"
their mainlands.

Since these nations became members of the U.N. in 1955,
e Afro-Asian bloc has each year put through a resolution in
ommittee demanding a U.N. investigation of what constitutes
non-self-governing territory, on which reports should be
ndered. Each year the resolution has been hung up on the
vo-thirds majority requirement in plenary Assembly for
important" questions. The same fate seemed certain for this
ar's resolution after frantic rallying of support by both sides,
spite of Guinea's admission to the U.N. just before the vote.
sponsors thereupon withdrew it rather than suffer another
feat. Privately they feel that by 1960 the requisite majority
ill be theirs in added African membership.

The United States has consistently voted against this resolution in
mpany with NATO, claiming that nations should decide for
emselves whether they have dependencies subject to report.

Other voting (it should be remembered that, almost without
ception, resolutions must have the support of the anti-
lonial majority in order to reach the Assembly at all):

rusteeship Council Report

U.S. and NATO opposed the setting of target dates for the
dependence of Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi.
(Passed in General Assembly by 57—18, but the decision
eans little without U.K. and Belgian support.)

U.S. and NATO opposed the study of the effects of the
uropean Economic Community on certain Trust Territories.
(Passed in General Assembly, 54—15).

U.S. and NATO voted against hearing from petitioner John
le on Ruanda-Urundi. He was heard, 36—23.

on-Self-Governing Territories

U.S. and NATO abstained from a resolution which, consider-
g that the European Economic Community was likely to
ect the economic development of some Trust Territories,
vited "Administering Members to examine the advisability
adopting . . . an investment policy which will ensure balanced
onomic development and the progressive increase of the *per*

capita income of the inhabitants of these territories."

(Passed in General Assembly, 58—5).

U.S. and NATO opposed a resolution asking study of the effects of the European Economic Community on Non-Self-Governing Territories.

(Passed in General Assembly, 55—16).

The U.S. supported renewal of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. The U.K. and three others abstained.

(Passed in General Assembly, 72—1).

Algeria

On the resolution "recognizing the right of the Algerian people to independence" and seeking "negotiations," the U.S. and four NATO nations abstained. This was considered by Algerian nationalists an advance for the U.S., since all colonial powers opposed the resolution. Of NATO, only Greece supported it. France did not participate.

The resolution failed by one vote (35—18; Guinea participating) to achieve the necessary two-thirds Assembly majority.

The U.S. did not speak in the debate.

This, then, is the United States record. Except for apartheid and the occasional mild shot at independent action, how firmly we stuck to our NATO friends.

An allegiance such as this does not go unnoticed. A delegation from the American Committee on Africa returned from the December, 1958, Pan-African Conference of political and labor groups (including many independence movements) at Accra, deeply disturbed at the waning influence of the United States on African thinking. In contrast, the U.S.S.R., which moves into newly independent countries with strong delegations and offers of economic aid, is a rising star.

"What can the United States do to help us?" was the question asked again and again by the not-yet-free.

The portent is clear, and one must speak the language that is understood. Is the alliance with NATO worth the loss of Africa? If Africa goes, what of NATO then? Is it really true that if the U.S. shakes NATO a little by a firm stand on colonial issues, France will go Communist, Britain Socialist? If NATO is synonymous with colonial oppression, is it a profitable alliance for the U.S. to possess in the modern world? It is very nearly too late—for the United States and her allies to face up to the African future.

OWARDS AN AFRICAN LITERATURE
IX: THE TALE OF NONGQAWUSE

DR. A. C. JORDAN
Lecturer in Bantu Languages, University of Cape Town.

ONGQAWUSE is the name of the girl generally held responsible r the "National Suicide of the Xhosa People" in 1856-7. The story her meeting with the "spirits of warriors long dead", of their joining her to tell the chiefs and the people to destroy all their estock and food-stores, of the carrying out of this injunction, and the consequent famine and deaths: all this is told in the records of ssionaries and colonial officials who were working amongst the nosa when these things happened. And all those who are familiar th South African history know it either directly from these cords or from ordinary history books. Yet very few people know at there is an account of this incident, written by an African who as living at this time, to be found in Rubusana's anthology, *Zemk' komo*, and that the author is no other than William W. Gqoba, e historian-poet who has figured so often already in this series. Gqoba was born in 1840, so that at the climax of this calamity he as seventeen years old. At that age, a boy in African primitive society s many social responsibilities, and though he may not be a direct rticipant in tribal councils, he is very well informed as to what kes place there. With its details of people's names, clan- and place-mes, Gqoba's account sounds very authentic, and for this reason e propose to give a faithful translation of its Xhosa original, as the est of the renderings of a story that still lives in the emotions and oughts of the Xhosa people today. We adhere to his own spelling the Xhosa names, many of which are well-known surnames at e present time, spelt as they were spelt by him:—

"THE CAUSE OF THE CATTLE-KILLING AT THE NONGQAUSE PERIOD"[1]
(by W. W. G.)

T so happened that in the Thenjini region of Gcalekaland, in e ward of headman Mnzabele, in the year 1856, two girls went t to the lands to keep the birds away from the corn. One as named Nongqause, daughter of Mhlakaza, and the other e daughter of a sister of Mhlakaza's. Near a river known as e Kamanga two men approached them and said, "*Convey our etings to your people, and tell them we are So-and-So and So-and-*" (giving their names). And the names by which they called emselves turned out to be the names of people who were own to have died long ago. They went on to say: "*You are tell the people that the whole community is about to rise again from*

[1] *emk' lin komo*, pp. 218-225

the dead. Then go on to say to them that all the cattle living now must be slaughtered, for they are reared with defiled hands, as the people handle witchcraft. Say to them there must be no ploughing of lands, rather must the people dig deep pits (granaries), erect new huts, set up wide, strongly built cattlefolds, make milksacks, and weave doors from buka roots. The people must give up witchcraft on their own, not waiting until they are exposed by the witchdoctors. You are to tell them that these are the words of their chiefs—the words of Napakade (Forever), the son of Sifubasibanzi (the Broad-chested).''

''On reaching home the girls reported this, but no one would listen to them. Everybody ridiculed them instead. On the following day they went again to keep the birds away from the corn, and after some time, these men appeared again and asked if the girls had told the people at home, and what the people had said in reply. The girls reported that their message had simply been a thing of laughter, no one believing them. ''The people simply said we were telling stories''. This happened in Gcaleka-land, near the mouth of the Gxara.

''The men then said, '*Say to the elders that they are to call all the chiefs together from Gcaleka's, Tato's, Ngqika's and from the Gqunukhwebe, and they must tell this news to them.*'

''On the following morning, Mhlakaza and some other men went to the lands, but these strangers did not reveal themselves. They were heard without being seen. It was only Nongqause and the other girl who heard them, and it was Nongqause who interpreted what was being said by the spirits. They said, '*Tell those men to go and call the chiefs and bring them here. Only then shall we reveal ourselves.*'

''Some men then went to Rili's royal place at the Hohita, and there the strange news was related by Mhlakaza's daughter. Then Rili sent out Botomani, a minor chief, to go and verify this thing. Botomani went, but the strangers did not reveal themselves. Then Rili sent messengers to tell the chiefs that there were people who had been heard by Mhlakaza's daughter to say all the chiefs must be called together to meet the chief Napakade, son of Sifubasibanzi, near the mouth of the Gxara.

''From Tato's came Maramnco, son of Fadana, accompanied by Shwele, son of Zizi. From the Ndungwanas came Dlulaze, son of Qwesha, related to Ndarala. From the Tshatshus came Mpeke, son of Mfeneni. From the Ngqika section came Namba, great son of Maqoma. From the Gcaleka section came Rili and Lindinxiwa, sons of Hintsa, together with Ngubo, son of

she, and Nxiti, son of Lutshaba. From the Ndlambes came vawe, son of Ndlambe. From the Gqunukhwebe came ma, son of Pato. All these men made their way to the home of akaza near the Gxara.

On arriving there, they were told that Nongqause desired the numbers to go to the Gxara be reduced, and that those who were to go must be mostly chiefs. This in truth was done.

'As the people were rather fearful, it happened that as they w near the River Kamanga, their throats went dry, and they thirsty. Meanwhile Nongqause, beautifully painted with red re, led the way. Then those who were thirsty were heard to 'Is one who is thirsty allowed to drink?'

'Nongqause replied, 'He who does not practise witchcraft drink without fear.'

'Thereupon Dilima, hero-son of Pato, removed his kaross and oped to drink. Then one by one the other men of *Nomagwayi e Mbo*[2] followed suit.''

THE VISION

'Just at this time, there was a tremendous crash of big lders breaking loose from the cliffs overlooking the head-ers of the River Kamanga, whereupon the men gazed at another wondering, for they were seized with fear. It med as if some unknown thing on the cliffs was going to burst flame.

'While they stood wondering, the girl was heard saying, st cast your eyes in the direction of the sea'.

'And when they looked intently at the waters of the sea, eemed as if there were people there in truth, and there were nds as if bulls were bellowing, and oxen too. There was a e, formless black object that came and went, came and went, finally vanished over the crests of the waves of the sea.

'Then it was that all the people began to believe.

'The army in the sea never came out to meet the chiefs, and n what they said was not heard by any one besides Nongqause. er it had vanished, she said, '*The Chiefs yonder say you are to rn to your homes and slaughter all your cattle and, in order that resurrection may hasten, you are not to rear any cattle. You are to plough your lands, but make big new pits (granaries), and these will suddenly find full of corn. Erect new huts and make many doors. yourselves in your huts, because on the eighth day, when the*

[2] Xhosa people's praise-name.

community returns in the company of Napakade, son of Sifubasibanzi, all the beasts on the land and in the rivers, and all the snakes will be roaming the land. You are also to take all the old corn out of the pits and throw it away. In order to survive, you are to use many doors to close each hut, fasten every door tightly, and abstain from witchcraft."

"She went on to say that there was another chief, mounted on a grey horse. His name was Grey, otherwise known as Satan. All those who did not slaughter their cattle would become the subjects of the chief named Satan, and such people would not see the glory of our own chief, Napakade, son of Sifubasibanzi.

"That then was the cause of the cattle-killing of 1856 to 1857.

"In the midst of this, there appeared another young girl from the house of Nkwitshi of the Kwemta clan, in the Ndlambe section near the Mpongo. Her name was Nonkosi. The message of this girl was one with Nongqause's. She used to lead the people to a pond there at the Mpongo, and they used to see *abakweta* dancing on the surface of the water, and they thought that they heard the thudding of the ox-hide, accompanied by a song, to which the *bakweta*[3] danced. Truly, the people were so deluded that they went as far as to claim that they had seen the horns of cattle, heard the lowing of milk-cows, the barking of dogs, and the songs of the herdsmen at milking-time.

THE ORDERS OF THE CHIEFS

"On reaching their homes, the chiefs assembled their subjects and made known the news of the ancestors who were expected to return to life, fresh and strong, of the promised coming-to-life-again of the cattle they were about to slaughter and of those that they had slaughtered long ago.

"Nongqause had said that anyone who, on slaughtering his ox decided to dispose of its carcass by barter, should nevertheless engage its soul, in order that on its coming back to life it should be his property. And she had said that all those who did not slaughter their cattle would be carried by a fierce hurricane and thrown into the sea to drown and die.

"The community was split in two. One section believed that the resurrection of the people would come some day, but not that of the cattle. Thereupon, father fell out with son, brother with brother, chief with subjects, relative with relative. Two names emerged to distinguish the two groups. One group was

[3]Boys at "initiation school", whose bodies are painted with white clay. Their spectacular dance (*umtshilo*) is accompanied by a rhythmic beating of dried ox-hides and singing by women.

ed *ama Tamba* (the Submissive), that is, Nongqause's converts. other was called *amaGogotya* (the Unyielding), that is, those were stubborn and would not kill their cattle. So some ghtered their cattle, and others did not.

THE EIGHTH DAY

As the killing of the cattle went on, those who had ghtered hurriedly for fear of being smelt out began to starve had to live by stealing the livestock of others. Then every- y looked forward to the eighth day. It was the day on which sun was expected to rise red, and to set again in the sky. n there would follow great darkness, during which the ple would shut themselves in their huts. Then the dead ld rise and return to their homes, and then the light of day ld come again.

On that day the sun rose as usual. Some people had washed r eyes with sea-water at the mouth of the Buffalo. Some red outside through little apertures in their huts, while e who had never believed went about their daily outdoor s. Nothing happened. The sun did not set, no dead person e back to life, and not one of the things that had been pre- ed came to pass.

Such then was the Nongqause catastrophe. The people died unger and disease in large numbers. Thus it was that when- thereafter a person said an unbelievable thing, those who rd him said, 'You are telling a Nongqause tale'."

BELLA

MARIANNE NORDFORS

FROM the day Bella first came to us we were struck by the iron of her name. Some Boer forefather had bequeathed to her he muscular, broadhipped frame, but everything else wa exaggeratedly Hottentot: the full posterior, the heavy breast bulging under the calico, the moonshaped face with its thic lips and nose all nostrils, the short, fuzzy hair. Her eyes turne on the world a liquid, vacant stare, and when she spoke it wa in a piping treble that issued grotesquely from her great hulk Most of the time she was pregnant, and we knew that sh supported three illegitimate children, all by different fathers who lived with her mother somewhere in Hottentot' Holland. Her fourth, a boy, was born one night in our backroom For a few months he existed somewhere in the slums of Cap Town, a misshapen little creature with a huge, nodding hea clothed in a dirty bonnet, and a weak, sickly whine. When t her relief he died of tubercular meningitis, it did not preven her from straightaway being with child again. Sex was her onl pleasure.

For a year she moved about our house, dusting, scrubbing washing, cooking, her motherliness surrounding her like a aura with its smell of milk, its curves and bulges of comfortin flesh. She served us with the same unquestioning faithfulnes she reserved for her good-for-nothing boy friend and her childre in the country. She spent all her wages on her dependents an never complained or asked for a rise.

Then one day her prospects altered. We took in a rich lodge from Johannesburg, an invalid lady, who moved into our fron bedroom with all the fuss and ceremony becoming to he pampered state. She announced her arrival by telegram, the kept us waiting and finally descended on us with a battery trunks, suitcases and bags, which we had great difficulty i storing in the attic. At our invitation she joined us in the parlou where she sat taking small, reluctant sips of our best coffee a refusing the cake because of her diet. The whole family h gathered to see her, and I think we were all equally disappointe She was a widow of about sixty-five with a large face but ve little forehead. Her thick, rheumatic fingers sparkled wi diamonds, but the rings a fond husband had given her in form

had dug deep into the flesh and formed unwieldy creases
. Her whole body creaked with stays and it seemed as
gh the bulges had thus been painfully depressed into the
which were swollen as with dropsy, the feet being
ezed into black old ladies' shoes. She sat there and sipped
talked on and on in a voice that seemed to come through a
of bubbling porridge and never changed its complaining
n. As she had nothing else to do, it became her custom thus
ore us daily, discoursing about her health, the way she had
betrayed by her friends, her two dead daughters, paragons
eauty and virtue and very, very high up in society. Her name
Mrs. Norton.

aving so little to recommend her she had long ago picked up
trick of impressing people with her opulence and bribing
n into friendship with promises of gifts and remembrances
ier will.

You're a likely young girl," she used to say when it was my
to see to her. "If you'll be my companion you won't be
. I'm really quite easy to get on with," she added, "and I
no heirs."

nd her crafty old eyes twinkled and appraised me.

ich blandishments she also used on my mother and my school-
brothers, John and Harry. But her only victim was Bella.
ne poor thing had of course been as excited as any of us at
prospect of having a millionaire in our midst and had with
, round eyes watched the arrival of the lady from the
nen door. Once installed in her room, Mrs. Norton immedi-
pounced on her.

And what is your name, my dear?"

Bella," piped the giantess in her thin treble.

Well, Bella, you just look after me nicely and you won't
by me, you know. There's more for a good girl where that
es from."

nd she pressed a pound note into the maid's bewildered

.

his was only the beginning of a long series of presents and
that flowed from Mrs. Norton's purse into the maid's
n, and Bella, her simple human greed aroused, danced quick
dance. She did not neglect us, of course, but always kept
ar cocked for the slightest sound from Mrs. Norton. The
Lady in her golden splendour was flattered by the dumb
ration, and Bella was in and out of her room, where she

kept her precious pound notes in stacks in an open cupboar and counted them and made them grow by clever manipulation on the stock market. It was strange that a woman so shrew in financial matters should not believe in banks, but so it was

"I like to keep my cash about me," she declared when w warned her. "It comforts me, you know."

But she did not know that Bella's eyes flew to the cupboar whenever she came in.

The sequel was, of course, inevitable. A change came ove Bella, who began to look quite bold in a furtive sort of way. Th boy friend gave up all pretence of looking for work and lounge all day in her room, smoking one cigarette after another. Th children in the country came up to see their mother, decked ou in all the pale pink finery her vulgar taste could invent. An Bella herself spent her afternoons off in town on all sorts o errands, revealed in the cloud of cheap perfume that hun around her and in the new silk undies and nylon stockings tha decorated the washing line. She began to go to the pictures, an sang garbled versions of the latest hits shrilly and tunelessly a she moved about the house.

Mother had taken the children to the country for the holidays when the storm broke. Mrs. Norton discovered tha ten pounds were missing from her hoard. Red and tremblin she burst into my room.

"It's that girl!" she exclaimed, hoarse with unleashed hatre "That's what you get from being kind to these people. Think all the presents I gave her. Why, only the other day she g those woollen knickers that had shrunk in the wash! You know the black ones. But they're all the same. No sense of gratitud They bite the hand that feeds them. They ought to be ke short. Bread and water is too good for them."

She was so beside herself that I thought she might have stroke, but actually she enjoyed the sense of injury that promis to give content to at least a few of her empty days. Natural she went to the police at once and came back most disappoint when she was told that she had to provide evidence for h accusations.

"She's spent it all, of course," she complained, "but I get the better of her yet."

I advised her to put her money in a safer place, but with sniff the irate lady sailed out of the room, pausing just lo enough to say "Wait and see!" in a dark and foreboding to

ice.

r a long time nothing happened except that Mrs. Norton enly made friends with Mrs. Smith next door. This harm- garrulous little woman was the widow of a post office clerk, had left her with a pension, a tiny house and many children arious simple walks of life. She went about in slippers, ed tea six times a day and knitted pullovers for her grand- ren. Her family, illness and a little gossip was the whole it of her conversation, and she had formerly been quite v Mrs. Norton's notice. Now there were endless visits to fro. Confidences were exchanged, knitting-needles clacked on Mrs. Smith's black bosom there appeared a big jade ch. I never bothered much about their chatter, and it er surprised nor disturbed me that Bella's name so often ed in it. I could only not quite understand what drew the adies to each other. It was quite simple: Mrs. Smith had a hone.

r in her sleepless, rheumatic nights Mrs. Norton had worked he campaign that was to lead to Bella's downfall and give he revenge her vanity so dearly craved. It was really quite ghtforward, the stratagem of the baited trap, but it required ccomplice who could provide a lookout at a neighbouring ow and instant access to the police.

ost of her money she now carried to the bank, but a sub- ial wad remained in the cupboard, all harmless and open he view. No one could know that she kept a list of the bers and checked it carefully whenever the maid had been in the room. Every morning when it was time to tidy up would call out to Mrs. Smith in a voice that was intended rry all over the house.

Are you free, dear? Do you mind if I come over for a cup a?''

en the two old women would take up their posts at the er window just opposite her own and watch every move- behind the curtain with the twitching excitement of ing cats.

ter a few weeks of this pleasurable occupation their patience rewarded. Bella was seen to open and close the cupboard and to slip quietly out to the back. A check showed that a d note was missing, the telephone rang and within a few tes the police were there.

llowing the first incredulous shock at this almost magic

appearance of retribution, the maid wept and gesticulated shrilly protesting her innocence to God and an interested knot gaping bystanders, her cries mingling with the furious accusations of Mrs. Norton, who, with arms akimbo, egged on the constables with all the fervour of a fan at a football match. Silence fell only when the servant's room was searched. The boy friend emerged, pale and slightly drunk on dagga, which dangerous and forbidden drug was found inside in considerable quantities. A close inspection of the bed brought to light the pound note, a yellow family snap and a tattered, rather garish print of Jesus blessing the poor. These were hidden under the mattress.

Bella realized that the game was up. She lifted her eyes and studied Mrs. Norton, standing on the doorstep like an overblown idol of justice.

"You dirty white bitch!" she said.

Then without another word she followed the policemen to the Black Maria, accompanied by a stream of triumphant vituperation from her conqueror, for whom this incident provided a subject for conversation for many weeks to come.

The last news we had of Bella was a few days later, when Mrs. Norton returned from the Magistrate's Court, where she had witnessed against her. She entered the parlour, her face flushed from the excitement of the day, and sat down without taking off her big, black hat with the ostrich feathers.

"She got three months," she pronounced with satisfaction. "Jail will take the kick out of her.—They shave their heads there, I'm told."



BOOK REVIEWS

Stride Toward Freedom by Martin Luther King, Jr. New York: Harper, 1958. 230 pp. $2.95.

Conquest of Violence: The Ghandian Philosophy of Conflict by Joan V. Bondurant. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. 269 pp. $5.00.

s paradoxical that on the very continent—Africa—where ıandas Gandhi conceived his method of non-violent direct on, or satyagraha, there should be a debate today on its efficacy. only did Gandhi "discover" his method in the early years he twentieth century while working for the rights of his w Indians in Durban and Johannesburg, but there has been nt wide-scale employment of non-violent resistance in ca, especially against racism in Northern Rhodesia and nialism in the Gold Coast. Most extensively in Africa the dhian method was used in the defiance campaign against unjust apartheid laws during 1952-53; while a more success- effort in non-violent non-co-operation was the 1957 boycott he buses from Alexandra to Johannesburg, during which oo Africans walked—and won their limited objectives.

andhism has, of course, flourished in other continents. greatest success was in the liberation of India; and since 7, Gandhian methods have been used within India by Indians nst their own government, and by Indians against Portugal in mass satyagraha on the border of Goa in 1954 and 1955. agraha has also been used in an attempt to change the foreign cy of governments. The crew of *Golden Rule* sailed toward Pacific nuclear testing area during the spring of 1958 in a dhian protest. In Nevada in August 1957, and in England ecember 1958, pacifists participated in non-violent protests nst nuclear tests and missile bases.

America Gandhism was consciously used to lessen racial

discrimination in the northern states as early as 1941, throug the Committee of Racial Equality (CORE). But the mo spectacular American use of Gandhism has undoubtedly bee the Montgomery bus protest, led by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr in Alabama from late 1955 to early 1957. Dr. King has recentl published an autobiographical account of this struggle.

Mohandas Gandhi was a voluminous writer and he compose a whole volume on "Satyagraha in South Africa" (1928). H various editorials on this subject have been collected in th two-volume work, "Non-Violence in Peace and War" (1944 1949) and in "Satyagraha: Non-Violent Resistance" (1951) Gandhi was not, however, a systematic theorist, and othe have assumed the task of evaluating his method. One of the firs to do so was the American lawyer, Richard Gregg, in "Th Power of Non-Violence" (1934). Another significant contribu tion is R. R. Diwakar's "Satyagraha: Its Technique and History (1946). Recently Dr. Joan V. Bondurant, an American studen of Indian affairs, in "Conquest of Violence", has written a important schematic account of the Gandhian technique primarily as used during Gandhi's lifetime in India.

An analysis of Dr. King's campaign in Montgomery, usin some of the insights suggested by Dr. Bondurant, may contai important lessons for the African scene. Gandhi used to sa that a non-violent army, like a violent one, needed to paus occasionally before regrouping for the final battle.

The Montgomery campaign began on December 1, 1955, an act of civil disobedience when a Negro woman without pr meditation refused to move to the "Negro" section of a publ bus, and was arrested for breaking the segregation laws. Th Negroes in Montgomery responded by refusing to ride the bus and launching a one-day protest with three minimum objective to lessen discourteous treatment of Negro bus passengers; lessen, but not eliminate, segregation of Negro passengers buses; and to force the eventual employment of Negroes as b drivers on predominantly "Negro" routes. The initial no co-operation was surprisingly such a success, however, that th Negroes decided that they would stay off the buses until the minimum demands were fully met.

The Montgomery Improvement Association was formed a Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., a young Baptist minister, elect president. Holding weekly mass meetings in churches, part in lieu of its own radio programme or other means of communi

the Association elicited the almost complete support of 50,000 Negroes in Montgomery, and few, if any, Negroes the buses. While many walked long distances daily to and work, the Association set up a parallel transportation em, first with Negro-owned taxicabs and later with 300 ate automobiles arranged in a travel pool. The Association ived no direct help or support from Montgomery's White munity, but gained increasing support from Whites and roes around the United States (and the world), so that a e percentage of the total cost of $250,000 for the transporta- system came from outside Montgomery.

While the Negroes of Montgomery leaned heavily on non- peration, they also knew that federal law, if not local and e law, was increasingly on their side. Scrapping their initial ands, they went to federal court to challenge bus segregation ctly, continuing to avoid the buses. They won the court and their victory was sustained by the U.S. Supreme Court. he meantime, the Montgomery segregationists used every hod of intimidation: rumour, defamation, harassment by ce, mass arrests (for conspiracy to boycott), and violence. ro churches and the homes of Negro leaders, including Dr. g's, were bombed; though, fortunately, not a single White or ro was killed. The Association constantly disciplined the ro people never to use violence—and the Negroes almost er did. Dr. King told irate neighbours when his own home bombed: "We cannot solve this problem through retaliatory ence. We must meet violence with non-violence." The ociation on the eve of integration prepared its members, ugh role-playing techniques, for every eventuality, including ence, on the desegregated buses. And less than 13 months n its beginning, the campaign ended in success. The Negroes e the buses, sitting wherever they chose.

he Montgomery campaign can be briefly compared to the 2-53 defiance campaign in South Africa. The Montgomery rt was impromptu, not premeditated as the 1952-53 South can campaign. The Alabama objective was limited, even n the Montgomery Association changed its goal from semi- egated seating in the buses to fully-integrated seating. The th African objective was greater—against the apartheid laws erally. The Montgomery campaign was limited to one city, n a population of less than 150,000 (of whom 50,000 were roes), while the South African campaign covered a whole

nation and involved, potentially, millions of non-Whites (an a few Whites) from a wide area. It was, however, more inter racial than the Montgomery protest, with which only a singl prominent White leader (the minister of an all-Negro church in the whole city identified himself. The Montgomery Associa tion was based on non-co-operation, but used the federal law which was on its side. The South Africa protest was based o civil disobedience.

In Montgomery, a single leader—Martin Luther King, Jr.— arose from the Negro clergy and almost overnight became powerful and formidable symbol. In South Africa, the to leadership of the campaign was more diffuse and no one perso emerged. In Montgomery, virtually all of the Negroes in th community participated in the protest—and could refuse t co-operate without grave sacrifices of job or risk of imprison ment. In South Africa, only a fraction of the non-Whites part cipated in the effort, and those who did were imprisoned an often additionally victimised. In neither campaign was ther the equivalent of what Gandhi called a constructive programm during the civil disobedience or non-co-operation or alternatin with it. In Montgomery, however, most of the Negroes di

Prejudice . . .

"In order to hate collectively one has to have a simplified schema of the enemy; one has to keep away from any personal individual encounter with him, because that might humanise the relationship . . . .

No group can remain psychologically integrated by a mere sense of danger from the outside. The forces of hostility and fear, if added up, would parallel the force of the atom-bomb. There is only one thing that is stronger; that is love."

from Group Psychology in the Atomic Era, by KARL STERN, leading American Psychiatrist, in a contribution to

WORLD CRISIS AND THE CATHOLIC 12/6 net

"As a charitable and temperate plea for the revival of Christian Humanism, it reaches out beyond the critical times in which we live, towards a constructive future."

—THE TIMES

SHEED AND WARD

icipate daily in the campaign, negatively by refusing to use buses and positively by using parallel transportation facilities; e was no such opportunity for participation by the mass of non-Europeans in South Africa.

h Montgomery the Negroes remained non-violent, despite it provocations of violence by White segregationists. In t Elizabeth, East London, and other centres, there was asional violence; and while the presumption is strong that violence was instigated by the police and *agents provocateurs*, picture is morally blurred. In Montgomery the police were neutral; they harassed the Negroes, but they were not sually "trigger-happy." There were few legal methods lable to them in order to put the Negro leadership out of ulation. In South Africa, the police were also on the side of rtheid, but there were available to them laws for going ond the harassment of the resisters. Thus imprisonment and ing were constantly employed. In Montgomery, or more en, outside the area, scepticism wilted at the calm persistent fering of the Negroes through disciplined non-violence. And Montgomery Negroes themselves underwent a miraculous nsformation. They became overnight new people with confi- ce and courage, despite nine previous decades of meagre gress against segregation since slavery. In South Africa, there ttle evidence that the hearts of any great number of Europeans he country were moved. In view of the sudden falling off of campaign, the morale of the non-Europeans themselves probably not permanently enhanced. However, the increased ty among many Africans, Indians, Coloureds, and a few Whites no inconsequential by-product of the campaign.

s non-violent resistance a technique which can only be cessfully used by Indians, or can it be used by persons of ous religious and cultural backgrounds? Is there something inctively Hindu about it? Gandhi denied that there was, ough he admittedly based satyagraha partly on the Hindu ptures. He wrote that he was also influenced by the Christian ptures, especially the New Testament, and by the writings both Tolstoy and Thoreau. Martin Luther King admits the ng Christian element in the Montgomery movement: rist furnished the spirit and motivation, while Gandhi ished the method." One can tentatively conclude that, in shrinking world, satyagraha need not be confined to Hindus, appeals to persons with the most varied religious back

grounds, or none. This holds for persons who use the metho and also for persons toward whom it is used. Thus there is n doubt that this method can continue to be used in Africa.

Do the participants in satyagraha have to believe in it as a way of life, or just as a political method? Gandhi, of course hoped for the former, but many of his co-workers were attracte to satyagraha for purely pragmatic reasons. Even Jawaharla Nehru believed in satyagraha more as a method than as an end i itself. Pyarelal, Gandhi's secretary, affirmed: "It *is* possible t run a satyagraha campaign with people who have no faith i non-violence as a creed provided they sincerely and implicitl follow the rules as a discipline and work under the leadershi of unadulterated non-violence."

Were the campaigns in Montgomery in 1955-57 and i South Africa in 1952-53 Gandhian in the classical sense? A non-violent campaign which "fails" might well be Gandhian while one that "succeeds" might not. Dr. Bondurant and Dr N. K. Bose of Calcutta have suggested nine fundamental rule of satyagraha: self-reliance at all times, initiative in the hand of the satyagrahis, propagation of the objective and tactics of th

Encounter

Edited by STEPHEN SPENDER and MELVIN J. LASKY

Interested in current affairs, sociology, travel, literature, the arts? If so, you should certainly be reading ENCOUNTER—'by far the most vital and immediate of the English literary magazines', as a reviewer recently described it.

With some 60,000 words in each monthly issue and a brilliant team of writers, ENCOUNTER gives truly marvellous value. Contributors so far this year include Bertrand Russell, Arthur Koestler, R. H S. Crossman, D. W. Brogan, W. H. Auden, Alastair Buchan, Harold Nicolson, Rosamond Lehmann, C. V. Wedgwood, and George Kennan.

You can order a year's subscription (£2 or $7.50, post free) through your newsagent or directly from ENCOUNTER, 25 Haymarket, London S.W.1.

paign, reduction of demands to a minimum consistent with
n, progressive advancement of the movement, examination
veaknesses, persistent search for avenues of co-operation
the adversary on honorable terms, refusal to surrender
ntials in negotiation, and insistence upon full agreement on
lamentals before accepting a settlement. Both the Mont-
ery and the South African efforts appear to fall generally
in these rules. Gandhi in his lifetime also laid down a code
liscipline for those participating in satyagraha: harbour no
r, but suffer the anger of the opponent and refuse to return
ults; do not submit to any order given in anger, even though
re punishment is threatened for disobeying; refrain from
lts and swearing; protect opponents from insult and attack,
at the risk of life; do not resist arrest nor the attachment of
perty; refuse to surrender any property held in trust at the
of life; if taken prisoner, behave in an exemplary manner;
member of a satyagraha unit, obey the orders of satyagraha
lers, and resign from the unit in the event of serious disagree-
nt; and do not expect guarantees for maintenance of depend-
. Again, this code appears to have been basically adhered to
both leaders and participants in Montgomery and South
ica.

Dr. Bondurant also enumerates the steps of a satyagraha
paign. These are nine in number: negotiation and arbitra-
, preparation of the group for direct action, agitation,
ing of an ultimatum, economic boycott and forms of strike,
-co-operation, civil disobedience, usurping of the functions
government, and parallel government. These steps differ
rally with the differing objectives of various satyagraha
paigns. If there is a substantial modification of these steps,
omission or commission, the resultant method might not
rue Gandhism, however non-violent. For example, the lack
constructive programme during the South African effort
the appeal to the law courts during the Momtgomery cam-
n may have been legitimate in themselves, but may have
ously taken both campaigns away from the Gandhian norm.
Indians have used the term, 'duragraha,' for a method of
born persistence which, because of principle or process,
short of satyagraha. Bondurant observes that "duragraha,
violence, may well succeed in achieving limited objectives"
"not every movement is *ipso facto* satyagraha merely because
voids physically violent resistance."

Is Gandhism effective under totalitarianism? Is this a method which can only be used under more or less democratic forms of government? Gandhi repeatedly asserted that satyagraha speaks to the best in all men, whether Nazis, Communists, or racists. He felt that the British were far from "democratic" in their treatment of Indians. He also suggested that the Jews use satyagraha against the Nazis. The method has been used, but so far without visible success, against totalitarian Portugal in Goa. Commander Stephen King-Hall, a British military writer, in "Defence in the Nuclear Age" (1958) has suggested that non-violent resistance—not nuclear weapons—be the principal means of defence of the British Isles against any invasion.

Certain aspects of satyagraha could be undertaken with extraordinary difficulty under totalitarianism. In Montgomery, as in Madras, publicity was possible during the campaigns. In Moscow or in Durban, all sources of publicity could be cut off. But the virus of non-violent rebellion—and discipline—could surely spread without radio or newspapers as it did in parts of Scandinavia during World War II. In Momtgomery, as in Johannesburg, only a few White persons seemed to be moved as the non-Whites suffered. Dr. King affirms: "The non-violent approach does not immediately change the heart of the oppressor. It first does something to the hearts and souls of those committed to it. It gives them new self-respect; it calls up resources of strength and courage that they did not know they had. Finally it reaches the opponent and so stirs his conscience that reconciliation becomes a reality." Certainly Gandhism even under totalitarianism can engender self-respect amongst the victims of injustice. But can it go beyond and effect the totalitarian hearts of the oppressors? No categorical answer can be given here. But what are the alternatives? Did the alternative of violence "work" for the Jews in Nazi Germany or for the Hungarians more recently under Russian occupation? Are there immediate alternatives for the non-Europeans in South Africa except satyagraha? Dr. Bondurant writes that "had the Jews offered satyagraha against the Nazi regime, their losses could scarcely have been greater they should have, moreover, mobilized world opinion behind them much more rapidly than they did." She adds that the chances of success of non-violent resistance "are certainly as great as are the chances for violent revolution under the modern police-state system".

HOMER A. JACK

American writer on Asian-African affairs

SPONSORS

ITH AFRICAN

GARET BALLINGER M.P. *Native Representative.*
TOR W. BALLINGER *Native Representative.*
BUTLER *Poet and Professor, Rhodes University.*
DAVIDOFF *Former Labour Member of Parliament.*
RICK DUNCAN *Journalist.*
DL HARRIS *Professor, University of the Witwatersrand.*
EN HELLMANN *Ex President, Institute of Race Relations.*
X HEPPLE *Former Leader, Parliamentary Labour Party.*
V. HOERNLÉ *Ex President, Institute of Race Relations.*
KUPER *Professor, University of Natal.*
EE-WARDEN M.P. *Native Representative.*
LOVELL *Former Labour Member of Parliament.*
F A. J. LUTULI *President-General of the African National Congress.*
. MACQUARRIE *Ex Native Education Inspector.*
IFRED MAXWELL *Professor, Rhodes University.*
E MCPHERSON *Chairman S.A. Labour Party, Ex Mayor of Johannesburg.*
G. M. NAICKER *President of the Natal Indian Congress.*
DAN K. NGUBANE *Journalist.*
N PATON *Author of "Cry the Beloved Country."*
RT. REV. R. A. REEVES *Bishop of Johannesburg.*
TOR LESLIE RUBIN *Native Representative.*
E WELSH *Writer, Economics Lecturer.*

TISH AND EUROPEAN

L DAVIDSON *Writer.*
MAS EDWARD DRIBERG *Journalist, Lecturer, Broadcaster.*
TOR GOLLANCZ *Publisher, Writer.*
GRIMOND, M.P. *Leader of the British Liberal Party.*
N HATCH *Writer.*
HER TREVOR HUDDLESTON *Master of Novices, Community of the Resurrection, Mirfield.*
NETH KIRKWOOD *Rhodes Professor of Race Relations, Oxford.*
IN LEGUM *Journalist.*
HON. A. CREECH JONES P.C., M.P. *Ex Secretary of State for the Colonies.*
GSLEY MARTIN *Editor, New Statesman and Nation.*
OLAS NABOKOV, *Secretary-General of the Congress for Cultural Freedom.*
N ROSS *Writer.*
HEN SPENDER, *Poet and Co-Editor of "Encounter".*
REV. DONALD O. SOPER *Methodist Leader.*
RT. REV. JOHN LEONARD WILSON *Bishop of Birmingham.*

MERICAN

GER N. BALDWIN *Chairman, International League for the Rights of Man.*
E BOLIN *Judge, New York City.*
N WYCK BROOKS *Author and Critic.*
ROTHY DUNBAR BROMLEY *Writer and Radio Moderator.*
KENNETH B. CLARK *Race Relations Psychologist.*
IS FISHER *Author and Journalist.*
N GUNTHER *Author and Journalist.*
REV. DONALD HARRINGTON *Chairman, American Committee on Africa.*
Minister, Community Church of New York.
REV. MARTIN LUTHER KING *President, Montgomery Improvement Association.*
URGOOD MARSHALL *Special Counsel to the N.A.A.C.P.*
BENJAMIN E. MAYS *President, Morehouse College.*
BI ISRAEL MOWSHOWITZ, PH.D. *American Jewish Leader*
REINHOLD NIEBUHR *Writer and Theologian.*
REV. WALTER P. OFFUTT *Assitant Secretary, Protestant Council.*
RIGHT REV. JAMES A. PIKE *Bishop of California.*
TOR G. REUTHER *International Affairs Director, United Automobile Workers.*
ANOR ROOSEVELT *U.S. Statesman.*
RMAN M. THOMAS *American Socialist Leader.*

l correspondence to be addressed to the Editor, Ronald M. Segal, P.O. Box 1039, Cape Town, South Africa.

Branch offices:

NITED KINGDOM: Miss R. Ainslie, 31A John Adam Street, London, W.C.2.
NITED STATES OF AMERICA: Mrs. S. Pauley, 320 West 87th Street, New York City.
EST AFRICA: Mr. E. Mphahlele, Dept. of Extra-Mural Studies, University College, Ibadan, Nigeria.

NTED IN THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA BY PIONEER PRESS (PTY.) LTD., CAPE TOWN, AND LISHED BY THE PROPRIETORS, AFRICA SOUTH PUBLICATIONS (PTY.) LTD., NEW BRIDGE COURT, KOEBERG ROAD, MAITLAND, CAPE.